Sunday, August 22, 2010

Delhi HC- Not necessary for the party to narrate each incident against the other spouse to constitute such conducts as cruelty-two or three incidences sufficient-normal wear tear petty quables not cruelty

FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 1 of 36
*   IN THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  DELHI  AT  NEW  DELHI
+       FAO  163/1997
      Date of Decision: August 20, 2010 
MRS. FLORA BOSE           …..  Appellant 
      Through:  Mr. Sunil Mittal, Advocate 
        VERSUS
SUPROTI BOSE                   ….. Respondent
      Through:  Nemo. 
%  CORAM:
  HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH
(1)    Whether reporters  of  local  paper  may  be  allowed to see the
   judgment?            
(2)     To be referred to the reporter or not?              Yes  
(3)     Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?  Yes
        J U D G M E N T
ARUNA SURESH, J.
1.  Under challenge in this appeal is the judgment and decree of the
learned Additional District Judge dated 8th
April, 1997 whereby the
petition of the appellant filed under Section 13 (1) (ia) and (ib) of the
Hindu Marriage Act was dismissed. 
2.  Succinctly,   the facts of the case are that parties to the petition were
married on 8.12.1974 according to Hindu rites and ceremonies.  One 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 2 of 36
male child Ankur Bose was borne out of the wedlock on 7.8.1978. 
Respondent is an alcoholic.  Many a times he remained out of job
and under the influence of liquor and even otherwise he used to treat
the petitioner with cruelty.  Respondent had to vacate the rental
premises on account of non payment of rent and petitioner had to
depend for financial support on her parents. Respondent had stopped
taking care of the family needs.  After vacating the rented
accommodation  parties  started  living  in  the  house  of  Petitioner‟s
parents.  After shifting to her parents house, petitioner  continued
with her job and in the evenings she started going to theater leaving
her child in the care of her parents because Respondent did not show
any inclination or interest to look after the child.  Petitioner became
pregnant again,  to which Respondent expressed his shock and
disowned the child as his own.  He suspected her  fidelity  and
Petitioner had to go for medical termination of the pregnancy.  To
meet his drinking habit, he used to take money from the Petitioner or
her parents and some times  even  sold out household articles. 
Petitioner was allotted a flat and Respondent wanted to sell the
allotment letter to which Petitioner did not agree.  This resulted into
hurling  of abuses and physical beatings to the Petitioner by the
Respondent.  The disputes and differences increased to the extent
that parties stopped their physical relations.  Petitioner sought 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 3 of 36
guidance from a voluntary organization  „Saheli‟, where Respondent
was called and the differences were reconciled with a view to restart
the matrimonial life.   Parties started living together w.e.f.
20.08.1989.  However, disputes and differences continued as before. 
On 2.12.1989,  allegedly a scene was created in the house and
Respondent took out a kitchen knife to assault the Petitioner but,
when their son intervened, he  sustained  injuries and was
hospitalized.  Petitioner lodged a complaint about this incident with
the police  on 3.12.1989. Since 2.12.1989 parties are living
separately.  
3.  Respondent has refuted the allegations of the Petitioner that he is
alcoholic or that he had been beating his wife and the child or that he
did not take care of him or that he had no interest in the child. He has
alleged that he never deserted the Petitioner but was forced to leave
the house on 2.12.1989.  He has also alleged that he had to vacate the
rented accommodation because of eviction decree suffered by him
for bona fide necessity and not on account of non payment of rent.  
4.  On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed for
consideration by the Court:-
(1) Whether the Respondent has treated the Petitioner with cruelty as
alleged? 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 4 of 36
(2) Whether the Respondent has deserted the Petitioner for continous
period of two years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition as alleged?
(3) Relief.  
5.    Respondent  has been contesting the appeal in person.  On 6th
August, 2009 he had stated that he was ready and willing to divorce
the Petitioner by mutual consent provided he was given half share in
MIG flat No.57-D, Pocket IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase-1,  in which  he
claimed himself to be the co-owner with the appellant.  He had also
agreed that if the appellant was able to show Conveyance Deed in
her favour in respect of the said flat, he would divorce her. 
Thereafter the matter was listed for 12th
  August, 2009 with the
direction to the appellant to produce the Conveyance Deed of the
said flat.  However, on 12.08.2009, the Respondent did not appear
though appellant had brought the original Conveyance Deed
executed in her favour by the DDA in respect of the said flat. 
ISSUE NO.1.  
6.  Mr. Sunil Mittal counsel for the appellant  (being referred to as
Petitioner)  has submitted that  the Trial Judge while delivering the
impugned judgment,  has not carefully examined the statement of the
witnesses of the parties and erred in disbelieving the Petitioner‟s 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 5 of 36
assertion that Respondent indulged in heavy drinking and thereafter
caused physical and mental cruelty to her   only on the ground that
there  was no documentary evidence or complaint made by the
Petitioner regarding the drinking habit  of the Respondent and the
cruelty  perpetuated  by the Respondent on the Petitioner under the
influence of liquor.  He was weighed by the fact that Respondent had
taken another premises on rent at Chitranjan Park after vacating the
earlier premises.  While observing that he was employed and if he
was alcoholic and unemployed, he could not have afforded the rented
accommodation in  Chitranjan Park.    He has argued that the trial
Court failed to take notice of the complaints Ex.PW-1/3 and
Ex.PW1/5 lodged by the Petitioner  with the police. 
7.  It is further argued that the Trial Court went wrong while observing
that the allegations of beatings levelled against the Respondent   and
forcing her to sell  allotment  papers  of DDA flat because of which
she had to suffer serious mental pain and agony are general in nature
as there was no complaint of receiving any physical injury or bodily
injury but she complained of having suffered mental  torture  and
agony.  He further emphasized that the Trial Court went wrong in
observing that there is no complaint or any evidence produced by the
Petitioner  to show that she was being asked by the Respondent for
disposal of the flat and the allegations appeared to be exaggerated.  It 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 6 of 36
is also argued that Trial Court committed an error in disbelieving the
Petitioner that she had to go for medical termination of her
pregnancy because of the allegations levelled by the Respondent
against her that she had become pregnant through someone else. The
Court also went wrong in appreciating that she would not have
continued to live with the Respondent  for the sake of  the child, yet
she did not raise any whisper, neither to any of her relations nor to
the relations of  the Respondent.  The Court  also did not properly
appreciate the statement of the Petitioner that Respondent was not
working anywhere after November, 1982,  when it observed that
Petitioner did not summon the record of M/s. Akshay Industries or of
M/s. Greaves Cotton Industries  to prove when Respondent left their
services and that the Petitioner therefore failed to discharge the onus
of proving that Respondent was unemployed.  Counsel for the
appellant has emphasized that the findings of the trial Court on each
and every acts of cruelty as narrated by the Petitioner in the petition
and proved  in evidence by way of her own testimony are erroneous
and perverse in nature.  
8.  Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon following cases:-
(1)   Smt. Vimla Mehra vs. Shri K.S. Mehra, 2009 III AD (Delhi)
  11; 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 7 of 36
(2)    Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, JT 2007 (5) SC 569;
(3)   Geeta Jagdish Mangtani vs. Jagdish Mangtani, 2005 Indlaw
  SC 561;
(4)   A. Jayachandra vs. Aneel Kaur, 2004 Indlaw SC 1034;
(5)   Vinita Saxena vs. Pankaj Pandit , 2006 (87) DRJ 655 (SC);
(6)    Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, 2006 (87) DRJ 630 (SC);
(7)   Rajinder Pershad (dead) by LRs. vs. Smt. Darshana Devi,
  2001 VI AD (SC) 272.   
9.  In brief, the acts of cruelty alleged in the petition are :-
(1)  Respondent is an alcoholic and under the influence of liquor,
he had been indulging in verbal abuses and physical beatings
to the appellant. 
(2)  To meet his financial requirements as well as his need for
liquor, he had been making monetary demands on the
appellant and her parents and also mentally and physically
tortured her for fulfillment of his demands.
(3)  Appellant registered a flat  in her name with the DDA.  On
allotment of the said flat Respondent pressurized, abused and
harassed her to sell the allotment  letter but, Petitioner did not
succumb to his pressure. 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 8 of 36
(4)  Respondent continued with his habit of drinking heavily and
even failed  to pay rent and suffered eviction.  With the result
parties had to reside in the house of parents of the Petitioner. 
(5)  In 1981 Petitioner conceived for the second time but
Respondent suspected  her  fidelity  and disowned the child as
his and indulged  into causing mental and physical torture to
her.  Petitioner had to undergo medical termination of
pregnancy, but for sake of the child, she continued to live with
him.  
(6)  In May, 1989 Respondent came back home heavily drunk and
gave her physical beatings, abused her, threw utensils and spit
and vomited on her and quarreled with her  the whole night.
Appellant had to leave the home in the morning. 
(7)  With  the  intervention  of  social  organization  „Saheli‟,  parties
were  reunited on 20.09.1989.  However,  there was no
improvement in their relationship.  On 2.12.1989 a quarrel
ensued between the parties when Respondent came  home
drunk at about 11:00 P.M.  He allegedly picked up a knife and
threatened to kill the appellant.  However, the child intervened
and  received injuries  on his person.  Appellant made a
complaint at Police Station Mayur Vihar and the child was got 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 9 of 36
medically examined.  Respondent left the company of the
Petitioner on 3.12.1989 and since thereafter parties are living
separately.   
10.  Parties to the petition were known to each other even before
marriage as they were working in the same theater  and had been
meeting with each other before they took the decision to get married. 
11.  Appellant as PW-1 has deposed that after losing lob in January, 1975
Respondent indulged in the habit of drinking wine with his friends. 
Though Respondent was employed with M/s. Akshay Industries  in
November, 1975 his drinking habits increased and Respondent even
sold household articles to buy liquor for himself.  Respondent was
again unemployed and appellant had to take a part time job in 1982
with Delhi Art Theater leaving her child in the custody of her
parents.   She has deposed that instead of improving his behaviour
Respondent started consuming more liquor and torturing her
mentally as well as physically by giving her beatings.  He   would
take money from her for his drink and also forced her to get money
from her parents.  Respondent with a view to purchase drinks also
took loan and started selling household articles.  She has deposed
that whenever she resisted the demand of Respondent for money, she
was given beatings.  Because of the beatings she suffered mental 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 10 of 36
pain as well as physical torture.  She has deposed on oath that
because of excessive drinking Respondent started coming late at
home and she and the Respondent seized to have any physical
relationship with each other. 
12.  Petitioner  in her statement  has narrated  the instance of May, 1989
stating that,  Respondent returned home late at night in drunken
condition and for  no  rhyme  or  reason  gave  her  physical beatings,
pulled her hair, sat on her, abused her, spit and vomited on her in the
absence of her child who had gone to school trip.  She has stated that
Respondent quarreled with her throughout the night with the result,
she had to leave house in the morning and take refuge in her parents‟
