Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Delhi Court - Every act sexual intercourse between two adults on the assurance of promise of marriage does not become rape. Pre-marital sex not only is immoral but also against the tenets of every religion.

Every act sexual intercourse between two adults on the assurance of promise of marriage does not become rape. Pre-marital sex not only is immoral but also against the tenets of every religion.



IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER BHAT, A.S.J. (SPECIAL
FAST TRACK COURT), DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI.
SC No. 109/13.
Unique Case ID No. 02405R0287532011.
State Vs.  Ashish Kumar,
S/o Sh. Balwinder Pal,
R/o A-52, Kiran Garden,
Uttam Nagar,
New Delhi.
Date of Institution : 29.8.2011.
FIR No.135 dated 21.5.2011.
U/s. 376/506 IPC.
P.S. Bindapur.
Date of reserving judgment/Order : 05.12.2013.
Date of pronouncement : 20.12.2013.
JUDGMENT
1. The prosecution has chargesheeted the above named
accused for the offences punishable u/s.376/506 IPC.
2. As per the case of the prosecution, the prosecutrix
namely 'P' (real name withheld in order to conceal her identity)
has submitted a written complaint in P.S. Bindapur on 07.5.2011,
the gist of which is as under :
“I am in relationship with a boy named Ashish
Kumar since July, 2006. His parents were aware about
our relationship and he had promised to get married to
SC No.109/13. Page 1 of 33me. He committed sexual intercourse with me several
times and I had become pregnant somewhere in the
month of July, 2008. I informed him about the same
and asked him to solemnize marriage with me but he
sought some time to convince his family and to marry
his two elder sisters first. He insisted me to abort and
when I refused, he blackmailed me saying that he
would not marry me if I did not abort. Therefore, I got
my pregnancy aborted. All the times, he kept on
promising me that he would marry me after the
marriage of his sisters. When both of his sisters had
got married, I asked him to solemnize marriage with
me but he again requested for some more time. When
I came to know that he is getting married with
someone else, I rushed to his house in Delhi on
09.4.2011. I stayed in his house for 21 days and he
had sexual relations with me at his house several
times during that period. He had taken lakhs of rupees
from me for our marriage. On 29.4.2011, he and his
parents took me to Pathankot (Punjab) to solemnize
my marriage with him but there all the family
members abused, harassed and insulted me. They told
me that since my parents are not alive, there is
nobody to support me and to fight for me. Thereafter,
he took me to Amritsar saying that he will get married
to me there but he left me in front of a gurudwara and
disappeared. I tried to contact him on his mobile
phone as well as on the mobile phone of his father but
both the mobile phones were switched off. From
SC No.109/13. Page 2 of 33Amritsar, I returned to Delhi alone by train on
01.5.2011. When I reached his home, nobody was
there. I have been cheated, harassed and insulted and
hence I request you to take necessary action against
them.”
3. On the basis of aforesaid written complaint of the
prosecutrix, FIR was registered u/s.376/506 IPC and investigation
was handed over to SI Domnica. She recorded statement of the
prosecutrix u/s.161 Cr.PC and got her medically examined in DDU
Hospital on 21.5.2011 vide MLC No.9981/11. Exhibits handed over
by the doctor were seized by her. Prosecutrix was not having in
her possession any document regarding the abortion. On
23.5.2011 she was produced before the Ld. Magistrate, who
recorded her statement u/s.164 Cr.PC. IO collected the school
certificate of the prosecutrix regarding her age which reveals her
date of birth to be 28.3.1989. Accused came to be arrested on
09.6.2011. He was got medically examined in DDU Hospital and
the exhibits handed over by the doctor were seized. All the
exhibits were sent to FSL for forensic examination. After the
completion of the investigation, Charge Sheet was prepared and
submitted to the concerned Ld. Magistrate.
4. Upon committal of the case to the court of Sessions,
Charge u/s.376/506 IPC was framed against the accused on
22.12.2012. Accused abjured his guilt and accordingly prosecution
was called upon to lead its evidence.
5. The prosecution has examined 10 witnesses to
SC No.109/13. Page 3 of 33establish the guilt of the accused. Ld. APP also tendered in
evidence the FSL results Ex.PA & Ex.PB. The accused was
examined u/s.313 Cr.PC on 02.7.2013 wherein he admitted that he
had started friendship with the prosecutrix through Yahoo chat on
internet and used to meet her occasionally but denied that he had
committed sexual intercourse with her at any point of time. He
claimed false implication in this case.
6. The accused has examined himself as DW1 in his
defence. During the course of his testimony, he produced the
printout of various E-mails and chats which had taken place
between him and the prosecutrix and which have been marked as
Mark-A to Mark-S. The accused also examined his wife as DW2.
DW3 is the Senior Executive of Yahoo India Pvt. Ltd., who deposed
that E-mail Id “ashishkumar84@yahoo.com” was generated by Mr.
Ashish Kumar on 15.9.2004 and he had provided his alternate Email address as “mrashishkumar84@gmail.com”. However, the
witness deposed that his office is unable to provide any date
regarding E-mail Id “diya_spirit@yahoo.com” as the same is
registered in US Domain and not in Indian Domain. He proved his
affidavit in this regard as Ex.DW3/B. DW4 is the Manager
(Administration and HR), M./s. Keppel Land International Limited,
Bangluru, who deposed that E-mail Id “parvati@elitahomes.com”
was allotted by their company to Ms. Parvati during the course of
her employment with the company and further stated that he has
not brought the records pertaining to said E-mail Id as those have
already been erased by the company. DW5 is Associate Manager
Facilities, Infosys Limited, who deposed that the records pertaining
to official E-mail account allotted to accused Ashish has already
SC No.109/13. Page 4 of 33been deleted from the records and are not available with the
company. He proved his detailed affidavit in this regard as
Ex.DW5/A.
7. I have heard Ld. APP, Ld. Counsel for the accused and
have perused the entire record.
8. Ld. APP vehemently argued that accused has deceived
the prosecutrix by making her to submit herself to intercourse with
him on the promise that he would marry her which promise he
never intended to fulfill. She submitted that it is evident from the
testimony of the prosecutrix that she gave consent for sexual
intercourse with the accused only on the promise and assurance of
the accused that he would marry her at any cost. According to
her, the accused obtained consent of the prosecutrix to the sexual
intercourse by deceit and fraud and hence he has committed the
offence of rape. She further submitted that the printouts of E-mails
and chats Mark-A to Mark-S produced by the accused during his
testimony cannot be looked into as those are not accompanied by
certificate u/s.65B of Indian Evidence Act and for the reason that
those have not been put to the prosecutrix in her cross
examination so as to elicit her comments regarding those.
However, she further submitted that even if these E-mails and
chats are read in evidence, these support the case of the
prosecution that the accused had been assuring and promising the
prosecutrix at every moment that he would marry her. According
to her, the accused is liable to be held guilty for the offence of
rape.
SC No.109/13. Page 5 of 339. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the accused
vehemently argued that there is no iota of evidence on record to
suggest that the accused at any point of time promised the
prosecutrix that he would marry her. He submitted that the
prosecutrix has mentioned neither in her written complaint to the
police nor in her statement u/s.164 Cr.PC that in her examination
in chief that she consented to intercourse with the accused only on
getting of assurance from the accused that he would marry her.
He further submitted that the prosecutrix has not mentioned in her
examination in chief the date when the sexual intercourse took
place between the two for the first time and when the accused
made promise to her for the first time that he would marry her. He
submits that even if it be assumed that accused had promised the
prosecutrix that he would marry her, still there is no evidence on
record that he had done so before engaging him in sexual
intercourse with her. He further submitted that the E-mails and
chats between the accused and the prosecutrix Mark-A to Mark-S
are admissible in evidence as they are supported by the affidavit
of the accused, who had taken these printouts from the computer
and therefore the affidavit of the accused can be read as a
certificate u/s.65B of the Evidence Act. He further submitted that
the accused was not obligedto confront the prosecutrix by these
E-mails and chats during her cross examination. According to him,
the accused is liable to be acquitted.
10. The testimony of the prosecutrix is the most vital and
important piece of evidence for the prosecution in the instant
case. She has been examined as PW8. She has disclosed her age
as 27 years. She deposed that she had started chatting with the
SC No.109/13. Page 6 of 33accused on internet in April/May, 2006 and ultimately both
became friends. They met each other for the first time in Banglore
on 14.7.2006 and enquired about each other job, family status etc.
At that time, accused was working with M/s. Infosys and was
posted at Mysore. Thereafter the accused used to visit Banglore
and met her at her house on weekends and holidays. After
sometime, the accused expressed his interest in solemnizing the
marriage with her. He promised her that he would marry her after
the marriage of his two elder sisters, one of whom was divorcee.
He expressed his inability to get engaged to her but convinced her
that he would definitely marry her. He introduced her to his
parents and sisters and made her to talk to them on phone from
Banglore. She further deposed that in the mid of November, 2006
she alongwith accused went to her native place in Hyderabad to
meet her parents. Accused convinced her that he would persuade
his parents and her sister also that he is going to marry her. After
returning from Hyderabad, accused started showing physical
interest in her and asked her to engage into sexual intercourse
with him but she showed her disinclination for the same. She told
her that they should wait uptill marriage but the accused provoked
her mentally to such an extent that she had to give in. He told her
that he is going to be her husband and there is nothing wrong to
