Saturday, September 25, 2010

Married or no, women maintenance a must- Deserted long-term live-in partner entitled to support, says SC


Married or no, women maintenance a must - Deserted long-term live-in partner entitled to support, says apex court

FULL TEXT
                                                    REPORTABLE





                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION





                CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010

       (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15071 of 2009)





Chanmuniya                                     ..Appellant(s)





                           Versus





Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr.           ..Respondent(s)





                        J U D G M E N T





GANGULY, J.





1. Leave granted.





2. One   Sarju   Singh   Kushwaha   had   two   sons,   Ram   Saran


  (elder   son)   and   Virendra   Kumar   Singh   Kushwaha



  (younger   son   and   the   first   respondent).   The



  appellant,   Chanmuniya,   was   married   to   Ram   Saran   and



  had   2   daughters-Asha,   the   first   one,   was   born   in





                                1


  1988   and   Usha,   the   second   daughter,   was   born   in



  1990. Ram Saran died on 7.03.1992.





3. Thereafter,   the   appellant   contended   that   she   was


  married   off   to   the   first   respondent   as   per   the



  customs   and   usages   prevalent   in   the   Kushwaha



  community   in   1996.   The   custom   allegedly   was   that



  after   the   death   of   the   husband,   the   widow   was



  married   off   to   the   younger   brother   of   the   husband.



  The appellant was married off in accordance with the



  local   custom   of   Katha   and   Sindur.   The   appellant



  contended   that   she   and   the   first   respondent   were



  living   together   as   husband   and   wife   and   had



  discharged   all   marital   obligations   towards   each



  other.   The   appellant   further   contended   that   after



  some time the first respondent started harassing and



  torturing the appellant, stopped her maintenance and



  also   refused   to   discharge   his   marital   obligations



  towards her.





4. As a result, she initiated proceedings under Section


  125   of   the   Cr.P.C.   for   maintenance   (No.20/1997)





                                2


  before   the   1st  Additional   Civil   Judge,   Mohamadabad,



  Ghazipur. This proceeding is pending.   





5. She   also   filed   a   suit   (No.42/1998)   for   the


  restitution   of   conjugal   rights   under   Section   9   of



  the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955   in   the   Court   of   1st



  Additional District Judge, Ghazipur. 





6. The  Trial Court  decreed the  suit for  restitution of


  conjugal   rights   in   favour   of   the   appellant   on



  3.1.2004 as it was of the opinion that the appellant



  had   remarried   the   first   respondent   after   the   death



  of   Ram   Saran,   and   the   first   respondent   had   deserted



  the   appellant   thereafter.   Thus,   it   directed   the



  first   respondent   to   live   with   the   appellant   and



  perform his marital duties.





7. Hence, the first respondent preferred a first appeal


  (No.110/2004) under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage



  Act.   The   main   issue   in   appeal   was   whether   there   was



  any   evidence   on   record   to   prove   that   the   appellant



  was the legally wedded wife of the first respondent.





                                 3


  The   High   Court   in   its   judgment   dated   28.11.2007   was



  of   the   opinion   that   the   essentials   of   a   valid   Hindu



  marriage,   as   required   under   Section   7   of   the   Hindu



  Marriage   Act,   had   not   been   performed   between   the



  first respondent and the appellant and held that the



  first   respondent   was   not   the   husband   of   the



  appellant   and   thus   reversed   the   findings   of   the



  Trial Court.





8. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   judgment   of   the   High


  Court,   the   appellant   sought   a   review   of   the   order



  dated   28.11.2007.   The   review   petition   was   dismissed



  on   23.01.2009   on   the   ground   that   there   was   no   error



  apparent   on   the   face   of   the   record   of   the   judgment



  dated 28.11.2007.





9. Hence, the appellant approached this Court by way of


  a special leave petition against the impugned orders



  dated 28.11.2007 and 23.01.2009.





10.One   of   the   major   issues   which   cropped   up   in   the


  present   case   is   whether   or   not   presumption   of   a





                                 4


  marriage   arises   when   parties   live   together   for   a



  long   time,   thus   giving   rise   to   a   claim   of



  maintenance   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.     In   other



  words, the question is what is meant by `wife' under



  Section   125   of   Criminal   Procedure   Code   especially



  having regard to explanation under clause (b) of the



  Section.





11.Thus, the question that arises is whether a man and


  woman   living   together   for   a   long   time,   even   without



  a   valid   marriage,   would   raise   as   in   the   present



  case,   a   presumption   of   a   valid   marriage   entitling



  such a woman to maintenance.





12.On   the   question   of   presumption   of   marriage,   we   may


  usefully   refer   to   a   decision   of   the   House   of   Lords



  rendered   in   the   case   of  Lousia   Adelaide   Piers   &



  Florence A.M. De Kerriguen  v.  Sir Henry Samuel Piers



  [(1849)   II   HLC   331],   in   which   their   Lordships



  observed that the question of validity of a marriage



  cannot   be   tried   like   any   other   issue   of   fact



  independent of presumption.   The Court held that law





                                 5


  will   presume   in   favour   of   marriage   and   such



  presumption   could   only   be   rebutted   by   strong   and



  satisfactory evidence.





13.In   Lieutenant  C.W.   Campbell  v.  John   A.G.   Campbell


  [(1867)   Law   Rep.   2   HL   269],   also   known   as   the



  Breadalbane   case,   the   House   of   Lords   held   that



  cohabitation,   with   the   required   repute,   as   husband



  and   wife,   was   proof   that   the   parties   between



  themselves   had   mutually   contracted   the   matrimonial



  relation.   A   relationship   which   may   be   adulterous   at



  the   beginning   may   become   matrimonial   by   consent.



  This   may   be   evidenced   by   habit   and   repute.     In   the



  instant   case   both   the   appellant   and   the   first



  respondent   were   related   and   lived   in   the   same   house



  and   by   a   social   custom   were   treated   as   husband   and



  wife.     Their   marriage   was   solemnized   with   Katha   and



  Sindur.        Therefore,   following   the   ratio   of   the



  decisions   of   the   House   of   Lords,   this   Court   thinks



  there   is   a   very   strong   presumption   in   favour   of



  marriage.     The   House   of   Lords   again   observed   in



  Captain   De   Thoren  v.  The   Attorney-General  [(1876)   1



  AC   686],   that   the   presumption   of   marriage   is   much



                                 6


  stronger   than   a   presumption   in   regard   to   other



  facts.





14.Again   in  Sastry   Velaider   Aronegary   &   his   wife  v.


  Sembecutty Viagalie & Ors. [(1881) 6 AC 364], it was



  held   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are   proved   to   have



  lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the   law   will



  presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that



  they   were   living   together   in   consequence   of   a   valid



  marriage, and not in a state of concubinage.





15.In  India, the  same principles  have been  followed in


  the   case   of  A.   Dinohamy  v.  W.L.   Balahamy  [AIR   1927



  P.C.   185],   in   which   the   Privy   Council   laid   down   the



  general   proposition   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are



  proved   to   have   lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the



  law   will   presume,   unless,   the   contrary   is   clearly



  proved,         that         they         were         living         together         in



  consequence   of   a   valid   marriage,   and   not   in   a   state



  of concubinage.





                                            7


16.In  Mohabbat   Ali   Khan  v.  Muhammad   Ibrahim   Khan   and


  Ors.  [AIR   1929   PC   135],   the   Privy   Council   has   laid



  down that the law presumes in favour of marriage and



  against   concubinage   when   a   man   and   woman   have



  cohabited continuously for number of years.