house.   There is no effective cross examination of the appellant and
Respondent as RW-1 has not specifically refuted the act of cruelty
committed by him on the  Petitioner in May, 1989.
13.  The other incident she has narrated is of 2.12.1989, when under the
guidance    of  „Shaheli‟,  a voluntary women organization, she had
started living with the Respondent and the child from 20.09.1989. 
She  has  testified  that on that date Respondent returned home at
about 11:00 P.M. in drunken condition and started abusing her for no
reason.  When he did not cool down, she asked him as to why he was
abusive,  on which Respondent picked up utensils and threw  them 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 11 of 36
upon her and he also picked up a knife from the kitchen and
threatened her of life.  To save herself, she went to the room and her
son, who had  intervened between her and the Respondent was also
threatened and was injured by him with a knife on his left eye.  
14.  In between 20.09.1989  to 2.12.1989,  as per her statement,  parties
continued to fight and Respondent continued to come home late at
night in drunken condition.  He showed his dis-interest towards the
Petitioner as well as the child.  
15.  There is no cross examination of the appellant about the behaviour of
the Respondent towards the appellant after their  re-union on
20.09.1989.     It is not disputed that the parties  had reconciled with
the  assistance  of  voluntary    organization  „Saheli‟,  and a document
Ex.PW-1/1  dated 5.08.1989  (copy of the same Ex. RW-2/1)  was
executed.  However, this document in no manner suggests that
parties had reconciled their dispute.  Rather  it suggests separation
and divorce by mutual consent.  It seems that after execution of this
document parties continued  to visit „Saheli‟,  on its calls  and
consequently decided to live together.    This is reflected from the
letter dated 20.09.1989 Ex.PW-1/17, written by the Respondent to
Saheli,  acknowledging their advice and assistance  in solving their
problem  and  helping them to re-unite.  However, there    is no 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 12 of 36
evidence produced by the Respondent on record to suggest    that he
had improved upon his behaviour towards the Petitioner. 
16.  It has come in evidence that after marriage parties started living in a
rented house at Chitranjan Park.  At that time, Respondent was
employed with M/s. Office Equipments and he lost his job in
January, 1975.  Petitioner took up job in September, 1975 with M/s.
K.G.Khosla Compressor at Faridabad.  Respondent had taken a job
with M/s. Akshay Industries  in 1975 and thereafter her parents dis-
continued  the  financial support.  She has deposed that the rented
accommodation had to be vacated on 31.12.1982 because
Respondent did not pay the rent of the premises and suffered eviction
order and she was forced to take shelter in her parents‟ house along
with Respondent and the child.  She has denied the suggestion that
the tenanted premises were vacated for bonafide requirement of the
landlord.   Respondent has a grouse that they were  provided garage
accommodation by appellant‟s parents and not  in  the house. 
Certified copy of the eviction order has not been placed and proved
on record by the Respondent to demolish the statement of the
appellant that they had to vacate the rented premises  at Chitranjan
Park for non payment of rent. Respondent has not placed on record
any document to indicate that he was employed and therefore there
was no occasion for him to demand any money from his wife, the 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 13 of 36
appellant or his in-laws to meet his demands.  Since Petitioner
categorically deposed that Respondent was unemployed for most of
the time,  it was for  him  to  demolish  her    evidence  by producing
relevant  evidence on record,  documentary or otherwise,  to indicate
his financial status.    Pass Book Ex.PW-1/R-3 pertains to the year
1985 till January, 1991.  Debit entries in the account book basically
relate  to the school fees which might have been paid by the
Respondent.  To this also the explanation has been given by the
Petitioner  that,  since school fees account was opened under the
guardianship of father, she had been financing the Respondent to pay
school fees of the child from the said account. 
17.  To a suggestion put to her in the cross examination she has deposed
that  „It  is  correct  that my  husband  has  been  resorting  to  physical
injuries to me right from the marriage.  I got married in the year,
1974.  I tolerated the illtreatment of the respondent till, 1989 in the
hope that the behaviour of the respondent might improve.  It is
correct that the influence of the father/respondent on the child was
not congenial‟.    
18.   It is pertinent that the testimony of the Petitioner that Respondent is
addicted to heavy drinking and has been giving physical beatings and
causing mental torture to her in drunken condition remained 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 14 of 36
uncontroverted as she has not been cross examined on  this  aspect
except that,  when asked,  she has replied that her husband was
addicted to alcohol right from the marriage. 
19.  True that Respondent in his statement has denied that every day he
indulged in  excessive  drinking,  but then his  vague  denial in the
absence of any cross examination of the Petitioner would not in any
manner prove that Respondent was not alcoholic or that under the
influence of liquor he did not torture his wife physically or mentally.  
20.  The Trial Court while considering the  oral evidence of the parties
observed:-
“34. As  regards  the grounds of  cruelty which
are based mainly on the drinking habits of the
respondent and on the basis of fact  that
respondent was unemployed for a considerable
period and that the respondent had always been
asking  the Petitioner to bring money from her
parents, all these do not stand proved as I have
already observed above.”
“35. As  regards  the  allegations  about  drinking
habit of the  respondent, there is no concrete
evidence except the oral testimony of both the
parties.  The  petitioner/wife has levelled
allegations that the  respondent/ husband was a
regular drunker and the  respondent/ husband
has denied the same. Since no particular
incident of drinking has been proved on record,
whereby respondent had taken excessive
drinking and then under the influence of liquor 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 15 of 36
he had caused any cruelty upon the petitioner or
had treated the petitioner with any cruelty. So I
find that general allegations regarding drinking
can  not be termed as cruelty of such a nature
which may  amount of  matrimonial offence of
cruelty for the purposes  of dissolution of
marriage.” 
21.  The fact findings of the Court are not born out of the record. 
Incidents of cruelty have been specifically testified by the  Petitioner 
as PW-1.  Such as incidents of May, 1989 and 2.12.1989.  These
allegations cannot in any manner be considered as general in nature. 
It is proved in evidence of the Petitioner that Respondent used to
physically and mentally torture her for bringing money from her
parents for fulfillment of his requirement of liquor. 
22.  To my mind, the Trial Court also did not properly appreciate the
allegations of unemployment and torture for money as proved by the
appellant in her testimony, while observing:-
“30.  ……will go  to  show  that  the  respondent
had at least not lost his job and that is why after
vacating one rental accommodation at
Inderpuri, he took up another rental
accommodation in Chitranjan Park. Though he
had denied that he started indulging in drinking
liquor daily and he has not at all  admitted fact
of taking drinks, yet assuming  for the sake of
arguments that at times the respondent had been
taking drinks but that factor alone will not be 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 16 of 36
sufficient to say that the petitioner was being
treated with cruelty by the respondent unless the
said drinking habit of the respondent is coupled
with the overt act of creating scenes or giving
beatings to the petitioner…….  that there is no
document on record to suggest that there was
any dispute between the parties either over
drinking habit of the  respondent or the
respondent not taking interest in the family
affairs or not supporting the family financially.”
“32.    ….. that none of the parties has
summoned any record from M/s  Akshay
Industries or from M/s  Greaves Cotton
Industries to show that the  respondent was not
working anywhere after Nov.,  82 and was
unemployed for some period. Since the
allegation of unemployment of  respondent are
by the petitioner so the onus  to prove  the same
was on petitioner. She should have shown the
records and prove  that respondent was
unemployed.
33.……. So there is a presumption that the
petitioner might have taken up a part time job
with Delhi Art Theatre on account of her
interest in that field…... But that does not show
that she was compelled to take part time job
because of financial crisis as the petitioner has
not proved on record to show that during the
year 1982 when she took up part time job
respondent was out of job and there was no
other source of income to properly maintain the
family.” 
23.  The Trial Court went  wrong  in observing that after vacating the
rented accommodation at Inderpuri,  he took up another rented
accommodation at Chitranjan Park because, soon after the marriage 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 17 of 36
parties first lived at Inder Puri with the parents of the Respondent for
a very short period and thereafter they took rented accommodation at
Chitranjan Park, where they continued to reside till the eviction order
was passed against the Respondent  in 1982  and therefore the Trial
Court was not right in its approach to discard the testimony  of the
appellant that Respondent was unemployed  when it observed that
Respondent had not lost  his job and that is why after vacating the
rented accommodation at Inder Puri, took another accommodation at
Chitranjan Park.  Analysis of  evidence by the Trial Court  is
therefore, erroneous and has to be brushed aside.  
24.  There cannot be any direct, oral or documentary evidence except the
testimony of the Petitioner and the circumstantial evidence  to prove
that there was dispute between the parties either for drinking habit of
the Respondent or  for  Respondent not taking any interest in the
family affairs or for not supporting the family financially.  Financial
status of the Respondent, indicated in his pass book, has already been
discussed above.  Needless to say, Respondent has not controverted
the statement of the Petitioner that he was unemployed or that he was
not supporting her financially. Rather, he tortured her physically and
mentally to take money from her and her parents to meet his need for
liquor.   In his  cross examination he admitted that he had no
documentary proof to show that he was in employment and was 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 18 of 36
getting salary and was financially sound  to meet his requirements
and that of his wife and child. 
25.  Respondent in his cross examination did admit that a complaint was
made by the appellant with a voluntary organization „Saheli‟, where
he was called number of times for reconciliation.  He also admitted
that a complaint was lodged  by his wife with CAW Cell which
remained alive during the period from 20.09.1989 to 2.12.1989 when
parties  were  living together.  This suggests  that they started living
together  on  a  trial basis to understand each other better  but,
unfortunately, they again fell out as Respondent did not improve his
behaviour.  Admittedly, Petitioner has been financially independent
throughout as she remained in employment and also worked in the
theater on part time employment after her office hours.  If the
Respondent was financially sound, there was no need for the
Petitioner  to take up a part time job in the evening after coming
home from the office at the cost of neglecting her house and the child
who admittedly was being  taken care of by her parents in her
absence. 
26.  In her complaint dated 3.12.1989 Ex.PW-1/3, made at Police Station
Mayur Vihar, Petitioner has specifically levelled allegations against
the Respondent that on 2.12.1989 he came home at about 11:00 P.M.    
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 19 of 36
Under the influence of liquor  he  picked up  a  quarrel with her. 
Similar were her allegations in her complaint Ex.PW-1/5 made on
the same day to SHO, Police Station Trilok Puri.  It is not in dispute
that Respondent was called by the SHO of the concerned Police
Station for interrogation. 
27.  There is a letter written by the Respondent on 11.09.1989 Ex.PW-