have sexual intercourse with him. After intense mental and
physical provocation, she engaged into sexual intercourse with
him many a times, as a result of which she had become pregnant
in the month of July, 2008 and later on had to abort the same at
the instance of the accused. She further deposed that in February,
2009 accused got transferred to Pune office of Infosys. She went
to meet him in Pune in August, 2009, stayed with him for three
SC No.109/13. Page 7 of 33days and thereafter accused committed intercourse with her. She
again went to Pune in November, 2009 and stayed with the
accused for two days. Every time when she met the accused, he
convinced and assured her that he would marry her. Whenever
she asked him about the marriage, he used to tell her that his
sister's marriage is fixed for May, 2010 and they should wait till
that time. She had also helped the accused financially by
transferring a huge amount to his bank account. She further
deposed that in June, 2010 the accused moved to Delhi and told
her that since both of his sisters have been married, it is turn for
their marriage. She came to Delhi on 07.8.2010 and stayed in the
house of the accused for two days. He introduced her to his
parents and also had intercourse with her. Accused promised and
assured her in front of her parents that he is going to marry her. In
November,2010 she again visited the house of accused in Delhi to
fix the date of marriage but this time his parents told her that
accused is Manglik and they should wait for his marriage till he
completes 27 years of age. She decided to wait for few more
months till the accused completed 27 years of age. On return from
Delhi, she came to know from other sources that the parents of
the accused are searching for some other girl for the accused. She
confronted the accused with the same but he denied all this saying
that he cannot get married to any other girl till he completes 27
years of age. She again came to the house of the accused in Delhi
on 09.4.2011 and stayed there for 21 days but during this period
she was shocked to see the behaviour of the accused's parents
who told her to go back and wait further. She was thrown out of
the house by the parents of the accused in the night of 09.4.2011
itself and accused also slapped her but later on she was allowed to
SC No.109/13. Page 8 of 33come inside the house and stay there. During this period of 21
days also accused kept on assuring that he is going to marry her.
During that period also, they had sexual intercourse with each
other. On 16.4.2011 accused took her to Dwarka Court and
introduced her to a lawyer namely Deepak Singh Sindhu saying
that he is planning a court marriage with her. They filled up
marriage application form and accused paid a sum of Rs.10,000/-to the lawyer as fee. After some days, accused told her that they
should not go for a court marriage as he is the only son of his
parents and his parents want a proper marriage to solemnize at
their native place in Pathankot, Punjab. She further deposed that
on 29.4.2011, she alongwith accused, his parents and his cousin
Happy went to Pathankot, Punjab, in train and reached there in the
morning of 30.4.2011. The uncle of the accused and his aunt came
to receive them at railway station and took them to Hotel Staywell
near the railway station. Soon after they checked into the hotel,
accused as well as his parents started showing true colours. They
abused her, beat her and used foul and filthy language with her.
Accused also gagged her mouth when she tried to shout. Accused
told her that he was only enacting a drama and whatever
happened between them should be forgotten. In the afternoon of
30.4.2011 accused and his cousin Happy took her to Golden
Temple, Amritsar, saying that accused would marry her there.
They reached Amritsar at 6 p.m. and in front of the Golden Temple
also, accused assured her that he would marry her. He told her to
close her eyes and pray to the God. She closed her eyes and
started praying. As soon as, she opened her eyes, she found that
the accused and his cousin had left and she was alone. She dialled
mobile number of the accused and his parents but all were
SC No.109/13. Page 9 of 33switched off. She called the brother-in-law of the accused who
stays at Banglore but he also feigned ignorance about the
accused. She stayed at Amritsar for the night and next day came
to Delhi. She directly went to the house of the accused but it was
locked and the neighbours did not know anything about the
accused and his family members. She stayed at Delhi for some
days and tried to contact the accused but did not succeed.
Ultimately, she visited P.S. Bindapur and submitted a written
complaint, on the basis of which FIR was registered. She was
produced before a Magistrate, who recorded her statement u/s.
164 Cr.PC Ex.PW4/A. According to her, accused was arrested from
his house in her presence on 09.6.2011 vide arrest memo
Ex.PW2/A.
11. In her cross examination, prosecutrix (PW8) deposed
that she had been doing job with M/s. Keppel Land international
Limited, Banglore, since the year 2005 and her job was of
secretarial and administrative nature. She joined UB Group in
August, 2011. She has been residing independently as a tenant in
Banglore since the year 2003 and was paying a sum of Rs.5,000/-as rent per month for one room set. She further deposed that they
(accused and the prosecutrix) had intercourse for the first time in
the month of November, 2006 at the house of the accused at
Banglore. She deposed that the accused had showed interest in
getting marriage to her at the time of their first meeting itself i.e.
14.7.2006. Thereafter he slowly used to put it in her mind that he
would marry her. In the month of August, 2006, he promised that
he would marry her but did not give any specific time frame for
marriage. She met the parents of the accused for the first time in
SC No.109/13. Page 10 of 33September, 2008 at the time marriage of his elder sister at
Banglore. She deposed that the purpose of visit of accused to her
native house at Hyderabad in November, 2006 was to assure her
family members about their marriage and nothing else. She
explained that by his statement in the examination in chief that
the accused mentally provoked her to have sexual intercourse
with him, she meant that he convinced her as well as her family
members that he would marry her in any event and there is
nothing wrong in having sexual intercourse between them before
the marriage. She consented to the sexual intercourse with him
only because of his promise of marriage even though he did not
give any definite time frame for marriage and told her that
marriage would be possible only after the marriage of his two
sisters. The accused used to tell her that if she is not going to
satisfy her husband i.e. him, where will he go. A specific question
was put to her by the Ld. Cross examining Counsel that if she had
any kind of fear that if she did not engage in sexual intercourse
with the accused, he would not marry her or that she had any kind
of temptation that he will marry her only if she had intercourse
with him. She replied that the only reason for which she consented
to have sexual intercourse is that she had become convinced that
he would marry her. She further deposed that after she had come
to know about her pregnancy, she informed the accused, who
advised her to abort the same. Accordingly, she visited the clinic
of Dr. Sumangla near her residence at Banglore and consumed the
tablets which were prescribed by the doctor. The tablets were
purchased by the accused but she did not remember exactly how
many tablets did she consume. She deposed that she had gone to
Pune to meet the accused in August, 2009, November, 2009 and
SC No.109/13. Page 11 of 33April, 2010. The accused did not come to Banglore from Pune to
meet her. In Pune, she stayed with the accused at his residence.
12. From the aforesaid testimony of the prosecutrix, it is
evident that she was about 20 years old in the year 2006 when
she started friendship with the accused. She was well educated
and doing a job of secretarial and administrative nature with a
reputed company of Banglore. She was an independent lady and
had been residing on rent alone in Banglore since the year 2003.
She had strong inclination towards the accused and used to spend
time willingly with him. She used to visit his place of residence off
and on, even in Pune and Delhi and spent nights with him. The
physical relations between her and the accused had developed
with her consent as admittedly, she had neither offered any
resistence nor had complained to anybody about the acts of the
accused. She used to exchange E-mails with the accused and used
to chat with him and the accused had been giving her assurance
that he would marry her but never gave any specific time frame
for the same. She continuously used to have physical relations
with the accused till the year 2011.
13. To rebut the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix
against him, the accused has entered the witness box himself as
DW1. He disclosed his aged as 29 years and deposed that he
joined Infosys in May, 2006 as System Engineer and remained
there till June, 2010, when he joined Accenture Services Pvt. Ltd.
He was staying in Banglore from October, 2006 to February, 2009.
He deposed that initially he was chatting with the prosecutrix at
her E-mail ID Diya_spirit@yahoo.com. She has sent her
SC No.109/13. Page 12 of 33photographs through E-mails on 05.7.2006 and 10.7.2006 but he
did not reply his E-mails. After a few days, the prosecutrix made a
call on his mobile number saying that they should start friendship
as they share common views. As per her request, they met at
Banglore bus stand in the end of July, 2006 for the first time when
he was coming to Delhi. She told him that she is in a depressed
state of mind as a person named Umesh with whom she was in a
relationship had got married. Thereafter, she kept on calling him
regularly and also used to come to meet him at his office. He
deposed that he never promised to marry the prosecutrix. He also
did not convince her parents about their marriage at the time of
their visit to her native village. According to him, it was the
prosecutrix, who had been insisting upon him to marry her but he
had told her categorically that his focus is on his career and not on
marriage. He also deposed that the prosecutrix told him that her
friend Rupa had found a match for her but she turned down the
proposal as she wanted to marry him. At that time also, he
rejected the marriage proposal. He deposed that the prosecutrix
kept on calling him and during those calls, she was alluring him to
have physical relations with her. On 14.5.2009 she told him that
she is going to marry a boy named Vikram in Trichi in Tamilnadu.
Thereafter, Vikram assaulted her physically and she had sent the