17.In   the   case   of  Gokal   Chand  v.  Parvin   Kumari  [AIR


  1952   SC   231],   this   Court   held   that   continuous   co-



  habitation   of   man   and   woman   as   husband   and   wife   may



  raise         the         presumption                   of         marriage,              but         the



  presumption   which   may   be   drawn   from   long   co-



  habitation                is         rebuttable               and         if         there            are



  circumstances                   which         weaken               and         destroy           that



  presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.





18.Further, in the case of Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director


  of   Consolidation   &   Ors.  [(1978)   3   SCC   527],   the



  Supreme   Court   held   that   a   strong   presumption   arises



  in   favour   of   wedlock   where   the   partners   have   lived



  together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband   and   wife.



  Although   the   presumption   is   rebuttable,   a   heavy





                                                8


  burden   lies   on   him   who   seeks   to   deprive   the



  relationship of legal origin.





19.Again, in  Tulsa and Ors.  v.  Durghatiya & Ors.  [2008


  (4)   SCC   520],   this   Court   held   that   where   the



  partners   lived   together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband



  and   wife,   a   presumption   would   arise   in   favour   of   a



  valid wedlock.





20.Sir   James   Fitz   Stephen,   who   piloted   the   Criminal



  Procedure   Code   of   1872,   a   legal   member   of   Viceroy's



  Council,   described   the   object   of   Section   125   of   the



  Code (it was Section 536 in 1872 Code) as a mode of



  preventing   vagrancy   or   at   least   preventing   its



  consequences. 





21.Then came the 1898 Code in which the same provision


  was   in   Chapter   XXXVI   Section   488   of   the   Code.   The



  exact   provision   of   Section   488(1)   of   the   1898   Code



  runs as follows:



     "488.   (1)   If   any   person   having   sufficient

     means   neglects   or   refuses   to   maintain   his

     wife   or   his   legitimate   or   illegitimate

     child   unable   to   maintain   itself,   the





                                 9


     District         Magistrate,          a         Presidency

     Magistrate,   a   Sub-divisional   Magistrate   or

     a   Magistrate   of   the   first   class   may,   upon

     proof   of   such   neglect   or   refusal,   order

     such   person   to   make   a   monthly   allowance

     for   the   maintenance   of   his   wife   or   such

     child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding

     five   hundred   rupees   in   the   whole   as   such

     Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same

     to such person as the Magistrate from time

     to time directs."





22.In  Jagir   Kaur   &   Anr.  v.  Jaswant   Singh  [AIR   1963   SC


  1521],   the   Supreme   Court   observed   with   respect   to



  Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C. of 1898 that provisions for



  maintenance   of   wives   and   children   intend   to   serve   a



  social   purpose.   Section   488   prescribes   forums   for   a



  proceeding   to   enable   a   deserted   wife   or   a   helpless



  child,   legitimate   or   illegitimate,   to   get   urgent



  relief.





23.In  Nanak   Chand  v.  Chandra   Kishore   Aggarwal   &   Ors.


  [1969   (3)   SCC   802],   the   Supreme   Court,   discussing



  Section   488   of   the   older   Cr.P.C,   virtually   came   to



  the   same   conclusion   that   Section   488   provides   a



  summary   remedy   and   is   applicable   to   all   persons



  belonging   to   any   religion   and   has   no   relationship



  with the personal law of the parties.





                                10


24.In  Captain
               
                
                    Ramesh
                                Chander   Kaushal  v.  Veena   Kaushal



  and   Ors.  [AIR   1978   SC   1807],   this   Court   held   that



  Section 125 is a reincarnation of Section 488 of the



  Cr.P.C.   of   1898   except   for   the   fact   that   parents



  have   also   been   brought   into   the   category   of   persons



  entitled   for   maintenance.   It   observed   that   this



  provision   is   a   measure   of   social   justice   specially



  enacted   to   protect,   and   inhibit   neglect   of   women,



  children,   old   and   infirm   and   falls   within   the



  constitutional   sweep   of   Article   15(3)   reinforced   by



  Article   39.   Speaking   for   the   Bench   Justice   Krishna



  Iyer   observed   that-   "We   have   no   doubt   that   sections



  of   statutes   calling   for   construction   by   courts   are



  not   petrified   print   but   vibrant   words   with   social



  functions   to   fulfill.   The   brooding   presence   of   the



  constitutional   empathy   for   the   weaker   sections   like



  women   and   children   must   inform   interpretation   if   it



  is   to   have   social   relevance.   So   viewed,   it   is



  possible   to   be   selective   in   picking   out   that



  interpretation out of two alternatives which advance



  the   cause-   the   cause   of   the   derelicts."   (Para   9   on



  pages 1809-10)



                                    11


25.Again in  Vimala (K)  v.  Veeraswamy (K)  [(1991) 2 SCC


  375],   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   held   that



  Section  125  of  the  Code  of  1973  is  meant  to  achieve



  a   social   purpose   and   the   object   is   to   prevent



  vagrancy and destitution.   Explaining the meaning of



  the word `wife' the Court held:




     "...The   object   is   to   prevent   vagrancy   and

     destitution.   It   provides   a   speedy   remedy

     for   the   supply   of   food,   clothing   and

     shelter   to   the   deserted   wife.   When   an

     attempt is made by the husband to negative

     the   claim   of   the   neglected   wife   depicting

     her   as   a   kept-mistress   on   the   specious

     plea   that   he   was   already   married,   the

     court   would   insist   on   strict   proof   of   the

     earlier   marriage.   The   term   `wife'   in

     Section   125   of   the   Code   of   Criminal

     Procedure,   includes   a   woman   who   has   been

     divorced   by   a   husband   or   who   has   obtained

     a   divorce   from   her   husband   and   has   not

     remarried.   The   woman   not   having   the   legal

     status   of   a   wife   is   thus   brought   within

     the   inclusive   definition   of   the   term

     `wife' consistent with the objective... "





26.Thus,   in   those   cases   where   a   man,   who   lived   with   a


  woman   for   a   long   time   and   even   though   they   may   not



  have   undergone   legal   necessities   of   a   valid



  marriage,   should   be   made   liable   to   pay   the   woman



  maintenance if he deserts her. The man should not be



  allowed   to   benefit   from   the   legal   loopholes   by



  enjoying   the   advantages   of   a         de   facto     marriage




                                  12


  without undertaking the duties and obligations.   Any



  other   interpretation   would   lead   the   woman   to



  vagrancy   and   destitution,   which   the   provision   of



  maintenance in Section 125 is meant to prevent.





27.The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System,


  headed   by   Dr.   Justice   V.S.   Malimath,   in   its   report



  of   2003   opined   that   evidence   regarding   a   man   and



  woman   living   together   for   a   reasonably   long   period



  should   be   sufficient   to   draw   the   presumption   that



  the   marriage   was   performed   according   to   the



  customary rites of the parties. Thus, it recommended



  that   the   word   `wife'   in   Section   125   Cr.P.C.   should



  be   amended   to   include   a   woman   who   was   living   with



  the man like his wife for a reasonably long period.





28.The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Mohammad


  Ahmed   Khan  v.  Shah   Bano   Begum   &   Ors.  reported   in



  [(1985)   2   SCC   556],   considering   the   provision   of



  Section   125   of   the   1973   Code,   opined   that   the   said



  provision   is   truly   secular   in   character   and   is



  different   from   the   personal   law   of   the   parties.   The





                                13


  Court   further   held   that   such   provisions   are



  essentially   of   a   prophylactic   character   and   cut



  across   the   barriers   of   religion.   The   Court   further



  held   that   the   liability   imposed   by   Section   125   to



  maintain   close   relatives,   who   are   indigent,   is



  founded   upon   the   individual's   obligation   to   the



  society to prevent vagrancy and destitution.