1/19 on the record. Few lines of  the said letter being relevant are
reproduced below:-
“…  Far  from  giving  proper  return  for
this love.  I have behaved in a very cruel
manner to you from all angles, mental,
physical, financial and social….” 
“…  Far  from  being  greatful  to  you  for
this, I have beaten you, I have tortured
you a lot,  and I confess this thousand
times.  I give you words that I will work
hard to keep your happiness intact….” 
“Save me from the grip of vice, and
allow me to do penance for all my
sins…..”
28.  Thus, there is clear admission on the part of the Respondent made to
the appellant in this letter that he had been torturing her mentally,
physically, financially and socially.   He was not providing any
finance to the appellant, rather forced her to part with money to meet
his demands for liquor.  This also indicates that Respondent was not
financially independent;  being jobless as alleged by the Petitioner.   
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 20 of 36
When  he  has  referred  to  a  „vice‟, and  sought forgiveness from the
Petitioner, he referred to no other vice but his addiction to liquor.  It
was because of excessive drinking,  he physically and mentally
tortured her, did not take any interest in the family, did not care for
her and the child.  
29.  This letter was written by the Respondent just nine days before he
joined the company  of the  Petitioner in September 1989  and re-
started living with her.  However,  despite all the assurances and
undertakings given  by him in this letter,  he completely failed to
honour them.   The Trial Court has failed to appreciate the
documentary evidence as discussed above and erroneously observed
that there was no direct evidence produced on record for the alleged
mis-conduct and ill-behaviour of the Respondent with the Petitioner.
30.  Another instance of grave mental cruelty is when in 1981 Petitioner
conceived for the second time, she suffered physical as well as
mental torture at the hands of the Respondent because he suspected
her fidelity and she had to get medical termination of the pregnancy
done.
31.  The Trial Court committed error when it observed that Petitioner
could not have continued to live with the Respondent after
termination of the pregnancy on the alleged ground of suspected 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 21 of 36
fidelity but she did not do so and continued to live with the
Respondent indicating that  no such cruelty was committed by the
Respondent and that the statement of the Petitioner was not
believable. 
32.  Respondent has not disputed that in 1981 Petitioner had conceived
second time and also that she had to undergo medical termination of
pregnancy.  There is no cross examination of the  Petitioner on this
aspect of the matter, nor Respondent has stated anything in his
statement as RW-1 indicating the reasons which might have forced
the Petitioner to get here pregnancy terminated. 
33.  Therefore, I find no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the 
Petitioner that she had to undergo termination of pregnancy because
of the Respondent‟s suspicion on her fidelity, and he accused that the
child was not his and disowned him.  Nothing can be more cruel to a
woman, rather a mother, than such accusation on her character and
also the father disowning the child. 
34.  Rift between the parties widened further when Petitioner was allotted
a flat by the DDA.  It has come in evidence  that Respondent
pressurized, abused, harassed and ill-treated the Petitioner for selling
the allotment  documents  to which  Petitioner  never agreed.   To
pressurize her, Respondent gave her physical beatings and mentally 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 22 of 36
tortured her.  It has also come in her statement, which has remained
uncontroverted on record that,  Respondent never provided any
financial assistance to her for purchase of  the  flat.  It is not the case
of the Respondent in his testimony that he had financially supported
his wife to pay the purchase price of the said flat to DDA.  It is an
admitted case of the parties  that Respondent had filed a civil suit
seeking half share in the said flat but he lost the case. His challenge
to the judgment and decree of the trial court in appeal also failed.   It
is obvious that Respondent pressurized appellant to sell the allotment
of the flat with a view to have easy access  to finances which would
have come in the hands of the Petitioner  on  sale of the flat.  It is
pertinent that even before this Court, Respondent made a statement
that he was ready and willing to divorce his wife by mutual consent
provided, he was given half share in the flat, being co-owner.  When
Petitioner produced the original Conveyance Deed dated 28.12.2005
on the desire of the Respondent, he absented himself knowing it well
that the flat was owned by the Petitioner and he has no share in the
same.  A copy of the Conveyance Deed has been placed on record by
her to prove that the said flat is allotted to her in her individual name
and not jointly with the Respondent.  A person, who remained almost
unemployed during his stay with his wife, started spending money on
liquor,  indiscriminately,  came home  late at night, gave physical 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 23 of 36
beatings as well as mentally tortured her and  least of all demanded
share in her flat, cannot claim that he was not „CRUEL‟ to his wife. 
Petitioner has been running her household and bringing up the child
single handedly, with no support  from her husband.  Behaviour of
the Respondent over the years can only be termed as „CRUEL‟.
35.  The worst incident of cruelty, as proved on record, is of the night of
2.12.1989.  It is proved in evidence from the testimony of the RW1,
which finds corroboration from consequent FIRs/police complaints
made by the  Petitioner  at Police Station,  Trilok Puri and  Mayur
Vihar,  that on the fateful night  Respondent came  heavily drunken
and for no rhyme  or  reason  picked up quarrel with  her, gave her
beatings, abused her, picked up utensils and threw them on her,
picked up a knife and threatened her of life.  When suddenly her son
intervened to save her from his anger and  threat under the influence
of liquor and when he tried to inflict injuries on her, he got injuries
on his left eye.  He was taken to SDN hospital where he was
provided with proper medical assistance.  MLC  Ex. PW-1/2  was
prepared by the concerned doctor of  the hospital.  As per this MLC
history of the patient as recorded is “being beaten by blunt weapon
q/e and left eye congested”.   Respondent in his cross examination
could not explain as to how his son got injuries on his left eye. He
has deposed that he had no idea if on the  fateful night of 2.12.1989 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 24 of 36
his son suffered injuries on his left eye.  He also had no idea if his
son was injured when he made attempt to save his mother during his
fight with the Petitioner.    According to him, he came to know that
his child   was provided medical aid only after coming to the Court. 
He admitted that neighbours did come on account of commotion
after hearing the loud voice and shouting of his wife.  He did admit
that on 3.12.1989  in the morning,  parents of the appellant and
volunteers from „Saheli‟, came to his house.  
36.  Thus, it is clear from the answers given by the Respondent in his
cross examination that,  he could not recollect the incident of
2.12.1989, obviously he was under the influence of liquor when he
physically  beat his wife, threw utensils on her and tried to cause
injuries with a knife.  To save herself, Petitioner had to lock herself
in the room.  To save his mother when the child intervened, he also
received injuries on his left eye.      
37.  The word  „cruelty‟  finds no definition in the Act.  Therefore, the
word „cruelty‟ used in Section 13 (1) (ia) of  the Act is in the context
of human conduct and behaviour in relation to and in respect of
matrimonial duties or obligations.  It is a course or  conduct of one
spouse which adversely affects the other spouse.    Cruelty can be
mental or physical, intentional or unintentional.  While judging the 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 25 of 36
physical cruelty, Court has to judge the degree of such physical
torture and if it is mental, the enquiry is required to the nature of
cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the
mind of the other spouse.            
38.  The ingredients of cruelty as required to be proved on record by the
Petitioner  are based on delicate personal relationship of husband and
wife. Court, therefore, has to see the probabilities in a given case to
find out the legal cruelty, not merely as a matter of fact, but as to the
effect on the mind of the  Petitioner  spouse because of the acts or
omission of the other.  This cruelty besides physical, mental can also
be corporeal. 
39.  To  constitute  cruelty,  the  conduct  complained  of  should  be  “grave
and weighty” so as to come to the conclusion that the  Petitioner
spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. 
It must be something more serious than  “ordinary wear  and  tear of
married life”.  The conduct, taking into consideration the
circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the
conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in
the matrimonial  law.   Court dealing with the petition filed for
divorce on the ground of cruelty has to keep in mind that the
problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 26 of 36
changes in a spouse‟s conduct have to be borne in mind before
disposing of the  petition for divorce.  However, insignificant or
trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of  another.  But
before such conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain
pitch of severity.  
40.  Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be  exaggerated and
magnified to destroy  a marriage.  Foundation of marriage is
tolerance, adjustment and respect towards one another.  Therefore,
inherently tolerance of each other‟s fault to a certain bearable extent
has to be kept in mind before considering a particular conduct of a
spouse  towards  the other as  tantamounting  to „cruelty‟.     The Court
has to consider the mental and physical conditions of the parties,
their characters  and social status and therefore, the incidents which
can be termed as „cruelty‟ have to be adjudged in a case on the facts
and circumstances and the evidence adduced on record.  It is not
required that physical violence as well as mental torture are essential
to constitute  cruelty.  Even conduct inflicting a miserable mental
agony  and torture  under the given circumstances  may constitute
cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1) (ia) of the Act.
41.  In case of physical cruelty, the Court generally gets direct evidence
but in case of mental cruelty, the Court has to first make an inquiry 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 27 of 36
to the nature of cruel treatment, the impact of such treatment in the
mind of the spouse if it caused reasonable apprehension that it can be
harmful or dangerous to live with the other.     It is not necessary for
the party to narrate each incident against the other spouse to
constitute such conducts as cruelty.  Sometimes two or three
incidents may be sufficient to prove the cruelty committed on the
petitioner by the other spouse. Many a times mental cruelty is more
severe than the physical cruelty. 
42.   In ‘Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh’ (2007) 4 SCC 51,  the Supreme
Court  has enumerated some instances of human behaviour which
may be relevant in dealing with the cases of mental cruelty.  They
are:
“ (i)  On consideration of complete matrimonial life
of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering
as would not make possible for the   parties to
live with each other could come within the broad
parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii)  On comprehensive appraisal of the  entire
matrimonial life of the  parties, it becomes abundantly
clear  that situation is such that the  wronged party
cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such
conduct and continue to live with other party.
(iii)  Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot
amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language,
petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may
reach such a degree that it makes the married life for
the other spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv)  Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 28 of 36
deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one
spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time
may lead to mental cruelty.
(v)  A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render
miserable life of the spouse.
(vi)  Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour
of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental
health of the other spouse. The treatment complained
of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be
very grave, substantial and weighty.
(vii)  Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied
neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal
standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental
health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to
mental cruelty.
(viii)  The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness
and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a
ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental
cruelty.
(ix)  Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear
and tear of the married life which happens in day to
day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on
the ground of mental cruelty.
(x)  The married life should be reviewed as a whole
and a few isolated instances over a period of years will
not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be
persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the
relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because
of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged
party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other
party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi)  If a husband submits himself for an operation of
sterilization without medical reasons and without the
consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly,  if the
wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 29 of 36
husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental
cruelty.
(xii)  Unilateral decision of refusal to have
intercourse for considerable period without there being
any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to
mental cruelty.
(xiii)  Unilateral decision of either husband or wife
after marriage not to have child from the marriage may
amount to cruelty.
(xiv)  Where there has been a long period of
continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that
the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage
becomes a  fiction though supported by a legal tie. By
refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does
not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it
shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the
parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental
cruelty.”
43.  Evidently mental cruelty cannot be comprehensively defined, within
which all kinds of cases of mental  cruelty can be covered.  Human
mind  is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally
complicated.   Similarly human ingenuity has no bound  and
therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition
is almost impossible.   What may amount to cruelty in one case may
not amount to cruelty in the other case because,  concept of cruelty
differ from person to person depending upon  his/her upbringing,
level of sensitivity,  educational, family and cultural background,
financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs,
human values and their value system.  The concept of mental cruelty 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 30 of 36
has changed with the passage of time; because of impact of modern
culture through various medias electronic and print and other value
system.  Therefore, there cannot be any straight jacket formula or
fixed parameters for determining the mental cruelty in matrimonial
matters.  No uniform standard, therefore, can be laid down  for
guidance  what may constitute mental cruelty in matrimonial
disputes.
44.  Coming back to the facts and circumstances of this case, parties to
the petition were married in December, 1974.  They continued to live
together for a period of fifteen years except a short separation from
May 1989 to September 1989.     Petitioner  has been tolerating the
physical torture as well as mental agony at the hands of the
Respondent  for the said period.  She continued to live with the
Respondent despite the fact that he suspected her fidelity when she
conceived for the second time in 1981.  She must have suffered
grave mental pain and agony when she had to go for medical
termination of pregnancy.  Respondent was never financially stable
and sound.   Petitioner had been working since after her marriage and
looking after the financial needs of the family including that of the
Respondent.  It is not disputed that parties had to vacate the rented
accommodation in Chitranjan Park  because of the eviction order,
which  Respondent  suffered.     Respondent  did not make any 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 31 of 36
arrangement for another rented accommodation.  Rather he shifted
with the Petitioner  in the house of her parents, where she continued
to live in a garage for quite sometime.  Respondent was in the habit
of taking liquor but, he became alcoholic over the period of time. 
45.  As discussed above, there is enough evidence to indicate that to meet
his demands for liquor, he physically and mentally tortured the
Petitioner.  Some of  the instances of physical and mental cruelty
proved on record are of  1981, May 1989 and of 2.12.1989.  It is
significant that behaviour of the  Respondent  became more cruel
when he refused to contribute for the purchase of the flat allotted in
the name of the Petitioner by the DDA.  Not only this, he wanted to
sell the allotment but, could not succeed as  Petitioner  remained firm
on her decision not to sell the allotment,  for which she had to face
physical as well as mental cruelty at the hands of the Respondent. 
The conduct of the Respondent  in pressurizing the Petitioner  to sell
the allotment is obvious from his various subsequent acts.  He filed a
suit claiming half share in the property but he lost.  He disputed the
absolute title of the Petitioner  in  the said property at Mayur Vihar. 
Even in this appeal, he made it clear that he would divorce the
Petitioner only after he was given half share in the house.  Under the
circumstances, to say that conduct of the  Respondent  towards the
Petitioner  cannot be  construed as cruelty within the meaning of 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 32 of 36
Section 13(1) (ia) of the Act would not be correct. 
46.  Parties to the appeal are artists.  An artist by temperament is
emotional and sensitive.  Behaviour of the Respondent  towards the
Petitioner  throughout fifteen  years of their living together has been
unreasonable and torturous.  His  ill  behaviour can be safely
construed as grave.  He has been ill-treating the Petitioner.  There is
evidence to indicate that there was  cessation of sexual intercourse,
neglect of the  Petitioner  and the family, his indifference attitude
towards the family and his assertion that Petitioner  is unchaste,  are
factors which constitute mental or legal cruelty.  Respondent, under
the influence of liquor seemed  to be losing his temper to such  an
extent that he would indulge into giving severe beatings, vomiting on
his wife, spitting on her.  Once be picked up a knife and threatened
the  Petitioner  of life.  In this fight, it was the innocent child, their
son, who received injuries on his left eye.  What could be more then
what has been discussed above to construe legal  cruelty? 
Respondent  though had been assuring the Petitioner of  reformation,
neither  his behaviour  nor his conduct  improved.  Rather his
behaviour and indifference to the Petitioner and the family increased. 
It was when Petitioner could not bear the Respondent any further that
she left the house in May 1989 and went to her parents.   She tried to
readjust with the  Respondent  with the assistance of women 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 33 of 36
organization „Saheli‟.  Again  Respondent  did not try to improve
himself in any manner.  His need for finances was another reason for
his torturous conduct towards the Petitioner.    Petitioner, therefore,
suffered physical as well as mental cruelty and it could not  be
expected that they could live together after the incident of 2.12.1989.
47.  Since after December 1989, parties are living separately.  Son is now
about 31 years of age and settled in life.  Parties are living separately
for about 21 years.  The matrimonial bond between the parties has,
therefore, been ruptured beyond repair because of mental and
physical cruelty caused by the  Respondent.  After separation, the
parties did not have any interaction with each other.  Rather they
have been litigating, may be in a Civil Court of law.  I find on record
a complaint dated 5th
  February, 1989 Ex. PW-1/15,  disclosing  the
behaviour of the Respondent of 4.02.1989.  Respondent has admitted
that he has not met his child since after 2.12.1989.  
48.  Trial Court did not properly appreciate the uncontroverted statement
of the  Petitioner when it observed that the allegations of beatings,
mental torture, pain and agony suffered by the Petitioner  were quite
general in nature and that the ground of cruelty as pleaded by the 
Petitioner  did not prove the extent that she was being treated by the
Respondent  with such cruelty, which may amount to  matrimonial 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 34 of 36
events of cruelty under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Act.  The
appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court is not in the correct
perspective  on  facts and  circumstances  of the case  and evidence
adduced on record.  Uncontroverted evidence of the  Petitioner  has
proved physical as well as mental cruelty and every incident of such
cruel behaviour of the  Respondent  clearly established  that
Respondent treated her with legal cruelty. 
49.  Hence, the findings of the Trial Court on this issue are set aside and
it is decided in favour of the Petitioner.  
ISSUE NO. 2
50.  On 3rd
  December, 1989 when  Respondent  left the house he was
residing in Mayur Vihar i.e. the flat owned by  the Petitioner.  This
happened because of a quarrel having taken place between the
parties on the intervening night of 2nd
/3rd
December, 1989.  Parties
continued to fight the whole night.   Respondent  was violent and
abusive towards the Petitioner  in so much so that he even inflicted
injury to his son.     It was under these circumstances that he left the
house in the morning of 3rd
  December 1989 in the presence of
workers of women organization „Saheli‟ and parents of the
Petitioner.
51.  There is no dispute that Respondent executed a document Ex. PW-
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 35 of 36
1/4 on 3rd
December, 1989 in the presence of S.Vatsyayan, PW-2.  In
this document, he has written that  he was finally leaving the
premises No.57-D, Pocket-IV, Mayur Vihar, New Delhi of his own
with a pledge not to come back to the said premises and disturb the 
Petitioner  s in future for any reason whatsoever.  It is submitted by
counsel for the Petitioner that Respondent deserted the Petitioner on
3.12.1989 of his own.  I find no force in his submission.  It is
significant to note that in the last few lines of this letter he has
written that he would not claim any rights or privileges in the said
flat.  In return he wanted that Petitioner  should not seek any
monetary assistance from him for the household from that date.  It is
also recorded that parties had agreed to go in for mutual divorce of
marriage in a court of law within fifteen days from that date.  Thus, it
is clear  from this letter that Respondent had deserted the Petitioner
because of the incident of the night. It cannot be said that he was left
with no option but to leave the house.
52.  As pointed out above,  Petitioner  had lodged a complaint dated 3rd
December, 1989 Ex. PW-1/3.  Perusal of this complaint indicate that
Respondent had to leave the house as a result of external intervention
after writing the attached contract Ex.PW-1/4.   It also indicate that
Petitioner would approach the court of law for mutual divorce and in
the meantime sought police protection.  Since  Respondent  left the 
FAO 163/1997                                                                                                     Page 36 of 36
house under adverse and strained circumstances, it cannot be said
that he deserted the  Petitioner  within the meaning of Section
13(1)(ib) of the Act.  Hence, findings of the Trial Court on this issue
are affirmed but, for different reasons. 
RELIEF
53.  In view of my findings on issue No.1, appeal is partly allowed and
decree and judgment of the Trial Court dated 8th
April, 1997 on this
is hereby set aside.  I hereby pass a decree for divorce under Section
13(1) (ia) of the Act.
54.  Under the circumstances, parties are left to bear their own costs. 
Decree be prepared accordingly.  Trial Court record be sent back
along with an attested copy of this order.
       ARUNA SURESH
                   (JUDGE)
AUGUST 20,  2010
vk/sb