photographs in this regard. She also demanded Rs.50,000/- from
him but he did not give money to her. Thereafter the prosecutrix
again started insisting upon him to marry her by saying that she
wants to marry him only. He further deposed that in January, 2009
when the prosecutrix had called him for a farewell lunch to her
residence in Banglore on the occasion of his transfer to Pune, she
administered some sedatives to him and thereafter started
SC No.109/13. Page 13 of 33tempting him for physical relations but he resisted her temptations
and no sexual intercourse took place. Thereafter, the prosecutrix
again started harassing him by transferring the amount of Rs.
1,20,000/- to his account without any intimation to him and
without disclosing her account number. However, with some
difficulty, he got to know about the account number of the
prosecutrix and deposited the amount back in her account. In
December, 2009 he informed her about his engagement in Punjab.
She again transferred a sum of Rs.1 Lac in his account and told
him that he could not return this amount to her and also closed
her bank account. He submitted an application to his bank i.e.
ICICI Bank asking them as to from which account this sum of Rs.1
Lac had been transferred to his account and vide communication
dated 23.9.2010 (Ex.DW1/C), he was informed that this amount
has been transferred from bank account no.01190023242. When
he made inquiries from the prosecutrix about her account number,
she started alleging that he made her to abort her pregnancy in
the years 2009 and 2010. Again after one week, she transferred
further sum of Rs.1 Lac to his account and then closed her
account. He returned this sum of money also to her. He further
deposed that the prosecutrix got to know from some common
friend that his marriage has been fixed for 10.5.2011 and she
came to their house in Delhi on 09.4.2011. She told the accused
that she had come in search of a job and is staying at Khanpur.
Her advocate Sh. Deepak Singh Sindhu telephoned him on
16.4.2010 saying that he had not returned money to her and in
that regard, he should meet him in the court. He showed all the
transactions to the said advocate and the matter was settled. She
requested them to take her to Punjab for attending the marriage
SC No.109/13. Page 14 of 33ceremony. Accordingly, his parents, his cousin Happy and the
prosecutrix reached Pathankot on 30.4.2011. The parents of
Happy received them at the railway station and they checked in
Hotel Staywell. His would be wife and her parents had also come
there. After taking meals they all went to Golden Temple. In the
bus, the prosecutrix was sitting alongwith his wife and she told her
that they (prosecutrix and the accused) are already married and
were residing in Banglore as husband and wife. His wife informed
her parents about the same and in the meanwhile, prosecutrix ran
away from there. His parents-in-law called off the marriage and
insulted them. After few days, he alongwith his parents went to
his in-laws house, showed all the E-mails to them and convinced
them that there was no relationship of husband and wife between
him and the prosecutrix. They got convinced and ultimately, their
marriage took place on 24.5.2011. He also deposed that the
prosecutrix has filed a false complaint against him with the
intention that he would not be able to marry at Delhi and would be
constrained to marry her. According to him, the prosecutrix had
also tried to hack his E-mail Id while he was in custody in this case
and after he was released on bail, the prosecutrix called his
parents and demanded Rs.20 Lacs from them or otherwise, she
would file a case against them at Banglore. She has filed a false
complaint against them at Banglore also. He filed on record the
printouts of E-mails and Chats exchanged between him and the
prosecutrix, which are Mark-A to Mark-S.
14. In the cross examination, he denied that he had
promised to marry the prosecutrix in any of the meetings with her.
He also denied that he had assured her parents that he would
SC No.109/13. Page 15 of 33marry her. He deposed that it was on the insistence of the
prosecutrix that he alongwith his two friends visited her house in
her native place. He denied that E-mails Mark-F and Mark-S are
fabricated and manipulated. He also denied that the prosecutrix
had become pregnant from his loin in July, 2008 and he asked her
to terminate the pregnancy or otherwise, he would not marry her.
He deposed that upon his transfer to Pune on 07.2.2009 he had
not apprised the prosecutrix about his Pune address. He admitted
that the prosecutrix had come to Pune in August, 2009 but denied
that she had visited his residence or stayed with him for three
days or that they had physical relations during those three days.
According to him, they met in a restaurant in Pune. He admitted
that the prosecutrix had again come to Pune in November, 2009
but denied that she had stayed with him at Pune. According to
him, they met at Sahaj Yoga temple and other public places. He
also denied that the prosecutrix visited his house in Delhi on
07.8.2010 and he introduced her to his parents but denied that
she stayed in their house for two days. According to him, she left
their house on the same day. He further admitted that the
prosecutrix had visited their house again in November, 2010 and
then on 09.4.2011 but denied that she stayed with them for 21
days. According to him, she stayed in their house for about 4 or 5
days and he did not extend any promise of marriage during those
days and there was no physical relations between them during
those days. He also deposed that his father Sh. Balwinder Pal has
filed complaint against the prosecutrix before a Ld. Magistrate in
Dwarka Court, New Delhi, regarding demand of Rs.20 Lacs made
by her after he was released on bail. He denied all other
suggestions put to him by the Ld. APP.
SC No.109/13. Page 16 of 3315. From the aforesaid testimony of the accused, it
appears that there had been no sexual relations between him and
the prosecutrix at any point of time. It is also evident that the
prosecutrix had been pestering him for sexual intercourse but he
had been keeping off from the same deliberately as he wanted to
focus on his career. He had never made any promise or assurance
to the prosecutrix that he would marry her and it is the prosecutrix
who had been time and again telling him that she wants to marry
him and for this reason, she had turned down a proposal of
marriage from her friend Rupa. It is also evident that the
prosecutrix had once told him that she is going to marry a boy
Vikram in Trichi in Tamilnadu but that boy assaulted her physically
and the relations became sour. The prosecutrix had been
transferring money to the bank account of the accused time and
again without any demand from him and without his information,
probably to harass him and to create some evidence against him.
She never stayed with the accused at his residence at Banglore or
at Pune. She stayed in his house at Delhi only once and that too
for just 4 or 5 days. She knew that the accused is going to marry a
girl in Punjab on 10.5.2011 and had accompanied his family to
Pathankot on 30.4.2011 to attend the marriage ceremony and
there she told the accused's would be wife that she is already
married to the accused and they have been residing at Banglore
as husband and wife.
16. Undoubtedly, in cases involving offence of rape, the
testimony of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence as
well as reliable and inspiring confidence requires no corroboration
SC No.109/13. Page 17 of 33and court may convict the accused on the basis of her sole
testimony. She is undoubtedly a competent witness u/s.118 of
Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is
attached to that of an injured in case of physical violence.
However, if for some reason, the court is hesitant to place implicit
reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix, it may look for some
other evidence on record, which may lend assurance to her
testimony, short of corroboration required in case of accomplice. If
the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix
at its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or
circumstantially which would lend assurance about her testimony.
It also needs mention that even in cases of rape the onus is always
on the prosecution to prove affirmatively all the ingredients of the
offence which it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is
not the duty of the defence to explain why and how the victim and
other witnesses have falsely implicated the accused. The
prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take the
support from the weakness of the case of defence. However, the
great suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral
belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the
accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of
legally admissible evidence and the material on record, the
conviction cannot be ordered. There is initial presumption of
innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home
the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused
is entitled to benefit of every reasonable doubt.
17. In the instant case, the prosecution alleges that the
accused obtained consent of the prosecution for sexual
SC No.109/13. Page 18 of 33intercourse on the basis of false promise of marriage and therefore
the consent of the prosecution cannot be termed as free or fair,
the same being a tainted one and hence the accused has
committed offence of rape.
18. The Supreme Court considered this issue at length in
case of Uday vs. State of Karnataka, 2003 (1) JCC 506, AIR
2003 SC 1639and held as under :
“It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial
opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given
by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person
with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he
would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be
given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is
not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are
inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that
there is no strait jacket formula for determining
whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual
intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a
misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the
tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance
to the judicial mind while considering a question of
consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider
the evidence before it and the surrounding
circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because
each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a
bearing on the question whether the consent was
voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact.