29.In a subsequent decision, in  Dwarika Prasad Satpathy


  v.  Bidyut   Prava   Dixit   &   Anr.  [(1999)   7   SCC   675],



  this   Court   held   that   the   standard   of   proof   of



  marriage   in   a   Section   125   proceeding   is   not   as



  strict   as   is   required   in   a   trial   for   an   offence



  under   Section   494   of   IPC.   The   learned   Judges



  explained   the   reason   for   the   aforesaid   finding   by



  holding that an order passed in an application under



  Section 125 does not really determine the rights and



  obligations   of   parties   as   the   section   is   enacted



  with a view to provide a summary remedy to neglected



  wives to obtain maintenance. The learned Judges held



  that   maintenance   cannot   be   denied   where   there   was



  some   evidence   on   which   conclusions   of   living



  together could be reached. (See para 9)



                               14


30.However,   striking   a   different   note,   in  Yamunabai


  Anantrao   Adhav       v.       Anantrao   Shivram   Adhav   and



  another,   reported   in   AIR   1988   SC   644,   a   two-Judge



  Bench   of   this   Court   held   that   an   attempt   to   exclude



  altogether         personal         law         of         the         parties         in



  proceedings under Section 125 is improper. (See para



  6).  The learned Judges also held (paras 4 & 8) that



  the   expression   `wife'   in   Section   125   of   the   Code



  should   be   interpreted   to   mean   only   a   legally   wedded



  wife.





31.Again   in   a   subsequent   decision   of   this   Court   in


  Savitaben   Somabhat   Bhatiya  v.  State   of   Gujarat   and



  others,   reported   in   AIR   2005   SC   1809,   this   Court



  held   however   desirable   it   may   be   to   take   note   of



  plight   of   an   unfortunate   woman,   who   unwittingly



  enters   into   wedlock   with   a   married   man,   there   is   no



  scope to include a woman not lawfully married within



  the   expression   of   `wife'.   The   Bench   held   that   this



  inadequacy   in   law   can   be   amended   only   by   the



  Legislature.   While   coming   to   the   aforesaid   finding,





                                      15


  the   learned   Judges   relied   on   the   decision   in   the



  Yamunabai case (supra).





32.It is, therefore, clear from what has been discussed


  above that there is a divergence of judicial opinion



  on   the   interpretation   of   the   word   `wife'   in   Section



  125.





33.We   are   inclined   to   take   a   broad   view   of   the


  definition   of   `wife'   having   regard   to   the   social



  object   of   Section   125   in   the   Code   of   1973.   However,



  sitting   in   a   two-Judge   Bench,   we   cannot,   we   are



  afraid,   take   a   view   contrary   to   the   views   expressed



  in the abovementioned two cases.





34.However,  law in  America has  proceeded on  a slightly


  different   basis.   The   social   obligation   of   a   man



  entering   into   a   live-in   relationship   with   another



  woman,   without   the   formalities   of   a   marriage,   came



  up   for   consideration   in   the   American   courts   in   the



  leading   case   of  Marvin  v.  Marvin  [(1976)   18   Cal.3d



  660].   In   that   context,   a   new   expression   of





                                 16


  `palimony'   has   been   coined,   which   is   a   combination



  of `pal' and `alimony', by the famous divorce lawyer



  in the said case, Mr. Marvin Mitchelson.





35.In   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   the   plaintiff,   Michelle


  Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered into



  an   oral   agreement   which   provided   that   while   "the



  parties   lived   together   they   would   combine   their



  efforts and earnings and would share equally any and



  all   property   accumulated   as   a   result   of   their



  efforts whether individual or combined." The parties



  allegedly further agreed that Michelle would "render



  her   services   as   a   companion,   homemaker,   housekeeper



  and cook." Michelle sought a judicial declaration of



  her   contract   and   property   rights,   and   sought   to



  impose   a   constructive   trust   upon   one   half   of   the



  property         acquired         during         the         course         of         the



  relationship.     The   Supreme   Court   of   California   held



  as follows:



     (1)   The   provisions   of   the   Family   Law   Act   do   not


     govern   the   distribution   of   property   acquired


     during   a   non-marital   relationship;   such   a


     relationship   remains   subject   solely   to   judicial


     decision.



                                      17


     (2)   The   courts   should   enforce   express   contracts


     between non-marital partners except to the extent


     that   the   contract   is   explicitly   founded   on   the


     consideration of meretricious sexual services.





     (3)   In   the   absence   of   an   express   contract,   the


     courts   should   inquire   into   the   conduct   of   the


     parties   to   determine   whether   that   conduct


     demonstrates   an   implied   contract,   agreement   of


     partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit


     understanding between the parties. The courts may


     also   employ   the   doctrine   of   quantum   meruit,   or


     equitable   remedies   such   as   constructive   or


     resulting   trusts,   when   warranted   by   the   facts   of


     the case.





36.Though in our country, law has not developed on the


  lines   of   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   but   our   social



  context   also   is   fast   changing,   of   which   cognizance



  has   to   be   taken   by   Courts   in   interpreting   a



  statutory   provision   which   has   a   pronounced   social



  content like Section 125 of the Code of 1973.





37.We   think   the   larger   Bench   may   consider   also   the


  provisions   of   the   Protection   of   Women   from   Domestic



  Violence   Act,   2005.   This   Act   assigns   a   very   broad



                                18


  and   expansive   definition   to   the   term   `domestic



  abuse'   to   include   within   its   purview   even   economic



  abuse.   `Economic   abuse'   has   been   defined   very



  broadly   in   sub-explanation   (iv)   to   explanation   I   of



  Section   3   of   the   said   Act   to   include   deprivation   of



  financial and economic resources.





38.Further, Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate


  to   direct   the   respondent   to   pay   monetary   relief   to



  the aggrieved person, who is the harassed woman, for



  expenses   incurred   and   losses   suffered   by   her,   which



  may   include,   but   is   not   limited   to,   maintenance



  under Section 125 Cr.P.C. [Section 20(1)(d)].





39.Section   22   of   the   Act   confers   upon   the   Magistrate,



  the   power   to   award   compensation   to   the   aggrieved



  person,   in   addition   to   other   reliefs   granted   under



  the Act.





40.In   terms   of   Section   26   of   the   Act,   these   reliefs


  mentioned   above   can   be   sought   in   any   legal



  proceeding,   before   a   civil   court,   family   court   or   a





                                 19


  criminal   court,   affecting   the   aggrieved   person   and



  the respondent.





41.Most   significantly,   the   Act   gives   a   very   wide


  interpretation   to   the   term   `domestic   relationship'



  as   to   take   it   outside   the   confines   of   a   marital



  relationship,           and          even         includes         live-in



  relationships   in   the   nature   of   marriage   within   the



  definition   of   `domestic   relationship'   under   Section



  2(f) of the Act.





42.Therefore,   women   in   live-in   relationships   are   also



  entitled to all the reliefs given in the said Act.





43.We   are   thus   of   the   opinion   that   if   the


  abovementioned   monetary   relief   and   compensation   can



  be   awarded   in   cases   of   live-in   relationships   under



  the   Act   of   2005,   they   should   also   be   allowed   in   a



  proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. It seems to



  us  that  the  same  view  is  confirmed  by  Section  26  of



  the said Act of 2005.





                                      20


44.We   believe   that   in   light   of   the   constant   change   in


  social   attitudes   and   values,   which   have   been



  incorporated   into   the   forward-looking   Act   of   2005,



  the   same   needs   to   be   considered   with   respect   to



  Section   125   of   Cr.P.C.   and   accordingly,   a   broad



  interpretation of the same should be taken.





45.We,   therefore,   request   the   Hon'ble   Chief   Justice   to


  refer   the   following,   amongst   other,   questions   to   be



  decided   by   a   larger   Bench.   According   to   us,   the



  questions are:





  1.    Whether the living together of a man and woman



        as   husband   and   wife   for   a   considerable   period



        of time would raise the presumption of a valid



        marriage   between   them   and   whether   such   a



        presumption         would         entitle         the         woman         to



        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?