 

http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/AS/judgement/21-08-2010/AS20082010FAO1631997.pdf

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Delhi HC -Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage (IBM) not a cakewalk

MAT APP 44/2005

                                                                         
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

Judgment delivered on: 14.7.2010

MAT APP 44/2005

SUBHASH CHANDER SHARMA     ……Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajiv Dewan, Advocate.

Versus

ANJALI SHARMA          ……Respondent
          Through: None.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR

1.  Whether the Reporters of local papers may     Yes
     be allowed to see the judgment?              
2.  To be referred to Reporter or not?                     Yes  
3.  Whether the judgment should be reported 
      in the Digest?              Yes

KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.  
*

1.    By this appeal filed under Section  28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the appellant seeks to challenge
the  impugned  judgment and decree dated 12.05.2003 passed by the learned ADJ, Delhi thereby dismissing  the
divorce petition filed by the appellant under Section 13(1) (ia) & (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act.


2.    Brief facts of the case  relevant for deciding the present appeal are that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on 29.11.1984  at Mathura, U.P according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. From this wedlock, two children were born i.e. on 10.02.1988 and 12.09.1992. Both the parties lived together as husband and wife for 14 years i.e. upto 15.02.1998.  The  acts  of cruelty based  on which the appellant-husband has sought decree of divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act mainly are that after the death of the father of the appellant the mother of the respondent started living with them and due to her presence the  atmosphere in the house got so surcharged that even the children started avoiding the appellant; the appellant though lived in the same house, but had to cook his own  food and do all his personal work himself; he felt neglected and depressed on account of  the behaviour of the respondent and her mother and ultimately on 15.02.1998 the appellant started living separately; the appellant made all efforts for  rapprochement  but  the respondent foiled all his attempts; the respondent gave instructions to the school  authorities  that the appellant
should not be allowed to meet the children; the respondent avoided to come to official telephone so as to talk with the appellant; the appellant was insulted by the respondent and her mother when he went to contact the respondent; the appellant was not even allowed to enter in the house; the respondent shifted her residence from housing society to some other place and she had also given instructions to her office not to disclose her new address to her husband; the appellant also wrote various letters to the respondent, but she did not respond to the same. The appellant has also averred that he has not condoned the acts of cruelty complained of against the respondent.