It may also weigh the evidence keeping in view the
fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove
each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of
consent being one of them.”
19. Similarly, in Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep Kumar
Verma vs. State of Bihar & anr., (2007) 7 SCC 413, the
SC No.109/13. Page 19 of 33Supreme Court observed as under :
“The failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain
date due to reasons not very clear on the evidence
does not always amount to a misconception of fact at
the inception of the act itself. In order to come within
the meaning of misconception of fact, the fact must
have an immediate relevance. The matter would have
been different if the consent was obtained by creating
a belief that they were already married. In such a case
the consent could be said to result from a
misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a
promise to marry. We do not know when. If a full
grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on
a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in
such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of
promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by
misconception of fact. Section 90 IPC cannot be called
in aid in such a case to pardon the act of the girl and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the Court
can be assured that from the very inception the
accused never really intended to marry her.”
20. In Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar,
AIR 2005 SC 203, it has been observed :
“20. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90
are from the point of view of the victim. The second
part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision
from the point of view of the accused. It envisages
that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to
believe that the consent was given by the victim in
consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact.
Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge
or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the
tainted consent. The requirements of both the parts
should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the
court has to see whether the person giving the
consent had given it under fear of injury or
misconception of fact and the court should also be
satisfied that the person doing the act i.e. the alleged
SC No.109/13. Page 20 of 33offender, is conscious of the fact or should have
reason to think that but for the fear or misconception,
the consent would not have been given. This is the
scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative
terminology.”
21. The Supreme Court again in Deepak Gulati vs. State
of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No.2322/10 decided on
20.5.2013, held as under :
“Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether
the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim,
or had mala fide motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the
latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception.
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an
early stage a false promise of marriage by the
accused; and whether the consent involved was given
after wholly, understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a
case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or
where an accused on account of circumstances which
he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only
if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of
the accused was mala fide, and that he had
clandestine motives.”
SC No.109/13. Page 21 of 3322. In the case at hand, the prosecutrix in her complaint
dated 07.5.2011 to the police, on the basis of which FIR has been
registered, has nowhere stated when did the accused extend
promise of marriage to her for the first time and when they had
sexual intercourse with each other for the first time. It is not clear
from the said complaint whether physical relations between the
two started before the accused promised her to marry or after
that. In her statement u/s.164 Cr.PC Ex.PW4/A she has stated that
they developed physical relations for the first time in the year
2008. There is no mention of any promise of marriage in that
statement. She has simply mentioned that the accused gained her
trust and stated that they will get married after the marriage of his
two sisters.
23. In the examination in chief also, the prosecutrix has
not mentioned when did the accused extend promise of marriage
to her for the first time and when did they engage into physical
relations for the first time. It is when she was questioned in this
regard in the cross examination that she stated that the accused
showed interest in getting married to her at the time of their first
meeting itself on 14.7.2006 and then in the month of August, 2006
he promised that he would marry her but did not give any specific
time frame for the same. In the cross examination, she stated that
they had sexual intercourse for the first time in the month of
November, 2006. This is totally contrary to her statement u/s.164
Cr.PC Ex.PW4/A where she had mentioned that they had physical
relations for the first time in the year 2008. The first time when the
SC No.109/13. Page 22 of 33accused committed sexual intercourse with her has been
described by the prosecutrix in her examination in chief as under:
“After returning from Hyderabad, we continued to
meet each other and the accused started showing
physical interest in me. He started telling me to
engage into sexual intercourse with him but I showed
my disinclination for the same. I told him that we
should wait uptill our marriage. However, he provoked
me mentally to such an extent that I had to give in.
He told me that he is going to be my husband and
there is nothing wrong if I engaged into sexual
intercourse with him. Ultimately after intense mental
and physical provocation, I compellingly engaged into
sexual intercourse with him many a times.”
24. The aforesaid portion of the testimony of the
prosecutrix is patently an improvement over her previous
statements recorded during the course of investigation. In those
statements, she did not state that the accused obtained her
consent for sexual intercourse after intense mental and physical
provocation. Even if the aforersaid portion of her testimony is
taken on its face value, it does not show that the accused obtained
her consent to the sexual intercourse solely on the basis of
promise to marry. A promise to marry is totally different from the
mental and physical provocation, as mentioned by the prosecution
in her testimony. If a boy engages a girl, whom he loves, in
sexually explicit talks and during those talks touches her sensitive
body parts so that she becomes sexually active and consents to
SC No.109/13. Page 23 of 33sexual intercourse, it can be said that the boy provoked the girl
mentally and physically to have physical relations with him but it
cannot be said that he obtained her consent by any
misconception, fraud or any other promise. Mental and physical
provocation is altogether different from a promise to marry and
the two cannot be equated. There is no categorical statement of
the prosecutrix in her examination in chief that she gave consent
for sexual intercourse with the accused only on the basis of her
promise to marry or on account of any threat or pressure from the
side of the accused. It is evident that she did not offer any
resistance and did not try to leave that place. I consider it not
proper for a girl to engage in sexual intercourse with a boy who
simply tells her that he is going to be her husband and there is
nothing wrong in engaging her into sexual intercourse with him. It
was for the girl in such circumstances to weigh the pros and cons
of the intended act and to decide whether or not she should
submit her a body to the boy.
25. It is important to note her that the prosecutrix, in none
of her statements mentions the place where the accused held out
promise of his marriage to her for the first time or where they had
physical relations with each other for the first time.
26. The prosecutrix had herself mentioned in each of her
statement that the accused did not give her any specific time
frame of marriage. Therefore, the prosecutrix was having no
guarantee when the accused would marry her and in these
circumstances, she should have been more circumspect before
giving her consent for sexual intercourse.
SC No.109/13. Page 24 of 3327. The statement of the prosecutrix in her cross
examination that she consented to have sexual intercourse with
the accused only for the reason that she had become convinced
that she would marry her does not appeal to any reason in view of
what has been discussed herein above. I fail to understand how
the prosecutrix had got convinced in just two or three months
after her first meeting with the accused that he would definitely
marry her. I myself do not feel convinced and satisfied that the
prosecutrix was misled by any promise or utterance of the accused
and she gave her consent to the sexual intercourse with him
because of the same. It appears that the prosecutrix being a
mature, educated and employed lady, understood the nature and
consequence of sexual indulgence with the accused and agreed to
have sexual intercourse with him only on account of her love and
passion for him and not solely on account of any alleged
misrepresentation.
28. Coming to the printouts of E-mails exchanged between
the parties and their Chats on the internet, filed by the accused at
the time of his deposition as DW1. These have been marked as
Mark-A to Mark-S. These were not exhibited at that time as this
court was in doubt whether these have been sufficiently proved as
per the Indian Evidence Act. These include transcripts of internet
chats between the prosecutrix and the accused dated 27.11.2006,
07.12.2006, 14.5.2008, 09.6.2008 and 24.9.2010 from their
respective E-mails ID parureddi@gmail.com and
mrashishkumar84@gamil.com. These also include transcripts of Emails dated 16.1.2007, 15.6.2007, 30.11.2007, 09.1.2009,
SC No.109/13. Page 25 of 3317.2.2009, 11.2.2009 and 17.2.2009, sent by prosecutrix from her
aforesaid E-mail ID to the accused on his aforesaid E-mail ID.
These also include transcripts of E-mails dated 12.2.2009 sent by
the prosecutrix from her another E-mail ID
parvathi@elitahomes.com to the accused and E-mail dated
12.7.2010 sent by the prosecutrix from her another E-mail Id
sahajparvati@gmail.com to the accused. No question has been put
to DW1 in his cross examination regarding authenticity and
genuineness of the aforesaid E-mail as well as internet chats. It is
manifest that the prosecution does not dispute that the two Emails IDs referred to in these E-mails and internet chats do not
belong to and were not operated by the prosecutrix.