  2.    Whether   strict   proof   of   marriage   is   essential



        for   a   claim   of   maintenance   under   Section   125



        Cr.P.C.   having   regard   to   the   provisions   of



        Domestic Violence Act, 2005?





                                          21


  3.    Whether   a   marriage   performed   according   to



        customary          rites         and          ceremonies,               without



        strictly   fulfilling   the   requisites   of   Section



        7(1)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955,   or   any



        other   personal   law   would   entitle   the   woman   to



        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?





46.We   are   of   the   opinion   that   a   broad   and   expansive


  interpretation should be given to the term `wife' to



  include   even   those   cases   where   a   man   and   woman   have



  been   living   together   as   husband   and   wife   for   a



  reasonably   long   period   of   time,   and   strict   proof   of



  marriage           should         not         be         a         pre-condition         for



  maintenance   under   Section   125   of   the   Cr.P.C,   so   as



  to   fulfil   the   true   spirit   and   essence   of   the



  beneficial   provision   of   maintenance   under   Section



  125.





47.We also believe that such an interpretation would be


  a   just   application   of   the   principles   enshrined   in



  the   Preamble   to   our   Constitution,   namely,   social



  justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.





                                           22


                         .....................J.

                         (G.S. SINGHVI)





                         .....................J.

                         (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)





New Delhi           

October 07, 2010





                         23




--------
OUR LEGAL CORRESPONDENT
New Delhi, Sept. 25: The Supreme Court has said that any woman in a long-term live-in relationship is entitled to maintenance if deserted.
It is immaterial whether the woman was legally married to the man or not, the court said. What matters is whether she was completely dependent on him for sustenance.
“Women can’t be left vagrant. Right to life (guaranteed under the Constitution) includes the right to live with dignity. It is not possible to live with dignity when a woman has no food and leads the life of a destitute,” said Justice A.K. Ganguly, sitting with senior judge G.S. Singhvi.
Justice Singhvi added: “Someone has to take care of her if she is not able to, just to prevent vagrancy.”
“Leaving women to vagrancy threatens social stability and public order,” Justice Ganguly underlined. Women are, after all, the source of all power, he said.
The two judges were hearing the petition of a woman, Chunmuniya, who claimed that after her husband Ram Sharan died on March 7, 1992, she was “married” off to his younger brother Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, as was the practice in her caste. Among some communities in northern India, the widow of an older brother is forced to live with any surviving brother. The marriage was performed simply by doing a katha, she said.
Virendra, who was 10 years younger than Ram Sharan, deserted her in 1996. She moved an application for maintenance on March 26, 1997, but he married another woman in 1998 while it was pending.
A family court upheld Chunmuniya’s plea for maintenance. But Virendra went to the high court denying that he had been married to her. He claimed she had fraudulently inserted her name as his wife in the family register with the panchayat to get a share of the property.
The high court ruled in his favour on November 11, 2007, saying Chunmuniya had not been able to prove marriage. Invocation before a sacred fire and saptapadi were the two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage, it said, setting aside the family court order. Chunmuniya then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decided that the issue needed consideration and appointed Altaf Ahmad and P.S. Patwalia as the amicus curiae to assist the judges in deciding the issue. Both contended that the law could be interpreted to include all such women in the definition of “wife” to enable them to get maintenance.
Ahmed said that if a woman marries under personal laws, she immediately gets several rights and obligations. Those who do not, do not get any rights. “If such dependent women are provided for, this trend (of living-in) will also be discouraged,” he contended.
The bench agreed that the status of a wife need not be a pre-requisite for getting maintenance before reserving orders in the case. A prolonged domestic relationship resembling marriage is enough to entitle a deserted woman to maintenance, it observed.
Patwalia said that living-in was a fast-catching “urban phenomenon” which the law must address. “Here, the man has no obligations or responsibilities of any kind. Let the law reach out to them,” he said.
The bench also expressed anguish over the use of such words as “illegitimate” children and “other woman” in various laws and blamed the “patriarchal” mindset of law-makers for this. “The use of the word illegitimate stigmatises these children the day they are born,” Justice Singhvi said.
At another point, the court criticised law-makers for enshrining Rs 500 as the maximum maintenance per month in a 1973 law. “Whoever fixed the amount was miserly,” the judges observed. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enshrines this as the maximum maintenance for all dependants — wife and children.

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

SC - Divorce granted by the Panchayat is illegal.

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.1801 OF 2007

Mahendra Nath Yadav                                          .... Appellant

                                     Versus

Sheela Devi                                                  .... Respondent

ORDER

1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 8th October, 2004 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad passed in First Appeal Nos.786 and 787/2000 and by which the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court, Varanasi has been reversed and dismissal of the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called as "Act, 1955") filed by the respondent before the Family Court has also been reversed and her case has been allowed. The parties herein got married on 3rd May, 1990. The ceremony of 'Gauna' was performed in 1991. Appellant is serving in the Army and respondent is serving as a teacher. There was no proper opportunity for both of them to lead a normal family life. Thus, differences arose and litigation started between the parties. The respondent-wife filed an Application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as "Cr.P.C."), before the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Varanasi. The Magistrate vide order dated 10th May, 1995, allowed the said application by directing the appellant to pay the respondent-wife a sum of Rs.400/- p.m. as maintenance. She also filed Case Crime No.131 of 1991 under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against the appellant and his family members in the Police Station, Choubeypur, Varanasi. The appellant preferred Revision No.330/95 in the Court of Sessions Judge, Varanasi against the order of the Magistrate granting the maintenance to the respondent. However, that was dismissed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 15th February, 1996. Though the order passed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was subsequently modified by the Family Court vide order dated 2nd June, 1997, the relations between the parties deteriorated, an attempt was made by the appellant's family to settle the matter. According to appellant, it was customary in the locality and in the community to which both parties belong to have a divorce through the Panchayat. Thus, the Panchayat was convened on 7th June, 1997. The said Panchayat decided that the appellant should pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the respondent's family. It was paid and a document was prepared which was duly signed by the parties. Thus, the marriage came to an end. In order to give legal effect to the said customary divorce, the appellant tried to persuade the respondent to get divorce from the Family Court under Section 13-B of the Act, 1955 by consent. However, she did not agree. Thus the appellant approached the Family Court by filing Petition No.370 of 1998 under Section 13 of the Act, 1955, seeking divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty. The respondent filed the counter case i.e. Petition No.57 of 1999 under Section 9 of the Act, 1955, for restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court decreed the suit mainly on the ground that the marriage stood dissolved through Panchayat and dismissed the petition filed by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights vide order dated 15th September, 2000.

2. Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred appeals against both the orders before the High Court and the High Court has reversed the said order in both the cases. Hence this appeal.

3. In spite of service the respondent-wife did not enter an appearance. Thus, we have heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. Dr. Dubey has taken us through the evidence available on record and through both the judgments. The High Court has rightly held that dissolution of marriage through Panchayat as per custom prevailing in that area and in that community permitted cannot be a ground for granting divorce under Section 13 of the Act, 1955. We fully agree with the said decision for the reason that in case the appellant wanted a decree on the basis of customary dissolution of marriage through Panchayat held on 7th June, 1997, he would not have filed a petition under Section 13 of the Act, 1955. Filing this petition itself means that none of the parties was of the view that the divorce granted by the Panchayat was legal. In view of the above, we do not see any reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

No costs.

...................J.(P. SATHASIVAM)

.....................J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,

August 25, 2010.

SOURCE -

SC- Divorce cannot be purchased by husband. But can only wife sell it at her price ?