3.    So far the ground of desertion is concerned, the appellant averred that the respondent had deserted him
without any reasonable cause and against his wishes. The appellant has also averred that there has not been any willful neglect on his part and for no fault of the appellant the respondent deserted him.


4.    The respondent did not choose to appear after having been duly served with the notice. She, however,
sent reply by post, making certain allegations against the appellant. Accordingly, the respondent was proceeded ex parte by the Court vide orders dated 28.01.2003.

5.    In the evidence, the appellant examined himself as PW-1 and except his own evidence he did not adduce
any further evidence. In his evidence, the appellant deposed that he got married to the respondent on 29.11.1984 at Mathura, U.P and since thereafter they were living together as husband and wife. He also deposed that out of the said wedlock, two children i.e. one daughter and one son were born on 10.02.1988 and 12.09.1992 respectively. He further deposed that he was forced to leave the house on  15.02.1998 due to the circumstances created by the respondent and her mother, when  she had joined them after the death of the father of the appellant in the year 1996. It would be relevant to reproduce the entire evidence of the appellant as under:-

            “PW1 Subhash Chander Sharma, petitioner.

On S.A.:-   I got married on 22nd  of Nov. 1985 with the respondent. Marriage took place at Mathura, U.P. Reception was held in Delhi. Since then we were living together as husband and wife upto 15th February, 1998. On 15.02.1998 I was forced to leave the house due to the circumstances created by respondent and her mother
who joined us on the death of my father in 1996. The relation was unbearable facing lot of depression and continuous failure in life. I faced lot of embarrassment in the relations. I faced mental agony by continuing in the circumstances.  Out of the wedlock we had two children, daughter named Anupriya date of birth 10/2/88, son Chinmay Sharma date of birth 12 Sept. 1992. After the separation she issued instructions to the school authorities not to allow me to meet the children. My every effort for reapproachment was foiled by her. She did not attend even the phone calls I made at her official telephone. Even my letters which were of personal nature were not responded at all. My friends and relatives whosoever tried for the reapproachment faced humiliation and insult which closed the door at me for reapproachment.  The respondent deserted me without any major cause and reasonable cause. I have not condoned the acts of cruelties and the petition has not been filed in collusion with the respondent. My petition is correct.

                   sd/-
 

RO& AC          ADJ/Delhi
             6/3/2003”

6.    The appellant was not cross-examined by the respondent as she was proceeded ex parte by the Court. Based on the case set up by the appellant in his divorce petition and the said ex parte evidence adduced by him, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that theallegations of cruelty leveled by the appellant  do not constitute cruelty as envisaged under Section 13(1) (ia) of  the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.    So far  as  the ground of desertion is concerned, the learned trial court found that it is the appellant himself who left the matrimonial home on 15.02.1998, therefore, no evidence on record has been adduced by the appellant to prove that the respondent had any intention  to bring the cohabitation permanently to an end. The learned trial court thus found that the appellant failed to establish any „animus deserendi‟ on the part of the respondent and in the absence of the same, the ground of desertion was also found to be not available to the appellant.

7.    Assailing the said judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the appellant preferred the present appeal.  Counsel appearing for the appellant strongly contended  that the respondent has neither contested the
petition before the learned trial court nor she is contesting the present appeal and, therefore, such conduct on the part of the respondent would be manifest of the fact that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. Counsel thus submitted  that this Court may direct dissolution of the marriage of  the parties on the said ground  itself. Counsel for the appellant further contended that the appellant fully established both the grounds of divorce i.e. cruelty as well as desertion beyond any shadow of doubt, but still the learned trial court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Counsel further contended that the learned trial court  committed  grave error by not appreciating the fact that the divorce proceedings were not contested by the respondent and, therefore, the evidence of the appellant remained unrebutted.


8.    In support of his arguments, counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in  Naveen Kohli Vs. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558  and the judgment of this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar  Dhanwaria  Vs. Maya Devi, 2003(107) DLT 583.

9.    I have heard counsel for the appellant at considerable length  and have given my anxious consideration to the pleas raised by him.

10.    By way of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, cruelty  was introduced  as a  ground of divorce  as
prior thereto    the  same was only a ground for claiming a decree of judicial separation under Section 10(1) (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The ground of cruelty was added with the omission of the expression “as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party” from Section 10 (1) (b). After the 1976 amendment, now Section 13(1) (ia) entitles the petitioner to claim decree of divorce, if after the solemnization of the marriage, he has been treated by the spouse with cruelty.  The term cruelty has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act and the legislature has left it to the courts to determine in the facts and circumstances of each case whether the conduct amounts to cruelty or not. In a plethora of judgments, the Apex Court and various High Courts of  the country have discussed  the scope of the concept of cruelty.


11.    In the case of  Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988) 1 SCC 105, the Apex Court with regard to cruelty observed as under:

“The word 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been used in Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act in the context of human conduct or behavior in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of  could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment.

It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked changed in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties. It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners. It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents.

Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] 2 All E.R. 257 (CA)  'the categories of cruelty are not closed'. Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are no generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop  up in any case depending upon the human behavior, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.

12.    In the case of V.Bhagat v. D.Bhagat (1994) 1 SCC 337,  the Apex Court while explaining the  concept of
mental cruelty, observed as under:-

“16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be decided in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made.

13.    The Apex Court in the case of Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli,  (2006)  4  SCC  558  relied on the case of A.Jayachandra Vs. Aneel Kaur (2005) 2 SCC 22  where it was observed that :-


“55. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem
presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other  spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. 

56. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the conclusion  that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married life". The conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background
of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section  10  of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party.


57. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would
tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.”

14.    As  would be evident from the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, it  is not the ordinary wear
and tear of the married life which would cause any sort of mental pain or cruelty to the petitioner. The conduct
complained of must be proved to be grave and weighty due to which the petitioner cannot be  reasonably  expected to live with his spouse. The Apex Court has also held that it is difficult to  lay down  any  precise definition  or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances  which would constitute cruelty. Therefore, in the facts of each case the conscience  of the Court should be satisfied that the relationship between the parties  had  reached to such an extent that it has become impossible or unbearable for them to stay together. Under the Rules of Hindu Marriage Act,  framed by this Court,  the petitioner approaching the Court is required to plead specific acts of cruelty and the occasions when and where such acts were committed by the other spouse.

15.    Rule 7(g) (iv) of the Hindu Marriage Rules, 1979 of this court states as under:-
“R.7.  Contents of petition.-In addition to the particulars required to be given under Order VII, Rule 1 of the Code and  Section 20(1) of the Act, all petitions under Sections 9 to 13 shall state:
      ……………………………
  (g)  the matrimonial offence or offences alleged or other grounds, upon which the relief is sought, setting out with sufficient particularity the time and places of the acts alleged and other facts relied upon, but not the evidence by which they are intended to be proved, e.g.:……………………………..
“(iv) in the case of alleged desertion, the date and the circumstances in which it began; in the case of cruelty the
specific acts of cruelty and the occasion when and the place where such acts were committed”.

16.    In the facts of  the present case, the allegations of cruelty leveled by the appellant against the respondent
are so vague, indefinite, unspecific and uncertain, not only in the petition but in his evidence as well. Without spelling out any specific acts of cruelty either  on the part of the respondent or her mother,  it is difficult to assume as to under what circumstances the appellant left his own house on 15.02.1998. Merely to say that the appellant started cooking his own food and his mother-in-law used to create scenes  in the house or the appellant felt neglected or depressed on account of behaviour of the respondent and her mother would not suffice  to prove mental cruelty on the part of the respondent  in the absence of  any specific dates or the period when the alleged acts were committed. Similarly, vaguely the appellant has alleged that he was not allowed to meet his own children due to some instructions given by the respondent to the school authorities and he was insulted by the respondent and her mother when the appellant went to meet the respondent at her house in the
housing society. The appellant has referred to some letters alleged to have been written by him to the respondent, but no such letters were proved on record by the appellant. 