29. Normally, in order to prove an electric record, the
requirements of section 65B of the Evidence Act have to be
complied with but there is no bar in adducing secondary evidence
in their proof under the provisions of sections 63 and 65 of the
Evidence Act. It is a matter of common knowledge that E-mails and
internet chats are stored in very huge servers of internet service
provider and those servers cannot be produced in the court.
Therefore when a witness produces the printouts of the E-mails
and internet chats in the court certifying that these have been
obtained truthfully and correctly, the printout documents
admissible as secondary evidence in view of section 63 of the
Evidence Act, unless these are disputed by the other side. Section
63 reads as under :
“63. Secondary evidence. - Secondary evidence
means and includes -SC No.109/13. Page 26 of 33(1) certified copies given under the provisions
hereinafter contained;
(2) copies made from the original by mechanical
processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of
the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
(3) copies made from or compared with the original;
(4) counterparts of documents as against the
parties who did not execute them;
(5) oral accounts of the contents of a document
given by some person who has himself seen it.”
30. In this regard, I may profitably refer to following
passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as
2005 (11) SCC 600, State vs. Navjot Sandhu:
“According to section 63, secondary evidence means
and includes, among other things, “Copies made from
the original by mechanical process which in
themselves ensures the accuracy of the copy, and
copies compared with such copies”. Section 65
enables secondary evidence of the contents of a
document to be adduced if the original is of such
nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute
that the information contained in the call records is
stored on huge servers which cannot be easily moved
and produced in the court. That is what the High Court
has also observed at page 276. Hence printouts taken
from the computers/servers by mechanical process
and certified by a responsible officer of the service
providing company can be led in evidence through a
witness who can identify the signature of the
certifying officer or otherwise speak of the facts based
on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the
compliance with the requirements of section 65B,
SC No.109/13. Page 27 of 33which is a provision dealing with the admissibility of
electronic records, there is no bar to adducing
secondary evidence under the other provisions of the
Evidence Act, namely, sections 63 and 65. It may be
that the certificate containing the details in sub
section (4) of section 65B is not filed in the instant
case, but that does not mean that the secondary
evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such
evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned
in the relevant provisions, namely sections 63 and
65.”
31. In the instant case, the E-mails and internet chats
Mark-A to Mark-S produced by the accused during the course of his
testimony have not been disputed from the side of the
prosecution. DW1 in his testimony has certified their correctness
and accuracy. Therefore, I am of the opinion, those have been
proved as per law and I hereby mark them as Ex.J1 (colly).
32. The E-mails and internet chats between the
prosecutrix and the accused tell a totally different story. It is
manifest from these that in fact, it was the prosecutrix, who was
insisting upon the accused to have sexual intercourse with her and
the accused was not inclined to the same. It is also apparent from
these E-mails and chats that the prosecutrix was not sure whether
or not the accused would marry her and still she was pestering
him for physical relations. The contents of these E-mails and
internet chats totally contradict the version of the prosecutrix and
destroy the prosecution case in totality. In fact, these advance the
defence taken by the accused that he did not engage into sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix at any point of time and had
never promised to marry her and he as well as the prosecutrix
were merely friends. These E-mails and internet chats corroborate
SC No.109/13. Page 28 of 33the testimony of DW1, which has been already noticed hereinabove.
33. There is not even a slightest indication in the aforesaid
E-mails and internet chats between the accused and the
prosecutrix that the accused had held out any promise of marriage
to her and she consented to sexual intercourse with the accused
only for that promise and in fact, sexual intercourse had taken
place between the two. It is another thing that the prosecutric had
the impression that the accused also loves and intends to marry
her. The conduct of the accused may have given rise to such
impression in the mind of the prosecutrix but that alone is not
sufficient to hold that the consent of the prosecutrix for
intercourse with the accused was not voluntary. There is nothing
in these E-mails or internet chats to demonstrate that the accused
had assured her on any point of time that he would marry her. If,
in fact, the prosecutrix had consented to sexual intercourse with
the accused only on later's promise of marriage, she would have
said so in these E-mails. She has not mentioned even a word in
these E-mails or in internet chats about any promise of marriage
held out to her by the accused.
34. Now even if it be assumed to be true that the accused
at some point of time had held out a promise of marriage to the
prosecutrix and the prosecutrix indulged in intercourse with the
accused on such promise, I wonder how the intercourse between
the two in such circumstances would amount to rape. 
35. In my opinion, every act sexual intercourse between
SC No.109/13. Page 29 of 33two adults on the assurance of promise of marriage does not
become rape, if the assurance or promise is not fulfilled later on by
the boy. When a grown up, educated and office going woman
subjects herself to sexual intercourse with a friend or colleague on
the latter’s promise that he would marry her, she does so at her
own peril. She must be taken to understand the consequences of
her act and must know that there is no guarantee that the boy
would fulfill his promise. He may or may not do so. She must
understand that she is engaging in an act which not only is
immoral but also against the tenets of every religion. No religion in
the world allows pre-marital sex.
36. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Jayanti Rani
Panda Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr., 1984 Cri.L.J. 1535
observed that in order to come within the meaning of
misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.
It was also observed that if a fully grown up girl consents to the
act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues
to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act
of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by
misconception of fact and it was held that Section 90 IPC can not
be invoked unless the court can be assured that from the inception
accused never intended to marry her.
37. However it can not be said that in no case, having
sexual intercourse with a girl on the basis of a promise to marry
would amount to commission of rape. Every such case has to
examined on its individual facts and attending circumstances. The
Supreme Court in Yella Grinivasa Roa Vs. State of A.P.,
SC No.109/13. Page 30 of 332006(3) JCC 1623held that if it is shown that since the very
inception of making the promise, the accused did not intend to
marry her and the prosecutrix extends her consent to have sexual
intercourse with him, only on the strength of such
misrepresentation made to her, and thereby forms a
misconception of fact that the accused was definitely going to
marry her, it would amount to commission of rape. 
38. In Uday Vs. State of Karnataka (supra)before the
Supreme Court, a friendship had developed between the
prosecutrix and the appellant. When the appellant proposed to
marry her, the prosecutrix told him that since they belonged to
different castes, their marriage is not possible. In these
circumstances the Supreme Court was of the view that the
consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a
person with whom she was deeply in love on a promise of
marriage, can not be said to be given under a misconception of
fact. The court further held that for determining whether consent
given by the prosecutrix was voluntary or under a misconception
of fact, no straight jacket formula can be laid down but following
factors stand out:-1. Where a girl was of 19 years of age and had sufficient
intelligence to understand the significance and moral
quality of the act she was consenting to
2. She was conscious of the fact that her marriage was
difficult on account of caste considerations.
3. It was difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge the
prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a
SC No.109/13. Page 31 of 33misconception of fact arising from his promise and 
4. There was no evidence to prove conclusively that the
appellant never intended to marry the prosecutrix.
39. In the instant case also, the prosecutrix was 20 years
old in the year 2006 when she started friendship with the accused
and hence a mature girl. She was well educated and doing a job of
secretarial and administrative nature with a reputed company of
Banglore. She was an independent lady and had been residing on
rent alone in Banglore since the year 2003. Hence, I consider that
she was intelligent enough to understand moral quality and
consequences of her act and there were no chances of their being
misled by any assurance given to her by the accused. There is no
evidence on record to show that she consented to sexual
intercourse with the accused only on the later's promise of
marriage and otherwise, she would not have given her consent for
the same. In fact, there is evidence on record in the form of Emails and internet chats between the two (Ex.J1) that prosecutrix
had been pestering and inducing the accused to have sexual
intercourse with her. 
40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I feel that the
prosecution has failed to prove that sexual intercourse had taken
place between the prosecutrix and the accused and the consent of
the prosecutrix to the same was obtained by the accused by any
misconception of fact. Thus the prosecution has failed to prove the
charges against the accused.
SC No.109/13. Page 32 of 3341. Therefore, the accused is liable to be acquitted and is
hereby acquitted.
Announced in open (VIRENDER BHAT)
Court on 20.12.2013. Addl. Sessions Judge
(Special Fast Track Court)
Dwarka Courts, New Delhi.
SC No.109/13. Page 33 of 33