                                               REPORTABLE
                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8196-8197 OF 2010
           (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos.5289-5290 of 2010)

Sanjeeta Das                                                     ....Appellant

                                    Versus

Tapan Kumar Mohanty                                             ....Respondent

                                JUDGMENT

AFTAB ALAM, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The order of a division bench of the Orissa High Court that is before us in this appeal, though passed in a judicial proceeding, appears to us to be completely alien to the law. The relevant facts to see the impugned order in perspective may be stated thus.

3. The respondent and the appellant were married in accordance with the Hindu religious rites. About three years after the marriage, he filed a petition (Civil Proceeding No.136 of 1997) before the Family Court, Rourkela for 2

dissolution of his marriage with the appellant on grounds of cruelty and desertion [clauses (ia) and (ib) of section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955]. The appellant strongly resisted the grounds taken by the respondent for dissolution of their marriage and took the plea that in reality she had been deserted and subjected to cruelty by the respondent. For the purpose of the present appeal, there is no need for us to go into the details of the allegations made by the respondent in his petition or the counter-allegations made against him in the written statement filed by the appellant. Suffice it to note that on the basis of the evidences adduced before it, the Family Court in its judgment dated October 29, 2005 arrived at findings against the respondent on both the issues of desertion and cruelty.Invoking, however, the provision of section 23A of the Act, it directed the appellant to resume cohabitation with her husband, the respondent, within 3 months from the date of the judgment. The operative order of the Family Court is as follows: "In the ultimate analysis, while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner seeking for grant of dissolution of his marriage with the respondent by a decree of divorce, I pass a decree of restitution of the conjugal life of the parties. Accordingly, the respondent-wife is directed to restitute her conjugal life with the petitioner-husband within 3 months, hence on the event of the respondent coming to the fold of the petitioner to restitute her conjugal life with the latter, he shall co-operate with the former and that consequent upon success of the restitution of conjugal life between the parties, the impact/gravity of the criminal proceeding u/s. 498A IPC started against the petitioner and his family members at the instance of the respondent shall be loosen"

4. Against the judgment and order passed by the Family Court, the respondent preferred appeal (MATA No.59 of 2005) before the Calcutta High Court. The appeal was disposed of by a division bench of the High Court by order dated September 2, 2009. From that order it appears that the respondent filed an affidavit before the court declaring his willingness to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000.00 (rupees ten lakhs only) as life term maintenance of the appellant and for the expenses of marriage of their daughter Kumari Ayushi Mohanty (Richi), in consideration of the dissolution of his marriage with the appellant by a decree of divorce and compounding of a criminal case instituted against him by the appellant. The respondent further stated in the affidavit that he would pay the sum of Rs.5,00,000.00 (rupees five lakhs only) within 4 months from the date of passing of the decree of divorce and the balance amount of Rs.5,00,000.00 (rupees five lakhs only) in 4 equal installments spread over a period of 2 years from the date of the passing of the decree of divorce. The High Court in its order dated September 2, 2009 simply paraphrased the statements made in the affidavit filed by the respondent and made it the order of the court. The order dated September 2, 2009 was later modified by order dated November 20, 2009 to the further advantage of the respondent. It was clarified that the payment of Rs.10,00,000.00 (rupees ten lakhs only) was not only for the lifetime maintenance of the appellant but also for the maintenance of the daughter, Kumari Ayushi Mohanty (Richi) till she got married besides the expenses that might be incurred for her marriage.

5. These two orders passed by the High Court, by which it purported to grant a decree of divorce for dissolution of the respondent's marriage with the appellant are now before us in appeal and plainly speaking we are unable to put any meaning to the order of the High Court. The marriage between the respondent and the appellant was admittedly solemnized in accordance with the Hindu religious rites. A Hindu marriage can be dissolved only on any of the grounds plainly and clearly enumerated under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The law does not permit the purchase of a decree of divorce for consideration, with or without the consent of the other side.

6. Leaned counsel appearing for the respondent urged us not to interfere in the matter submitting that the respondent and the appellant had lived together barely for four months. He stated that the marriage had taken place on April 29, 1994 and from August 24, 1994 they are living separately. He also tried to argue that the order of the High Court was passed with the consent of the parties and for that reason also this Court should not interfere in the matter. We are not prepared to accept the submission for a moment. First, there is nothing to indicate that the order was passed with the consent of the appellant. All that is said in the order is as under: "On consideration of such affidavit and the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we dispose both these appeals with the following directions" (Emphasis added)

7. The affidavit referred to in the order is the one filed by the respondent and consideration of submission of counsel for the parties does not indicate that the appellant had given her consent for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent on payment of Rs.10,00,000.00 (rupees ten lakhs only). Secondly, and more importantly, the consent of the parties is of no relevance in the matter. No court can assume jurisdiction to dissolve a Hindu marriage simply on the basis of the consent of the parties de hors the grounds enumerated under section 13 of the Act, unless of course the consenting parties proceed under section 13B of the Act.

8. In the light of the discussions made above, we find the order of the High Court completely unsustainable. It is set aside and the appeal against the judgment and order passed by the Family Court is restored to its file. The High Court must now hear and dispose of the appeal along with the connected appeal afresh, in accordance with law. Since the matter is somewhat old, the High Court may give the appeals some priority and dispose them of at an early date.

9. In the result, the appeals are allowed with costs, quantified at Rs.15,000.00 (rupees fifteen thousand only).

.....................................J (AFTAB ALAM)

.......................................J (R.M. LODHA)

New Delhi

September 22, 2010.