17.    The appellant has also failed to establish the ground of desertion, as it is the own case of the appellant that he himself left the matrimonial house.   A bare perusal of the  lone  deposition of the appellant, as already reproduced above, would show that the appellant failed to establish either of the grounds.

18.    It is  a  settled legal position that even in an ex parte case, the petitioner is required to lead cogent  and convincing  evidence to prove and substantiate the averments made in the petition and the petitioner cannot derive any special advantage just on account of the fact that the respondent did not choose to contest the case or the testimony of the appellant remained unchallenged or unrebutted.


19.    In the present case, the appellant has  failed to establish with specific details any act or acts,  whether mental or physical,  due to which it became impossible or unbearable for him to live with the respondent. Similarly in the evidence as well,  the appellant (PW1),  in his sole testimony does not succeed to establish either the ground of cruelty or desertion on the part of the respondent. 

20.   The counsel for the appellant also submitted that this court should dissolve the marriage of the appellant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. It would be important to bring forth that the High Court in the exercise of it inherent powers cannot grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as it  is  yet  not a ground of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. Here, it would be pertinent to refer to the  recent  judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju Sharma (2009) 6 SCC 379  where it was held that :

“On a bare reading of Section  13  of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature. Learned Counsel for the appellant has stated that this Court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.  In our opinion, those cases have not taken into consideration the
legal position which we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents .A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. If we grant divorce  on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is  also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the Courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant”. Also recently, the Apex Court in the case of  Neelam Kumar vs. Dayarani, Civil Appeal No. 1957/2006  placed reliance on the judgment   of Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra)   and reiterated the  same view and held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce as it is not contemplated under Section  13  of the Hindu Marriage Act.
 


21.    However,  it would be befitting to mention here that  the Apex Court in the  case of  Naveen  Kohli  vs. Neelu Kohli (supra)  recommended  to the legislature to make „irretrievable breakdown of marriage‟ as a ground for divorce.  The Apex Court in the said judgment was confronted with a situation where the parties were living separately  for a period of more than 10 years.  Based on the said recommendation made by the Apex Court in the said case,  as  also in  various earlier  decisions, the Law Commission of  India in  its 217th  report has  recently  again recommended  to the Parliament to introduce an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act 1954 to include  “irretrievable breakdown of marriage as another ground for divorce”.

23.  The relationship between husband and wife  is one of the most delicate emotional bonds and  needs constant nurturing, tolerance and understanding. This relationship once which was of love and mutual trust when starts to leave a bitter aftertaste bedeviling this bond  that it is no more bearable to stay under one roof is when they seek to legally put an end to such a marriage.  Divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage might be contrary to common perception and the idea of marriage being a holy union for seven births, but in the bid to preserve the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be alive is abound to be a source of greater misery for the parties than the divorce itself.

24.    However it is a catch 22 situation as this ground can ease the way for many who are under the burden of a
doomed relationship to a breather but at  the same time it may give an opportunity to the ones trying to maneuver the alleys of law for their self conceited motives.

25.    There has been a lot of brainstorming with regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground
would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the
Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the
message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.


26.    Henceforth, there are some key areas that need to be pondered upon.  The ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage cannot be resorted to as a strait jacket formula leading to the institution of marriage becoming so fragile that the wrong doer abuses it for his selfish ends leaving the other party in lurch. But it is only when the court is satisfied that the marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and there is no chance of their coming together should the court open the deadlock of wedlock. 

27.    It is an open secret that getting a decree of divorce takes an invariably long time and with the existing grounds available, it leads the parties to level acrimonious allegations antagonizing each other. Consequently, when the decree of divorce is granted then the other party appeals to the High Court, and if unsuccessful, reaches the Supreme Court in the hope for relief, therefore prolonging the  already gruesome legal battle. It happens in a lot of cases that in the end during this vicious legal voyage, whatever little hope there is of reconciliation is anyway diminished leading the parties pitiful and penniless. 

28.    Adding to the woes, if there are children born out of the wedlock, then they suffer immensely; emotionally, psychologically and even financially, depriving them of proper upbringing and education due to meager means of one of the spouses.  A divorce from a spouse is not a divorce from the children and they should not be punished for the act of their parents. Hence if this ground is added it has to be taken care of that the children do not bear the brunt between two warring adults and that a proper mechanism is in place for taking care of all their needs. The child‟s well being, who  is but a mute spectator and officially not a party to the lawsuit, should be the eye of the resolution.

29.    Also in cases where the wife is the respondent, and the husband orchestrates a breakdown and unilaterally
wants to terminate the marriage on this ground, it has to be taken care of that to achieve his ulterior motive the
husband on the premise of a deadlock does not leave the wife  impoverished or at the mercy of her parents. 

30.    Hence, succinctly,  this court is of the opinion that there should be adequate provisions with regard to the
following:

  There should be a minimum period before which this ground cannot be invoked as a ground for divorce.

  In the case where this ground has been invoked by the husband, then the grant of divorce should only be
subject to the provision of adequate financial provisions for the wife

   In case where there are children born out of the wedlock then adequate provision for the grant of maintenance, education  and upbringing  of the children should be in place before grant of divorce

  The issue of custody of the children  and visitation rights  should also be decided at the very stage of divorce itself

  This ground should be an independent provision and not a complimentary or supplementary provision along with any other ground under section 13 of the Act The goal in the end to add this ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage  should be with aim of providing a solution to a lethal problem and not to defame the Hindu Marriage Act for breaking more families than it has united. 

31.    However, in view of the aforesaid observations, the contention of the appellant that this Court should grant
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage does not hold good. 


32.    Hence in the light of the above discussion this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment and decree dated 12.05.2003 passed by the learned trial court. 

32.       There is no merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.


July 14, 2010

KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
dc

source - http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/KG/judgement/09-08-2010/KG14072010MATA442006.pdf

Delhi HC - Quash criminal proceedings initiated by a woman against her live-in partner after he refused to marry her - ‘Live-in relationship’ is a walk-in and walk-out relationship. There are no strings attached to this relationship

Crl.M.C.No. 299/2009    

Alok Kumar v. State & Anr.     

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Reserve:   July 12, 2010
Date of Order: 9th
August, 2010
Crl.M.C.No. 299/2009               09.08.2010

  Alok Kumar              ... Petitioner
        Through: Mr. Ajay Burman, Mr. Anwesh Madhukar,
        and Mr. Rajesh Samanotra, Advocate

Versus

  State & Anr.           ... Respondents
        Through: Mr.  Sunil Sharma, APP for the State
        Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate with 
        Mr. Jayant K. Sud & Mr. Atul Sahi, Advocates

JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?  Yes.
2. To be referred to the reporter or not?            Yes.
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?        Yes.

JUDGMENT

    The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR  No. 426/2007  PS IGI Airport  registered against the petitioner under Section 354/506 IPC.


2.    The complainant  (respondent no.2 herein)  got this FIR registered stating therein  that  she was in  ‘live-in relationship’  with the petitioner for more than 05 years and was involved  with him  physically, emotionally and mentally.  The petitioner had promised to marry her as soon as possible.  Few days back (from date of registration of FIR) she learnt that petitioner was getting married to someone else, so she came to IGI airport to remind him of his promises and  refresh memories (as he was leaving India). The petitioner told her to solve the matter and took her to visitors’ lounge where she started arguing with her.  In the meantime he went to washroom
and gave his  passport to  the complainant to  keep in safe  custody.  While coming from toilet he was bit angry and pushed her at visitors’  lounge of  IGI airport outside the toilet, started abusing her and saying that he would kill her.  She (complainant) was trying to make him calm but he suddenly became violent and started hitting her.  He pulled her with her breast and punched her at her head, face and neck.  Many people came to her rescue but he punched her on her breast.  He got a cab and went out of scene but while running he forgot his passport with her.  The time of occurrence of incident  is shown as 1.00 pm on 18th  October, 2007 and the time of registration of FIR is shown as 4.00 pm.

3.    The  complainant  had  also  lodged another FIR against the petitioner under Section 376 IPC wherein she made following allegations:

6.  In the month of September, 2004 he invited me to visit him in London.  During that stay in London in his house 16, Narine Grove, Dulwich Village, London SP 24, 9PU we became intimate with each other and also had physical relations, but only after he promised and assured that he will marry me after his divorce has taken place with his first wife, from whom he had a son.