Source - http://164.100.52.44/judis_cat/chrseq_dc.aspx (Page -6)

Wednesday, January 8, 2014

Landmark Judgement on Quackery - Jhola Chhap doctor - Allahabad High Court


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 


A.F.R 
Court No. - 39 
Reserved on 19.11.2013 
Delivered on16.12.2013 



Case :- WRIT - C No. - 64481 of 2012 



Petitioner :- Praveen Kumar 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Hira Lal Singh Kushwaha,Pankaj Dube 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. 




Hon'ble V.K. Shukla,J. 
Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J. 
Praveen Kumar has approached this Court praying therein for following reliefs: 
(i) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent to permit the petitioner to practice as Modern Medicines (Allopathic Medicines) alongwith Aurvedic Medicines in the wake and light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Phool Singh decided on July, 20, 1998. 
(ii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent not to disturb the petitioner's career in any way even alleging him as Jhola Chhap Doctor." 



Petitioner claims that he has got to his credit B.A.M.S. Degree from Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Science Karnataka and is registered with registration No. 57099 with Board of Aurvedic and Unani Tibbi Systems of Medicine, U.P.. Petitioner claims that he has also done specialization course in Child Health (Paediatric) C.C.H and is having certificate no. IHSM/7903/11. Petitioner further claims that students of MBBS, BUMS, BAMS and BHMS are equally eligible for CCH Course. Petitioner submits that he is a competent B.A.M.S Doctor having knowledge and training of both modern and aurvedic medicines, as the course of B.A.M.S. comprises not only the syllabus and curriculum of Aurvedic medicines but also to great extent the syllabus and curriculum of modern medicines, in such a situation and in this background, petitioner claims that he is entitled to and deserves to practice modern medicines also alongwith Aurvedic medicines and in the said practice no obstructions should be caused by the respondents. 
Petitioner has proceeded to mention that as there is dearth of doctors, in view of the same petitioner should be permitted to practice in morden medicines (Allopathy medicines) alongwith Aurvedic medicines and any impediment sought to be created to his practice be stopped. 
To the said writ petition counter affidavit has been filed and therein stand has been taken that request as has been made by the petitioner cannot be accepted as petitioner does not fulfil requisite minimum eligibility criteria provided for under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and petitioner is not at all qualified to practice in the said field and petitioner cannot claim as a matter of right to practice in Modern Medicines and petitioner can practice in the branch of "Indian Medicine" only. 
To the said counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit has been filed disputing the averments mentioned therein and the judgment in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Phool Singh decided on 20.07.1998 has been appended and has been relied upon. 
After pleadings mentioned above have been exchanged present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing and disposal. 
Sri Hira Lal Singh Kushwaha, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that in the present case petitioner is fully entitled to practice even "Modern medicines" as he has knowledge and training of general use of allopathic medicine which is included in the course of B.A.M.S. Degree and there being dearth of Doctors in the State of U.P., such permission should be accorded specially keeping in view the provision of Rule 2 (ee) of the Durgs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 as well as the provisions of Section 17 (3) (b) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 which gives privilege to the practitioners of Indian System of Medicine to practice alongwith "Indian medicine" any system of medicine and accordingly writ petition deserves to be allowed. 
Countering the said submission Sri J.K.Tiwari, learned Standing counsel submitted that petitioner is entitled to practice in the Indian System of Medicine Branch comprising of Ashtang Ayurveda, Sidha the qualification recognized under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 and is not at all entitled to practice in Allopathy medicine which is provided for under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, as such writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 
In order to examine the issue as has been sought to be raised by the petitioner before this Court, this Court proceeds to take note of statutory provision which governs the field of "Modern Medicines" as well as "Indian Medicines", as well as the relevant provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules , 1945. 
To start with the provision as contained under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Section 2(ee) being relevant is reproduced below: 
2[(ee) "Registered medical practitioner" means a person__ 
(i)holding a qualification granted by an authority specified or notified under Section 3 of the Indian Medical Degrees Act, 1916 (7 of 1916), or specified In the Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956); or 
(ii) registered or eligible for registration in a medical register of a State meant for the registration of persons practicing the modern scientific system of medicine 3 [excluding the Homoeopathic system of medicine] ; or 
(iii) registered in a medical register, 3 other than a register for the registration of Homoeopathic practitioner, of a State, who although not falling within sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) declared by a general or special order made by the State Government in this behalf as a person practising the modern scientific system of medicine for the purposes of this Act; or 
(iv) registered or eligible for registration in the register of dentists for a State under the Dentists Act, 1948 (16 of 1948); or 
who is engaged in the practice of veterinary medicine and who possesses qualification approved by the State Government] " 
The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 holding the field Modern medicine (Allopathic) has been promulgated with an object for reconstitution of Medical Council of India and the maintenance of Medical Register of India. Section 2 of the Act deals with definition and Sub-Sections (d), (f), (h) and (k) being relevant are being reproduced below: 
"(d) "Indian Medical Register" means the medical register maintained by the Council. 
(f) "medicine" means modern scientific medicine in all its branches and includes surgery and obstetrics, but does not include veterinary medicine and surgery . 
(h) recognised medical qualification" means any of the medical qualifications included in the Schedules. 
(k) State Medical Register" means a register maintained under any law for the time being in force in any state regulating the registration of practitioners of medicine.". 



Section 11 of this Act provides that the medical qualifications granted by any University or Medical Institution in India which are included in the First Schedule shall be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of this Act. The First Schedule enumerates the recognised medical qualifications granted by Universities or Medical institutions in India. Section 15(1) provides that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, the medical qualifications included in the Schedule shall be sufficient qualification for enrolment on any State Medical Register. Section 15(2)(b) provides that save as provided in Section 25 no person other than a medical practitioner enrolled on a State Medical Register, shall practise medicine in any State. Section 15(3) lays down that any person who acts in contravention of any provision of Sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 
The Indian Medicine Central Council Act. 1970 was enacted by the Parliament and was published on 21-12-1970. Its preamble shows that it is an Act to provide for the Constitution of a Central Council of Indian Medicine and the maintenance of a Central Register of Indian Medicine and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(1) of this Act gives the definition clause and Clauses (b), (c), (d), (e), (j) and (h) of Section 2(1) read as follows: 
"(b) "Board" means a Board, Council, Examining Body or Faculty of Indian Medicine (by whatever name called) constituted by the State Government under any law for the time being in force regulating the award of medical qualifications in, and registration of practitioners of, Indian medicine; 
(c) "Central Council" means the Central Council of Indian Medicine constituted under section 3; 
(d) "Central Register of Indian Medicine" means the register maintained by the Central Council under this Act. 
(e) "Indian Medicine" means the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb whether supplemented or not by such modern advances as the Central Council may declare by notification from time to time. 
'(ea) "medical college" means a college of Indian medicine, whether known as such or by any other name, in which a person may undergo a course of study or training including any post-graduate course of study or training which will qualify him for the award of a recognized medical qualification;'. 
(f) "medical institution" means any institution within or without India, which grants degrees, diploma or licenses in Indian medicine. 
( g) "prescribed" means prescribed by regulation; 
(h) "recognised medical qualification" means any of the medical qualifications, including Post-graduate medical qualification, of Indian medicine included in the Second, Third or Fourth Schedule; 
(i) "regulation" means a regulation made under section 36; 
(j) "State Register of Indian Medicine" means a register or registers maintained under any law for the time being in force in any State regulating the registration of practitioners of Indian Medicine;" 