SOURCE - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp

SC -Reasons for judgment must – 15 points outlined for reasoning

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.20428 of 2007)
M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ..Appellant(s)
Versus
Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others ..Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP (C) NO.12766 OF 2008)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   two   appeals,   one   at   the   instance   of   the
builder   and   the   other   at   the   instance   of   the
Corporation   Bank,   have   been   filed   impugning   the
Order   of   National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal
Commission (hereinafter, the said Commission).
13. In the case of the builder, the said Commission has
not   given   any   reason   and   dismissed   the   revision
petition by passing a cryptic order dated 31.8.2007
which reads as under:
“Heard.
In view of the concurrent findings of the
State   Commission,   we   do   not   find   any
force in this revision petition.
The revision Petition is dismissed.”
4. In so far as the case of the builder is concerned,
this   Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   said
Commission   cannot,   considering   the   way   it   is
structured,   dismiss   the   revision   petition   by
refusing to give any reasons and by just affirming
the order of the State Commission.
5. The said Commission has been defined under Section
2(k)   of   the   Consumer   Protection   Act,   1986
(hereinafter CP Act) as follows:
“2(k)   “National   Commission”   means   the
National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal
Commission   established   under   clause   (c)
of Section 9;”
6. Under section 9(c) of CP Act, the said Commission
has been established by the Central Government by a
notification.
27. The   composition   of   the   said   Commission   has   been
provided   under   Section   20   of   the   CP   Act   and
wherefrom it is clear that the said Commission is a
high-powered adjudicating forum headed by a sitting
or a retired judge of the Supreme Court.
8. Section   21   of   the   CP   Act   provides   for   the
jurisdiction of the said Commission.
9. In   order   to   appreciate   the   questions   involved   in
this case, the provision relating to jurisdiction of
the said Commission is set out hereunder:
“21.   Jurisdiction   of   the   National
Commission.-   Subject   to   the   other
provisions   of   this   Act,   the   National
Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
(i)  complaints   where   the   value
of   the   goods   or   services
and   compensation,   if   any,
claimed exceeds [rupees one
crore]; and
(ii)   appeals   against   the   orders
of   any   State   Commission;
and
(b) to call for the records and pass
appropriate   orders   in   any   consumer
dispute   which   is   pending   before   or
has   been   decided   by   any   State
Commission   where   it   appears   to   the
National Commission that such State
Commission   has   exercised   a
jurisdiction   not   vested   in   it   by
law,   or   has   failed   to   exercise   a
3jurisdiction so vested, or has acted
in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally   or   with   material
irregularity.”
10. Under Section 23 of the CP Act, an appeal would lie
against the order of the said Commission passed in
exercise of its powers under Section 21(1)(a), to
this Court, within 30 days, subject to extension of
time by this Court on sufficient cause being shown.
Under   Section   21(1)(b),   the   said   Commission
exercises   revisional   power   over   orders   of   State
Commission.
11. The   power   and   procedure   applicable   to   the   said
Commission has been provided under Section 22 of the
CP Act. A perusal of Section 22(1) would show that
Sections 12, 13 and 14 of CP Act, with necessary
modification, are applicable to the decision making
process by the said Commission. Under Section 13 of
the CP Act, the District Forum has been vested, in
certain matters, with the powers of a Civil Court
while   trying   a   suit.   Section   13(4)   of   CP   Act   is
applicable to the said Commission in view of Section
22(1)   thereof.   Similarly,   Sections   13(5),   (6)   and
4(7) will also apply to the said Commission in view
of Section 22(1).
12. On a perusal of Sections 13(4), (5), (6) and (7) of
the CP Act, it is clear that the said Commission has
been   vested   with   some   of   the   powers   of   a   Civil
Court. The following powers have been vested on the
said Commission:
“13(4) For the purposes of this section,
the   District   Forum   shall   have   the   same
powers   as   are   vested   in   a   civil   court
under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) while trying a suit in respect of
the following matters, namely:-
(i) the   summoning   and   enforcing
the   attendance   of   any
defendant   or   witness   and
examining   the   witness   on
oath,
(ii) the discovery and production
of   any   document   or   other
material object producible as
evidence,
(iii) the reception of evidence on
affidavits,
(iv) the   requisitioning   of   the
report   of   the   concerned
analysis   or   test   from   the
appropriate   laboratory   or
from   any   other   relevant
source,
(v) issuing of any commission for
the   examination   of   any
witness, and
(vi) any other matter which may be
prescribed.
513. Under Section 13(5) of CP Act, every proceeding of
the said Commission will be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and
228   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   and   the   said
Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for
the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
14. The   above   provisions   make   it   clear   that   the   said
Commission has the trappings of a Civil Court and is
a high-powered quasi-judicial forum for deciding lis
between the parties.
15. The   necessity   of   giving   reason   by   a   body   or
authority   in   support   of   its   decision   came   up   for
consideration   before   this   Court   in   several   cases.
Initially   this   Court   recognized   a   sort   of
demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-
judicial   orders   but   with   the   passage   of   time   the
distinction between the two got blurred and thinned
out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the
judgment of this Court in  A.K. Kraipak and others
vs.  Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970
SC 150.
616. In  Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another  vs.  Union of
India and others  reported in AIR 1973 SC 389, this
Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord
Denning in  Rigina  vs.  Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim
[(1970) 2 WLR 1009] and quoted him as saying “that
heresy was scotched in Ridge and Boldwin, 1964 AC
40”.
17. The expression ‘speaking order’ was first coined by
Lord   Chancellor   Earl   Cairns   in   a   rather   strange
context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the
ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with
errors on the face of the record and pointed out
that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking
order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of
the report)
18. This Court always opined that the face of an order
passed   by   a   quasi-judicial   authority   or   even   an
administrative   authority   affecting   the   rights   of
parties,   must   speak.   It   must   not   be   like   the
‘inscrutable face of a Sphinx’. 
719. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam
Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669,
the   question   of   recording   reasons   came   up   for
consideration   in   the   context   of   a   refusal   by
Harinagar   to   transfer,   without   giving   reasons,
shares   held   by   Shyam   Sunder.   Challenging   such
refusal,   the   transferee   moved   the   High   Court
contending,   inter   alia,   that   the   refusal   is   mala
fide,   arbitrary   and   capricious.   The   High   Court
rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to
file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the
Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of
Indian   Companies   Act,   1956   which   was   dismissed.
Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed
another application for transfer of his shares which
was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the
Central Government quashed the resolution passed by
the Company and directed the Company to register the
transfer.   However,   in   passing   the   said   order,
Government   did   not   give   any   reason.   The   company
challenged the said decision before this Court.
20. The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra)
was whether the Central Government, in passing the
8appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable
to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.
21. Even though in  Harinagar  (supra) the decision was
administrative,   this   Court   insisted   on   the
requirement   of   recording   reason   and   further   held
that   in   exercising   appellate   powers,   the   Central
Government   acted   as   a   tribunal   in   exercising
judicial powers of the State and such exercise is
subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.
Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively
exercised if reasons are not given by the Central
Government in support of the order (Para 23, page
1678-79).
22. Again in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India
and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606, the Constitution Bench
of   this   Court   examined   the   question   whether   the
Central   Government   was   bound   to   pass   a   speaking
order while dismissing a revision and confirming the
order   of   the   State   Government   in   the   context   of
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55
of Mineral and Concessions Rules. The Constitution
9Bench held that in exercising its power of revision
under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity (See para 8 page 1610).
Where the State Government gives a number of reasons
some of which are good and some are not, and the
Central Government merely endorses the order of the
State Government without specifying any reason, this
Court,   exercising   its   jurisdiction   under   Article
136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are
the grounds on which Central Government upheld the
order   of   the   State   Government   (See   para   9   page
1610).   Therefore,   this   Court   insisted   on   reasons
being given for the order.
23. In  M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar  vs.  State of
U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC 1302, while dealing with
U.P.   Sugar   Dealers   License   Order   under   which   the
license was cancelled, this Court held that such an
order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be
a speaking one. This Court further held that merely
giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and
further pointed out where the order is subject to
appeal,   the   necessity   to   record   reason   is   even
greater. The learned Judges held that the recording
10of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed
claim ensures that the decision is not a result of
caprice,   whim   or   fancy   but   was   arrived   at   after
considering the relevant law and that the decision
was just. (See para 7 page 1304).
24. In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd.  vs. The
Union   of   India   and   others,   AIR   1971   SC   862,   the
Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of
the Central Government under the then Section 36 of
the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, held that the