7.  In this way we kept on meeting in Delhi in London and had physical relations and every time he kept on promising and assured me that we will get married as soon as his divorce will be through.
  x  x  x  x  x
15.  I got suspicious and went to IGI International Airport at around 11.00-11.30 am on 18th October and found Mr.  Alok Kumar holding hands of a lady, whose name I came to know later as Ms. Amrita Das R/o Sector 41, Noida and Mr. Alok Kumar was having his arm around her waist. 


16.  On my confronting him, he sent away that lady and reacted violently with me and also misbehaved and
physically assaulted me, all the facts of the incident have been reported by me in my complaint in Police Station IGI Airport on the very same day, on the basis of my complaint a case under Section 354/506 IPC was registered against Mr. Alok Kumar (a copy of the FIR is enclosed herewith for ready reference).

4.    The petitioner’s contention is that on 18th  October, 2007 he had come to IGI Airport as he was a solicitor in London and was returning back to London.  He had not denied about live-in relationship with the complainant but
had stated that his parents did not agree to this marriage because of certain reasons.  He was to catch flight of Virgin Atlantic Airlines  to London and he reached airport around 12.05 pm with his fiancée and was about to enter departure building when complainant called him from behind and asked him to talk for about five minutes.  He agreed to talk and while talking she snatched his passport from his shirt pocket and told that she would not return the passport unless he accompanied her and  solemnized marriage with her in a temple  forthwith.  He  told her that he had to report at check-in counter  latest by 12.35 pm.  The complainant after taking her passport went  to ladies toilet and did not come out till 12.45 pm, he missed his flight.  After coming out from toilet  she told him that she had  torn away his passport and flushed it.   Complainant also started screaming and shouting at him  that she would not allow him to marry another woman.   Many people were looking at them.  She left the place in a scooter and told him to come to her sister’s house.  He went to her sister’s house kept waiting there but she did not come there. Thereafter he learnt about lodging of this FIR.

5.    It is submitted by the petitioner that the allegations made by the complainant about molesting her were preposterous and the FIR was lodged with mala fide intention to prevent the petitioner from going to London where petitioner was practicing.  The complainant subsequently lodged another FIR under Section 376 IPC against the petitioner with the same motive.

6.    From the allegations made by the complainant,  it is apparent that when the complainant started  ‘live-in relationship’ with the petitioner,  the petitioner had not even divorced his previous wife  though it seems was living
separate from her.  The complainant was having a child while the petitioner was also having a child.   ‘Live-in relationship’  is a walk-in and walk-out relationship. There are no strings attached  to  this relationship,  neither this relationship creates any legal  bond between the parties.  It is a contract of living together which is renewed every day by the parties and can be terminated by either of the parties without consent of the other party and one party can walk out at will at any time.  Those, who do not want to enter into this kind of relationship of walk-in and walk-out,  they enter into a relationship of marriage, where the bond between the parties has legal implications and obligations and cannot be broken by either party at will.  Thus, people who chose  to have  ‘live-in relationship’ cannot complain of infidelity or immorality as live-in relationships  are also known to have been between married man and unmarried woman or between a married woman and an unmarried man.

7.    It is admitted case of the complainant that she herself came to IGI International Airport when she learnt that the petitioner was going back to London  and was  about  to marry  someone  else  and  it  is  complainant’s  own
case that she could not tolerate  this and wanted to remind the petitioner of good old days and promises.  She subsequently lodged an FIR under Section 376 IPC against the petitioner.  These facts make it abundantly clear that sole  design of the  complaint  was to prevent the petitioner from leaving India because petitioner had decided to walk out of the live-in relationship between the parties.  This is clear from  the sequence of events stated by the complainant in her compliant.  She in her complaint under Section 354/506 IPC  had not stated as to at what time she reached the airport  but in her subsequent FIR she had given time of her reaching at the airport at 11.30 a.m.  Obviously, she had reached airport well in advance knowing the timing of the flight.  It seems the quarrel had taken place when the petitioner was to enter the departure building as there  is  no  visitors’  lounge  at  IGI  Airport (International) and the visitors have to stay outside the departure building where taxis and cars drop the passengers who have to catch flight.  There are several gates at the departure building and each gate is manned by security persons, no one can enter the departure building without an air-ticket and a
passport or without a security pass.  The police post is at one corner of the departure building  itself and police station is downstairs near arrival building.  The alleged incident reported by complainant had taken place around 12.30 p.m., the FIR was lodged at 4.00 pm when the police post is at the corner of the departure building.   The four and half hours difference in lodging of FIR shows that the FIR was lodged after a considerable long time with a design to deposit passport of the petitioner with the police so  late  that  the passport of the petitioner  was not returned to the petitioner.  This is clear from the subsequent events as the petitioner was not returned his passport by police and his LoC was opened by the police.  This case reflects that the police was acting under some influence.  Even thereafter when petitioner asked for return of passport to the police,  the police refused to return it on the ground that it was part of the case property. 

8.    It is settled law that the Court should refrain from quashing FIR on the ground that allegations made in FIR were false.  However, when FIR is lodged with mala fide motives to wreck vengeance, the Courts have interfered
as an exceptional matter and quashed  the FIRs.  In M/s Eicher Tractors Limited & Ors. v. Harihar Singh & Anr. 2009(1) JCC 260, State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa 2002 (1) JCC 214, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992
SCC (Crl.) 426 and Madhavrao J. Scindhia v. Sambhajirao C. Angre 1988  SCC (Crl.) 234, Supreme Court held that where allegations made in an FIR or complaint were so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person could ever reach a just conclusion, this was sufficient ground for quashing the FIR. The  Apex  Court also held that where criminal proceeding is manifestly attended  with  mala fide and where proceeding is maliciously  instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking  vengeance on  the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and person grudge,  the FIR can be quashed.  


9.    In the present case, motive of the complainant is writ large in her two complaints.  She had entered into live-in relationship knowing fully well that the petitioner was not even divorced at that time.  She being an educated
lady, already once married, was not a naïve as not to know the realty of live-in relationship.  It cannot be thought that she was not aware that live-in relationship was not a marriage but it was a relationship of convenience where two parties decide to enjoy company of each other at will and may leave each other at will.   However, despite entering into  ‘live-in relationship’ with the petitioner,  she could not tolerate that petitioner should  marry someone else and when the petitioner was about to leave India with his  fiancée and was at the airport, she went  to  the airport with the sole motive, which is clear from the sequence of events,  to prevent petitioner from flying
out from India and to  teach him a lesson.  She had been  lived  with the petitioner in London.  She knew that the petitioner was working in London.  She enacted the events in such a manner that the petitioner could not get
hold of his passport for considerable long time and could not leave India for that period.  She made allegations of rape against the petitioner.  

10.    This Court while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner in the rape case lodged by the complainant observed as under:

7.  The facts of the case as narrated  in  two FIRs show that there was admittedly a live-in relationship between the Petitioner and the complainant for more than five years.  The petitioner found that he could not go ahead with the marriage although at one point of time the parties had proposed to marry each other.  The circumstances narrated preclude an automatic inference on absence of that consent of that complainant.  Such conclusion would have to be preceded by a careful examination of events that transpired during the five years when the  live-in relationship subsisted and during which according to the complainant she underwent an abortion as well.  Prima facie it appears to this Court, on the basis of existing averments in the FIR that it would be unsafe to infer an absence of consent of the complainant; which is an essential ingredient of the offence of rape.  The Court is also unable to discern parity of the facts in Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and the instant case.  There the prosecutrix was between 15 years and 17 years living in a village and right from the beginning she refused to participate in the act but the accused kept on persisting and persuading her.  The fact that the police took four months to register the second FIR is also a pointer to  the difficulty in early inferring the offence of rape in these circumstances.”

11.    I consider that the FIR No. 426/2007 PS IGI Airport  was got registered against the petitioner out of malice in order to wreck vengeance on the petitioner because petitioner refused to continue live-in relationship with  the complainant, after due deliberations.  The incident is of 12.30 pm (around) FIR’s registration  time is 4.00 pm, MLC of complainant was done at 7.15 pm showing no external injuries on her body.  The allegations that accused
petitioner, despite his fiancée being there handed over his passport to her for safe custody are preposterous.  It is not her case that he was wearing clothes with no pockets.  There is no reason a man would hand over his passport to a woman who had come to airport only to quarrel with him.  


12.    Keeping in view the above circumstances, I consider that it is a fit case where FIR should be quashed to prevent the misuse of criminal justice system for personal vengeance of a partner of ‘live-in  relationship’.The petition is allowed.  FIR No No. 426/2007 PS IGI Airport is hereby quashed.  

August 09,  2010       

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.
vn

 

source - http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SND/judgement/10-08-2010/SND09082010CRLMM2992009.pdf