Section 2(1)(e) shows that "Indian Medicine" means the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb. Allopathic system of medicine is not at all included in the aforesaid definition. Chapter III of this Act deals with recognition of medical qualifications and Section 14 thereof provides that the medical qualifications granted by any University, Board or other medical institution in India which are included in the Second Schedule shall be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of this Act. The Second Schedule to the Act gives a long list of recognised medical qualifications in Indian medicine granted by Universities. Boards and other Medical Institutions in India, Part 1 of this Schedule deals with Ayurveda and Siddha and Part II deals with Unani. Section 17(1) of this Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act any medical qualification included in the Second Schedule shall be sufficient qualification for enrolment on any State Register of Indian Medicine. Sub¬section (2) of Section 17 imposes certain restrictions and Clause (b) thereof lays down that no person other than a practitioner of Indian medicine who possesses a recognised medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian Medicine shall practise Indian Medicine in any State. This provision clearly shows that unless a person possesses a recognised medical qualification as laid down in the Schedule of the Act and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian Medicines, he cannot practise Indian Medicine. A similar restriction is contained in Clause (a) of Section 17(2) namely, that unless a person possesses a recognised medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian medicine, he cannot hold office as Vaidya, Siddha. Hakim or Physician or any other office in Government or in any institution maintained by a local or other authority. Sub-Section (3) of Section 17 provides for by mentioning that nothing contained in sub-section (2) of Section 17 shall effect the right of practitioner of Indian Medicine. Section 17(4) provides that any person who acts in contravention of any provisions of Sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 
On the parameters of the provisions quoted above, issue as raised by petitioner is being examined by this Court. 
The scope of Section 15 of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 has been considered before the Apex Court in the case of Poonam Varma Vs. Ashwin Patel 1996 (4) SCC 332, wherein the practitioner registered under Bombay Homoeopathic and Biochemic Practitioner Act, 1959 proceeded to administer modern medicine, then Apex Court took the view, that he was not qualified to practice Allopathic, and had entered into prohibited field of Allopathic. Relevant extract of the said judgement is as follows: 
"31. The impact of the above provisions is that no person can practice medicine in any State unless he Possesses the requisite qualification and is enrolled as a Medical Practitioner on State Medical Register. The consequences for the breach of these provisions are indicated in Sub-section 
32. If a person practices medicine without possessing either the requisite qualification or enrollment under the Act on any State Medical Register, he becomes liable to be punished with imprisonment or fine or both. 
32. Apart from the Central Act mentioned above, there is the Maharashtra Medical Council Act 7 1965 dealing with the registration of Medical Practitioners and recognition of qualification and medical institutions. Section 2 (d) defines 'Medical Practitioner' or 'Practitioner' as under : "Medical Practitioner or Practitioner means a person who is engaged in the practice of modern scientific medicine in any of its branches including surgery and obstetrics, but not including Veterinary medicine or surgery or the Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathic or Biochemic system of medicine 
(emphasis supplied) 
33. It will be seen that the definition consists of two distinct parts; the first part contains the conclusive nature of phraseology and the latter part is the exclusionary part which specifically excludes Homoeopathic or Biochemic System of Medicine. A register of Medical Practitioners is to be maintained in terms of the mandate contained in Section 16(1) of the Act Under Sub-section (3), a person possessing requisite qualification and on payment of requisite fee can apply for registration of his name in the aforesaid Register. 
34. A combined reading of the aforesaid Acts, namely, the Bombay Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959, the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Maharashtra Medical Council Act, 1965 indicates that a person who is registered under the Bombay Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959 can practice Homoeopathy only and that he cannot be registered under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 or under the State Act, namely, the Maharashtra Medical Council, Act, 1965, because of the restriction on registration of persons not possessing the requisite qualification. So also, a person possessing the qualification mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 or the Maharashtra Medical Counsel Act, 1965 cannot be registered as a Medical Practitioner under the Bombay Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959, as he does not possesse any qualification in Homoeopatnic System of Medicine. The significance of mutual exclusion is relevant inasmuch as the right to practice in any particular system of medicine is dependent upon registration which is permissible only if qualification) and that too, recognised qualification, is possessed by a person in that System. 
35. It is true that in all the aforesaid Systems of Medicine, the patient is always a human being. It is also true that Anatomy and Physiology of every human being all over the world, irrespective of the country, the habitat and the region to which he may belong, is the same. He has the same faculties and same systems. The Central Nervous System, the Cardio-Vascular System, the Digestive and Reproductive systems etc. are similar all over the world. Similarly, Emotions, namely, anger, sorrow, happiness, pain etc. are naturally possessed by every human being. 
36. But merely because the Anatomy and Physiology are similar, it does not mean that a person having studied one System of Medicine can claim to treat the patient by drugs of another System which he might not have studied at any stage. No doubt, study of Physiology and Anatomy is common in all Systems of Medicines and the students belonging to different Systems of Medicines may be taught physiology and Anatomy together, but so far as the study of drugs is concerned, the pharmacology of all systems is entirely different. 
37. an ailment, if it is not surgical, is treated by medicines or drugs. Typhoid Fever, for example, can be treated not only under Allopathic System of medicine, but also under the Ayurvedic, Unani and Homoeopathic Systems of Medicine by drugs prepared and manufactured according to their own formulate and pharmacopoeia . Therefore, a person having studied one particular System of Medicine cannot possibly claim deep and complete knowledge about the drugs of the other System of Medicine. 
38. The bane of Allopathic medicine is that it always has a side-effect. A warning to this effect is printed on the trade label for the use of the person (Doctor) having studied that System of Medicine. 
39. Since the law, under which Respondent No. 1 was registered as a Medical Practitioner, required him to practice in HOMOEOPATHY ONLY, he was under a statutory duty not to enter the field of any other System of Medicine as, admittedly, he was not qualified in the other system, Allopathy, to be precise. He trespassed into a prohibited field and was liable to be prosecuted under Section 15(3) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. His conduct amounted to an actionable negligence particularly as the duty of care indicated by this Court in DR. LAXMAN JOSHI'S CASE (SUPRA) WAS BREACHED BY HIM ON ALL THE THREE COUNTS INDICATED THEREIN. 
41. A person who does not have knowledge of a particular System of Medicine but practices in that System is a Quack and a mere pretender to medical knowledge or skill, or to put it differently, a Charlatan. 
As per the said judgement right to practice in particular system of medicine is dependent upon registration which is permissible only if qualification is there, and that too, if recognised qualification is possessed by a person in that system. Apex Court further made it clear that merely because the subject of Anatomy and Physiology are similar, it does not mean that a person having studied one System of Medicine can claim to treat the patient by drugs of another System which he might not have studied at any stage. 
Thereafter once again before the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and others Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (1998) 7 SCC 579, issue was raised as to whether an incumbent who is engaged in medical practice in Indian medicines can he be permitted to practise in modern medicine based on the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 vis-a vis the provisions of 1956 Act and 1970 Act. The answer has been in negative as follows: 
"However, the claim of those who have been notified by Ste Government under clause (iii) of Rule 2(ee) of the Drugs Rues and those who possess degrees in integrated courses to practice allopathic medicine is sought to be supported form the definition of Indian medicine is Sence 2(e) of the 1970 Act, referred to above , meaning the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ash tang Ayurvedic, Sridhar or USANi Tabb whether supplemented or not by such modern advances as the Central Council may declare by notification from time to time. A lot of emphasis is laid on the words italicized to show that they indicate modern scientific medicine have been included in the syllabi. A degree-holder in integrated courses is imparted not only the therorticalknowledge of modern scenic medicine but also training there under, is the claim. We shall examine the notifications issued by the Central Council to ascertain the import of those words. In its resolution dated 11-3-1987. The Central Council elucidated the concept of "modern advances" as follows; 
"This meeting of the Central Council hereby unanimously resolved that in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of of Section 2 of the 1970 Act of the IMCC Act, ''the modern advances;, the drug had made advances under the various branches of modern scientific system of medicine, clinical, non-clinical biosciences, also technological innovations made from time to time and declare that the courses and curriculum conducted and recognized by the CCIM are supplemented by such modern advances." 
On 30-10-1996, a clarificatiory notification was issued, which reads ads under: 
"As per proven under Section 2(1) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, hereby the Central Council of Indian Medicine notifies that "institutionally qualified practitioners of Indian system of medicine(Ayurvedic, Sridhar and Unani) are eligible to practice Indian system of medicine and modern medicine including surgery, gynecology and obstetrics based on their training and teaching which are included in the syllabi of courses of ISM prescribed by the Central Council of Indian Medicine after approval of the Government of India. 
The meaning of the word "modern medicine" (advances) means advances made in various branches of modern scientific medicine, clinical, non-clinical biosciences, also technological innovations made from time to tome and notify that the courses and curriculum conducted and recognized by the Central Council of Indian Medicine are supplemented by such modern advances" 
Based on those clarifications, the arguments proceed that persons who registered under the 1970 Act and have done integrated courses, are entitled to practice allopathic medicine. In our view, all that the definition of "Indian medicine" and the clarifications issued by the Central Council enable such practitioners of Indian Medicine id to make use of the modern advances in various sciences such as radiology report, (X-ray), complete blood picture report, lipids report, ECG, etc. for purposes of practicing in their own system. However, it any State Act recognizes the qualification of integrated course as sufficient qualification for registration in the State Medical Register of that State, the prohibition of Section 15(2)(b) will not be attracted. 
47. A harmonious reading of Section 15 of the 1956 Act and Section 17 of the 1970 Act leads to the conclusion that there is no scope for a person enrolled on the State Register of Indian Medicine or the Central Register of Indian Medicine to practice modern scientific medicine in any of its branches unless that person is also enrolled on a State Medical Register within the meaning of the 1956 Act. 
48. The right to practice modern scientific medicine or Indian system of medicine cannot be based on the provisions of the Drugs Rules and declaration made there under by State Government. 
"Neither it is averred in the writ petition nor it has been urged that the petitioner is enrolled on a State Medical register as defined in Section 2(k) of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and, therefore, he is not entitled to practise modern scientific medicine or to prescribe allopathic drugs. Learned counsel has also referred to certain provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules but in our opinion they are wholly irrelevant as they deal with import manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs and they neither confer nor deal with the right to practise medicine." 