Central Government was actually exercising judicial
power of the State and in exercising judicial power
reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on
two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved
gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons
are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record
reasons   operates   as   a   deterrent   against   possible
arbitrary action by the executive authority invested
with the judicial power (See para 11 page 865-866).
25. In  M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd.  vs.  Woolcombers
Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this
Court while considering an award under Section 11 of
11Industrial   Disputes   Act   insisted   on   the   need   of
giving   reasons   in   support   of   conclusions   in   the
Award. The Court held that the very requirement of
giving   reason   is   to   prevent   unfairness   or
arbitrariness   in   reaching   conclusions.   The   second
principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine
that justice should not only be done, it should also
appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said
that   a   just   but   unreasoned   conclusion   does   not
appear   to   be   just   to   those   who   read   the   same.
Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will
also   have   the   appearance   of   justice.   The   third
ground is that such awards are subject to Article
136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of
reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain
whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5
page 2761).
26. In  Union of India  vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others,
AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the
question   of   selection   under   Indian   Administrative
Service/Indian   Police   Service   (Appointment   by
Promotion   Regulation)   held   that   the   expression
“reasons for the proposed supersession” should not
12be   mere   rubber   stamp   reasons.   Such   reasons   must
disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter
for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a
decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial.
This   Court   held   that   the   reasons   in   such   context
would   mean   the   link   between   materials   which   are
considered   and   the   conclusions   which   are   reached.
Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two
(See para 28 page 98).
27. In  Siemens   Engineering   and   Manufacturing   Co.   of
India Ltd. vs.  The Union of India and another, AIR
1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too
well settled that an authority in making an order in
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record
reasons   in   support   of   the   order   it   makes.   The
learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi-
judicial   order   must   be   supported   by   reasons.   The
rule   requiring   reasons   in   support   of   a   quasi-
judicial   order   is,   this   Court   held,   as   basic   as
following the principles of natural justice. And the
rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere
pretence   of   compliance   would   not   satisfy   the
requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789).   
1328. In  Smt. Maneka Gandhi  vs. Union of India and Anr.,
AIR   1978   SC   597,   which   is   a   decision   of   great
jurisprudence   significance   in   our   Constitutional
law,   Chief   Justice   Beg,   in   a   concurring   but
different opinion held that an order impounding a
passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page
612).  The learned Chief Justice also held when an
administrative action involving any deprivation of
or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the
authorities must see that justice is not only done
but   manifestly   appears   to   be   done   as   well.   This
principle   would   obviously   demand   disclosure   of
reasons for the decision.
29. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was)
in   a   concurring   but   a   separate   opinion   also   held
that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a
passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and
is to be done very sparingly and only when it is
fully   justified   by   the   exigencies   of   an   uncommon
situation.
1430. The   learned   Judge   further   held   that   law   cannot
permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep
the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing
so   is   to   keep   the   reasons   away   from   judicial
scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613).
31. In  Rama   Varma   Bharathan   Thampuran  vs.  State   of
Kerala   and   Ors.,   AIR   1979   SC   1918,   Justice   V.R.
Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held
that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial
in   character.   One   of   the   attributes   of   quasi-
judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in
support of decisions taken and the other requirement
is   following   the   principles   of   natural   justice.
Learned   Judge   held   that   natural   justice   requires
reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See
para 14 page 1922).
32. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors.,
(1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service
matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held
that   “rubber-stamp   reason”   is   not   enough   and
virtually quoted the observation in  Capoor  (supra)
to the extent that reasons “are the links between
15the materials on which certain conclusions are based
and the actual conclusions.” (See para 18 page 377).
33. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc.  vs.  The
Commissioner,   Hindu   Religious   and   Charitable
Endowments   Dept.   and   Ors.,   AIR   1980   SC   1,   while
giving   the   majority   judgment     Chief   Justice   Y.V.
Chandrachud referred to Broom’s Legal Maxims (1939
Edition, page 97) where the principle in Latin runs
as follows:
“Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex”
34. The English version of the said principle given by
the Chief Justice is that:
“Reason is the soul of the law, and when the
reason of any particular law ceases, so does
the law itself.” (See para 29 page 11)
35. In M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of
India and Others, AIR 1984 SC 160, this Court held
that   while   disposing   of   applications   under
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the
duty of the Government is to give reasons for its
order.  This court made it very clear that the faith
16of   the   people   in   administrative   tribunals   can   be
sustained   only   if   the   tribunals   act   fairly   and
dispose   of   the   matters   before   them   by   well
considered orders. In saying so, this Court relied
on   its   previous   decisions   in  Capoor  (supra)   and
Siemens Engineering (supra), discussed above.
36. In  Ram Chander  vs.  Union of India and others, AIR
1986   SC   1173,   this   Court   was   dealing   with   the
appellate   provisions   under   the   Railway   Servants
(Discipline   and   Appeal)   Rules,   1968   condemned   the
mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in the context
of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rule.
This Court held that the word “consider” occurring
to the Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway Board shall
duly   apply   its   mind   and   give   reasons   for   its
decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to
give reason is an incident of the judicial process
and   emphasized   that   in   discharging   quasi-judicial
functions   the   appellate   authority   must   act   in
accordance with natural justice and give reasons for
its decision (Para 4, page 1176). 
1737. In  M/s.   Star   Enterprises   and   others  vs.  City   and
Industrial   Development   Corporation   of   Maharashtra
Ltd.   and   others,   (1990)   3   SCC   280,   a   three-Judge
Bench of this Court held that in the present day set
up   judicial   review   of   administrative   action   has
become expansive and is becoming wider day by day
and the State has to justify its action in various
field   of   public   law.     All   these   necessitate
recording of reason for executive actions including
the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held
that   disclosure   of   reasons   in   matters   of   such
rejection provides an opportunity for an objective
review both by superior administrative heads and for
judicial process and opined that such reasons should
be   communicated   unless   there   are   specific
justification for not doing so (see Para 10, page
284-285).
38. In  Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher
Secondary   Education  vs.  K.S.   Gandhi   and   others,
(1991)   2   SCC   716,   this   Court   held   that   even   in
domestic   enquiry   if   the   facts   are   not   in   dispute
non-recording of reason may not be violative of the
principles of natural justice but where facts are
18disputed   necessarily   the   authority   or   the   enquiry
officer,   on   consideration   of   the   materials   on
record,   should   record   reasons   in   support   of   the
conclusion reached (see para 22, pages 738-739)
39. In the case of  M.L. Jaggi  vs.  Mahanagar Telephones
Nigam   Limited   and   others,   (1996)   3   SCC   119,   this
Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the
Telegraph   Act   and   held   that   since   the   said   award
affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in
the award. It was also held that such reasons are to
be recorded so that it enables the High Court to
exercise   its   power   of   judicial   review   on   the
validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).
40. In  Charan   Singh  vs.  Healing   Touch   Hospital   and
others,   AIR   2000   SC   3138,   a   three-Judge   Bench   of
this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP Act,
held   that   the   authorities   under   the   Act   exercise
quasi-judicial   powers   for   redressal   of   consumer
disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such
a   body   should   arrive   at   conclusions   based   on
reasons. This Court held that the said Act, being
one   of   the   benevolent   pieces   of   legislation,   is
19intended to protect a large body of consumers from
exploitation   as   the   said   Act   provides   for   an
alternative mode for consumer justice by the process
of a summary trial.  The powers which are exercised
are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such
a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons
and held that requirement of recording reasons is
“too   obvious   to   be   reiterated   and   needs   no
emphasizing”. (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report)
41. Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a
different   note   in   two   of   its   Constitution   Bench
decisions, the first of which was rendered in the
case   of  Som   Datt   Datta  vs.  Union   of   India   and
others,   AIR   1969   SC   414,   Mr.   Justice   Ramaswami
delivering   the   judgment   for   the   unanimous
Constitution Bench held that provisions of Sections
164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order
confirming   proceedings   of   Court   Martial   to   be
supported by reasons.  The Court held that an order
confirming such proceedings does not become illegal
if it does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421-
422 of the report).
2042. About   two   decades   thereafter,   a   similar   question
cropped up before this Court in the case of  S.N.
Mukherjee  vs.  Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. A
unanimous   Constitution   Bench   speaking   through
Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier decision
in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000 of the
report   and   held   reasons   are   not   required   to   be
recorded   for   an   order   confirming   the   finding   and
sentence recorded by the Court Martial. 
43. It must be remembered in this connection that the
Court   Martial   as   a   proceeding   is  sui   generis  in
nature and the Court of Court Martial is different,
being called a Court of Honour and the proceeding
therein   are   slightly   different   from   other
proceedings.  About the nature of Court Martial and
its   proceedings   the   observations   of   Winthrop   in
Military Law and Precedents  are very pertinent and
are extracted herein below:
“Not belonging to the judicial branch of the
Government,   it   follows   that   courts-martial
must pertain to the executive department; and
they are in fact simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by Congress for
the   President   as   Commander-in-Chief,   to   aid
him in properly commanding the Army and Navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.”
2144. Our   Constitution   also   deals   with   Court   Martial
proceedings   differently   as   is   clear   from   Articles
33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.
45. In England there was no common law duty of recording
of   reasons.     In  Marta   Stefan  vs.  General   Medical
Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, “the
established position of the common law is that there
is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to
record reasons”.   It has been acknowledged in the
Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at
page   23   that   “No   single   factor   has   inhibited   the
development   of   English   administrative   law   as
seriously as the absence of any general obligation
upon public authorities to give reasons for their
decisions”.
46. Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal
Board, ex parte Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All
ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very
strongly   in   favour   of   disclosing   of   reasons   in   a
case where the Court is acting in its discretion.
The learned Master of Rolls said:
22“..It   is   a   corollary   of   the   discretion
conferred upon the board that it is their duty
to set out their reasoning in sufficient form
to   show   the   principles   on   which   they   have
proceeded.     Adopting   Lord   Lane   CJ’s
observations   (in   R   vs.   Immigration   Appeal
Tribunal, ex p Khan (Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER
420   at   423,   (1983)   QB   790   at   794-795),   the
reasons for the lower amount is not obvious.
Mr.   Cunningham   is   entitled   to   know,   either
expressly or inferentially stated, what it was
to which the board were addressing their mind
in arriving at their conclusion.   It must be
obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is
left with a burning sense of grievance.  They
should   be   sensitive   to   the   fact   that   he   is
left with a real feeling of injustice, that
having   been   found   to   have   been   unfairly
dismissed, he has been deprived of his just
desserts (as he sees them)”.
47. The   learned   Master   of   Rolls   further   clarified   by
saying:
“..thus, in the particular circumstances
of this case, and without wishing to establish
any   precedent   whatsoever,   I   am   prepared   to
spell out an obligation on this board to give
succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of
Mr.   Cunningham   at   rest.   I   would   therefore
allow this application.”
48. But, however, the present trend of the law has been
towards   an   increasing   recognition   of   the   duty   of
Court   to   give   reasons   (See  North   Range   Shipping
Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1
WLR 2397).  It has been acknowledged that this trend
is consistent with the development towards openness
in Government and judicial administration. 
2349. In  English  vs.  Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited,
(2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been held that justice
will   not   be   done   if   it   is   not   apparent   to   the
parties why one has won and the other has lost.  The
House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord
Bingham   of   Cornhill   and   Lord   Steyn,   on   the
requirement of reason held, “First, they impose a
discipline … which may contribute to such decisions
being   considered   with   care.     Secondly,   reasons
encourage   transparency   …   Thirdly,   they   assist   the
Courts in performing their supervisory function if
judicial review proceedings are launched.” (Para 7,
page 1769 of the report)
50. The position in the United States has been indicated
by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph
11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held
that   in   the   United   States   the   Courts   have   always
insisted   on   the   recording   of   reasons   by
administrative   authorities   in   exercise   of   their
powers. It was further held that such recording of
reasons is required as “the Court cannot exercise
their duty of review unless they are advised of the
24considerations underlying the action under review”.
In  S.N. Mukherjee  (supra) this court relied on the
decisions   of   the   U.S.   Court   in  Securities   and
Exchange Commission  vs.  Chenery Corporation, (1942)
87   Law   Ed   626   and  John   T.   Dunlop  vs.  Walter
Bachowski,  (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its
opinion discussed above.
51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:
a. In   India   the   judicial   trend   has   always   been   to
record reasons, even in administrative decisions,
if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in
support of its conclusions.
c. Insistence   on   recording   of   reasons   is   meant   to
serve the wider principle of justice that justice
must not only be done it must also appear to be
done as well.
d. Recording   of   reasons   also   operates   as   a   valid
restraint   on   any   possible   arbitrary   exercise   of
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
25e. Reasons   reassure   that   discretion   has   been
exercised   by   the   decision   maker   on   relevant
grounds   and   by   disregarding   extraneous
considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component   of   a   decision   making   process   as
observing   principles   of   natural   justice   by
judicial,   quasi-judicial   and   even   by
administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review
by superior Courts.
h. The   ongoing   judicial   trend   in   all   countries
committed   to   rule   of   law   and   constitutional
governance   is   in   favour   of   reasoned   decisions
based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is   virtually   the
life blood of judicial decision making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial   or   even   quasi-judicial   opinions   these
days   can   be   as   different   as   the   judges   and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate
by   reason   that   the   relevant   factors   have   been
objectively   considered.   This   is   important   for
26sustaining   the   litigants’   faith   in   the   justice
delivery system. 
j. Insistence   on   reason   is   a   requirement   for   both
judicial accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not
candid   enough   about   his/her   decision   making
process then it is impossible to know whether the
person   deciding   is   faithful   to   the   doctrine   of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons   in   support   of   decisions   must   be   cogent,
clear   and   succinct.   A   pretence   of   reasons   or
‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a
valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine
qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision making not only makes the
judges   and   decision   makers   less   prone   to   errors
but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor
(1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates
from   the   broad   doctrine   of   fairness   in   decision
making,   the   said   requirement   is   now   virtually   a
component of human rights and was considered part
27of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.   See (1994) 19 EHRR
553,   at   562   para   29   and  Anya  vs.  University   of
Oxford,   2001   EWCA   Civ   405,   wherein   the   Court
referred   to   Article   6   of   European   Convention   of
Human   Rights   which   requires,   “adequate   and
intelligent   reasons   must   be   given   for   judicial
decisions”.
o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a
vital   role   in   setting   up   precedents   for   the
future.     Therefore,   for   development   of   law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of   the   essence   and   is   virtually   a   part   of   “Due
Process”. 
52. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of
the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
and remand the matter to the said forum for deciding
the matter by passing a reasoned order in the light
of the observations made above. Since some time has
elapsed, this Court requests the forum to decide the
matter   as   early   as   possible,   preferably   within   a
period of six weeks from the date of service of this
order upon it.
2853. In   so   far   as   the   appeal   filed   by   the   Bank   is
concerned,   this   Court   finds   that   the   National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its order
dated 4th  April 2008 has given some reasons in its
finding. The reasons, inter alia, are as under:
“We   have   gone   through   the   orders   of   the
District   Forum   and   the   State   Commission,
perused   the   record   placed   before   us   and
heard   the   parties   at   length.   The   State
Commission has rightly confirmed the order
of the District Forum after coming to the
conclusion   that   the   Petitioner   and   the
Builder   –   Respondents   No.3   and   4   have
colluded   with   each   other   and   hence,
directed them to compensate the complainant
for the harassment caused to them.”
54. From the order of the State Commission dated 26.7.07
in connection with the appeal filed by the Bank, we
do   not   find   that   the   State   Commission   has
independently   considered   Bank’s   appeal.   The   State
Commission   dismissed   the   Bank’s   appeal   for   the
reasons   given   in   its   order   dated   6.7.07   in
connection with the appeal of the builders.
55. This Court is of the view that since the Bank has
filed a separate appeal, it has a right to be heard
independently in support of its appeal. That right
has   been   denied   by   the   State   Commission.   In   that
view   of   the   matter,   this   Court   quashes   the   order
29dated 26.7.07 passed by the State Commission as also
the order of the National Commission dated 4th April
2008   which   has   affirmed   the   order   of   the   State
Commission.
56. This case is remanded to the State Commission for
hearing on merits as early as possible, preferably
within   a   period   of   six   weeks   from   the   date   of
service of this order to the State Commission.
57. It is expected that the State Commission will hear
out   the   matter   independently   and   give   adequate
reasons   for   its   conclusions.   We,   however,   do   not
make any observations on the merits of the case.
58. Both   these   appeals   are   allowed.     No   order   as   to
costs.
.....................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
.....................J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
30New Delhi 
September 08, 2010
31

 

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