The provisions of Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 under the scheme of things provided for show that a person holding a qualification recognised by the aforesaid Act in the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang. Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb is entitled to practise only in the discipline in which he has acquired the qualification. The Act does not authorise him to practice in Allopathy system of medicine. The right to practice modern scientific medicine or Indian system of Medicine can not be based on the provisions of Drug Rules and for practising modern medicine, one has to have the qualifications provided for under 1956 Act, alongwith enrolment on State Medical Register. 
Contrary to the said view, as quoted above the most surprising feature of present writ petition is that petitioner is placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case, State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh, 1998-Laws (SC)-7-81, decided on 20.7.1998 wherein Apex Court has held as follows: 
"(1) For the last few days we have heard a batch of Civil matters in which sub-clause (iii), clause (ee) of Rule 2 of the The Drug and Cosmetics Rules 1945 has been the subject matter of debate in its widest spectrum. Prima facie conclusions drawn therefrom make us feel that the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted with. The respondent does come within the definition of a registered medical practitioner entitled to keep allopathic medicines by virtue of his degree and registration in the state of Bihar. We thus find nothing to interfere in this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed." 
Bare perusal of the said judgment would go to show, that on prima facie basis conclusions drawn by High Court has not been faulted with. Same Bench comprising of Hon'ble M.M. Punchi, C.J., and K.T. Thomas and S.M. Quadri J., based on hearing that is referred to in the judgment itself by mentioning that for last few days we have heard batch of Civil matters, wherein sub-clause (iii), clause (ee) of Rule 2 has been subject matter of debate in its widest spectrum, subsequent to the same have exhaustively dealt with the issue on 8.10.1998, while deciding the case of Dr. Mukhtar Chandra (Supra) and therein altogether different view, has been taken, then for all practical purposes,view as expressed on prima-facie basis in the case of State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh, as relied upon by petitioner, has to be accepted as virtually over-ruled. Subsequent reasoned judgment, by the same Bench will hold the field, and accordingly petitioner, cannot get any benefit or advantage of the judgment and order dated 29.7.1998, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh. 
As lines were repeatedly being crossed by incumbents, who were not authorised to practice allopathic branch of medicine, on 25.04.2000 the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Joshi Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2000 (5) SCC 80 came heavily by issuing following directions: 
(i) All district Magistrates and the Chief Medical officers of the State shall be directed to identify, within a time limit to be fixed by the Secretary, all unqualified/ unregistered medical practitioners and to initiate legal actions against these persons immediately; 
(ii) Direct all District Magistrates and the Chief Medical Officers to monitor all legal proceedings initiated against such persons; 
(iii) The Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department shall give due publicity of the names of such unqualified/ unregistered medical practitioners so that people do not approach such persons for medical treatment. 
(iv) The Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department Shall monitor the action taken by all District Magistrates and all Chief Medical Officers of the State and issue necessary directions from time to time to these officers so that such unauthorized persons cannot pursue their medical profession in the State 
This Court also had an occasion to consider whether the persons holding degrees in Indian Medicines such as Ashang, Ayurved, Siddha, Unani Tibb are authorized to practice Allopathic system of medicines in the case of Dr. Mehboob Alam vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (06.09.2001) W.P.(Cr.) 5896 of 2000 reported in [(2001) 2 JIC 774 (All)] and after analysis of provisions of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 took the view that the medicine means modern scientific medicine for all its branches and includes surgery, and same is entirely different from the Indian Medicine and only a person who possess the qualification enumerated in the first schedule of this order which have been recognized and entitled to be enrolled on any State register, can only practice. A person holding qualification recognised under 1970 Act, does not authorise him to practice Allopathy system of medicine. 
This Court once again on issue being raised as to whether incumbents who has got to his credit degree in Indian Medicine can he be permitted to practice in modern medicine, proceeded to consider the matter at length in the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (II) Vs. A.P. Verma, reported in 2004 (2) ESC (All) 960, and repelled the submission, so advanced. 
Division Bench of this Court once again reiterated the same principal in the case of Ravinder Kumar Goel vs. State of U.P. 2004 (2) ESC 976, that a person with Ayurvedic and Unani qualification, if is practising Allopathic, same is illegal. 
The field of practice thus stands demarcated i.e. the doctors enrolled in their branch of medicine should not be allowed to practice in any other branch of medicine of which he has not acquired knowledge or has little knowledge. Under the scheme of things provided for, there is mutual exclusion i.e. one is not allowed to practice in any other branch of medicine of which he has not acquired knowledge. 
Petitioner has next proceeded to place reliance on the Government Notification dated 25.11.1992, issued by Government of Maharashtra, under Maharashtra Medical Practitioners Act, 1961, as well as on the notification dated 22.01.2004, issued by Central Council of Indian Medicine. 
Petitioner will not succeed on this score also, for the reason that the provisions of Maharashtra Medical Practitioner Act, 1961, cannot be pressed in reference of practice of modern medicine in the State of U.P. Coupled with this, the circular as has been issued, the same has been interpreted by Kerela High Court in the case of National Integrated Medical Association and another Vs. State of Kerala WA No. 1260 of 2006 (A) decided on the 12.12.2006 wherein the High Court of Kerela at Ernakulam held that the modern advances mentioned in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1970 can only be advanced in Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani and not Allopathic medicine. By virtue of Section 15(2) (b) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 the persons having the prescribed qualifications included in the schedules alone are eligible to practice modern medicine. The words "modern medicine" would be referable to the modern advances made in the respective fields of Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani. The Kerela High Court followed Mukhtar Chand Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1999 SC 468. In support of the observations made by it and reiterated that modern advances mentioned in Section 2(3) of the Act of 1970 cannot be interpreted to mean Allopathic Medicines. 
Against the judgment of Kerela High Court dated 12.12.2006, Special Leave to Appeal NO.6116 of 2007 had been filed, and the same has also been dismissed on 23.7.2007. Thereafter, Central Council of Indian Medicine, taking note of judicial proceedings in its 158th Meeting dated 28.6.2010 has decided to withdraw all earlier resolutions. Madras High Court also in Writ Petition No.13696 of 2009, D.J. Kaleem Nawaz, BUMS vs. State of Tamilnadu, decided on 29.10.2010, wherein prayer was made to the similar effect, not to interfere in administering allopathic medicine, very clearly ruled that such a prayer cannot be accorded and clarifications issued by Central Council of Indian Medicine are of no consequence, wherein it has been mentioned that practitioners of Indian System of Medicine who practised modern scientific system of medicine, allopathic medicine are protected under Section 17(3)(b) of 1970 Act is not correct as provisions of 1956 Act have been ignored. 
This Court, also approves of the same view, and further clarifies that a statutory body created under Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 such as Central Council of Indian Medicine, at the point of time when it proceeds to exercise its statutory authority the same has to be in connection with "Indian Medicine" and not at all beyond the same. Words "Modern advances" has to be contextually interpreted i.e "Modern advances" in the field of Ayurveda, Sidha and Unani and not at all in context of "Modern Medicines". In the context of, practitioners of "Indian Medicine" the practitioners of "Indian Medicine" can make use of modern advances in various sciences such as radiology report (X-ray), complete blood picture report, lipids report, ECG etc for practising in their own system. This does not mean that practitioners of "Indian Medicine" would start acting as Radiologist/Pathologist/Cardiologist. Only for the purposes of practising "Indian Medicine" they can make use of the reports and this will not at all authorize the practitioners of "Indian Medicine" to administer and prescribe modern medicines (allopathic)" 
Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Bhanwar Kanwar Vs. R.K. Gupta and another reported in (2013) 4 SCC 252 has taken the view that wherein unauthorized medical treatment is administered, same is unfair trade practice and administering allopathic medicine by person who is qualified in Ayurvedic medicine cannot be approved of. Apex Court in the facts of case, enhanced the compensation amount from Rs.5 lacs to Rs. 15 lacs. 
In the said judgment benefit has been sought to be taken of the Government Order dated 24.02.2003. Qua the same, Apex Court has mentioned that in connection with some cases, the High Court Allahabad has issued direction to take action against the quacks who are practising Allopathic medicine but not registered with Medical Council. In order to put restrain from practising modern medicine two further Government Orders have been issued by the State Government on 04.03.2008 and 08.06.2012 wherein State Government has clearly proceeded to issue guidelines mentioning therein that any incumbent who is authorized to practice under Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 is not at all entitled and authorized to prescribe medicines under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Said Government Orders still hold the field and same are in consonance with the repeated view taken by this Court and by the Apex Court that an incumbent who has obtained degree under 1970 Act cannot be permitted to prescribe modern medicine as provided for under 1956 Act. 
Under the scheme of things provided for it is clear and categorical that the definition as has been provided for under Rule 2(ee) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 will not at all come to the rescue and reprieve of the petitioner. Said definition has been used in different context and same does not authorize incumbent having qualification under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 to start prescribing medicine which the incumbents registered under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 only can administer. 
Petitioner cannot be permitted to prescribe allopathic/modern medicine as is provided for under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, by any means, as a person having studied one particular system of medicine cannot possibly claim deep and complete knowledge about the drugs of the other system of medicine, and specially when right to health and medical care is fundamental right under Article 21 read with Articles 39(c), 41 and 43 of Constitution, as expressed by Apex Court, in the case of Consumer Education and Research Centre Vs. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 922, and by further providing that right to life includes protection of health and strength and the minimum requirement to enable the persons to live with dignity. Petitioner will have to practice in his own branch, and it would be a extremely grave situation, to allow petitioner to treat and prescribe a sick incumbent with allopathic medicine. The transgression into other branches of medicine as has been prayed for is not permissible, as same would tantamount to quackery and exposing petitioner to cancellation of registration and prosecution. 
Petitioner at last stated before this Court that there is dearth of doctors, in such a situation in this background such resources should be utilized. 
This is not at all case of the petitioner that he has acquired degree or qualification as is provided for under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and is registered in the State register, maintained in this regard then, in such a situation and in this background, the petitioner cannot be permitted to administer the medicine connected with the modern medicine and it may be true on the ground that large number of poorer sections of the society, being rendered service by him and various other similarly situated but the same cannot be a criteria to flout the statuary provisions, the same being in the realm of policy decision of other constitutional functionaries. Apex Court in the case of Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in JT 2009 (3) SC 351 has repelled such an argument wherein plea has been raised that incumbent was rendering service to treat the poor people and there is dearth of Doctors, and accordingly, he should be permitted to prescribe medicine. 
In terms of above, prayer made by the petitioner cannot be entertained, accordingly, present writ petition is dismissed. 




(Suneet Kumar, J.) (V.K. Shukla,J.) 



Order Date :- 16.12.2013