Wednesday, January 8, 2014

Landmark Judgement on Quackery - Jhola Chhap doctor - Allahabad High Court


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 


A.F.R 
Court No. - 39 
Reserved on 19.11.2013 
Delivered on16.12.2013 



Case :- WRIT - C No. - 64481 of 2012 



Petitioner :- Praveen Kumar 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Hira Lal Singh Kushwaha,Pankaj Dube 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. 




Hon'ble V.K. Shukla,J. 
Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J. 
Praveen Kumar has approached this Court praying therein for following reliefs: 
(i) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent to permit the petitioner to practice as Modern Medicines (Allopathic Medicines) alongwith Aurvedic Medicines in the wake and light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Phool Singh decided on July, 20, 1998. 
(ii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent not to disturb the petitioner's career in any way even alleging him as Jhola Chhap Doctor." 



Petitioner claims that he has got to his credit B.A.M.S. Degree from Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Science Karnataka and is registered with registration No. 57099 with Board of Aurvedic and Unani Tibbi Systems of Medicine, U.P.. Petitioner claims that he has also done specialization course in Child Health (Paediatric) C.C.H and is having certificate no. IHSM/7903/11. Petitioner further claims that students of MBBS, BUMS, BAMS and BHMS are equally eligible for CCH Course. Petitioner submits that he is a competent B.A.M.S Doctor having knowledge and training of both modern and aurvedic medicines, as the course of B.A.M.S. comprises not only the syllabus and curriculum of Aurvedic medicines but also to great extent the syllabus and curriculum of modern medicines, in such a situation and in this background, petitioner claims that he is entitled to and deserves to practice modern medicines also alongwith Aurvedic medicines and in the said practice no obstructions should be caused by the respondents. 
Petitioner has proceeded to mention that as there is dearth of doctors, in view of the same petitioner should be permitted to practice in morden medicines (Allopathy medicines) alongwith Aurvedic medicines and any impediment sought to be created to his practice be stopped. 
To the said writ petition counter affidavit has been filed and therein stand has been taken that request as has been made by the petitioner cannot be accepted as petitioner does not fulfil requisite minimum eligibility criteria provided for under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and petitioner is not at all qualified to practice in the said field and petitioner cannot claim as a matter of right to practice in Modern Medicines and petitioner can practice in the branch of "Indian Medicine" only. 
To the said counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit has been filed disputing the averments mentioned therein and the judgment in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Phool Singh decided on 20.07.1998 has been appended and has been relied upon. 
After pleadings mentioned above have been exchanged present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing and disposal. 
Sri Hira Lal Singh Kushwaha, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that in the present case petitioner is fully entitled to practice even "Modern medicines" as he has knowledge and training of general use of allopathic medicine which is included in the course of B.A.M.S. Degree and there being dearth of Doctors in the State of U.P., such permission should be accorded specially keeping in view the provision of Rule 2 (ee) of the Durgs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 as well as the provisions of Section 17 (3) (b) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 which gives privilege to the practitioners of Indian System of Medicine to practice alongwith "Indian medicine" any system of medicine and accordingly writ petition deserves to be allowed. 
Countering the said submission Sri J.K.Tiwari, learned Standing counsel submitted that petitioner is entitled to practice in the Indian System of Medicine Branch comprising of Ashtang Ayurveda, Sidha the qualification recognized under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 and is not at all entitled to practice in Allopathy medicine which is provided for under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, as such writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 
In order to examine the issue as has been sought to be raised by the petitioner before this Court, this Court proceeds to take note of statutory provision which governs the field of "Modern Medicines" as well as "Indian Medicines", as well as the relevant provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules , 1945. 
To start with the provision as contained under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Section 2(ee) being relevant is reproduced below: 
2[(ee) "Registered medical practitioner" means a person__ 
(i)holding a qualification granted by an authority specified or notified under Section 3 of the Indian Medical Degrees Act, 1916 (7 of 1916), or specified In the Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956); or 
(ii) registered or eligible for registration in a medical register of a State meant for the registration of persons practicing the modern scientific system of medicine 3 [excluding the Homoeopathic system of medicine] ; or 
(iii) registered in a medical register, 3 other than a register for the registration of Homoeopathic practitioner, of a State, who although not falling within sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) declared by a general or special order made by the State Government in this behalf as a person practising the modern scientific system of medicine for the purposes of this Act; or 
(iv) registered or eligible for registration in the register of dentists for a State under the Dentists Act, 1948 (16 of 1948); or 
who is engaged in the practice of veterinary medicine and who possesses qualification approved by the State Government] " 
The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 holding the field Modern medicine (Allopathic) has been promulgated with an object for reconstitution of Medical Council of India and the maintenance of Medical Register of India. Section 2 of the Act deals with definition and Sub-Sections (d), (f), (h) and (k) being relevant are being reproduced below: 
"(d) "Indian Medical Register" means the medical register maintained by the Council. 
(f) "medicine" means modern scientific medicine in all its branches and includes surgery and obstetrics, but does not include veterinary medicine and surgery . 
(h) recognised medical qualification" means any of the medical qualifications included in the Schedules. 
(k) State Medical Register" means a register maintained under any law for the time being in force in any state regulating the registration of practitioners of medicine.". 



Section 11 of this Act provides that the medical qualifications granted by any University or Medical Institution in India which are included in the First Schedule shall be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of this Act. The First Schedule enumerates the recognised medical qualifications granted by Universities or Medical institutions in India. Section 15(1) provides that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, the medical qualifications included in the Schedule shall be sufficient qualification for enrolment on any State Medical Register. Section 15(2)(b) provides that save as provided in Section 25 no person other than a medical practitioner enrolled on a State Medical Register, shall practise medicine in any State. Section 15(3) lays down that any person who acts in contravention of any provision of Sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 
The Indian Medicine Central Council Act. 1970 was enacted by the Parliament and was published on 21-12-1970. Its preamble shows that it is an Act to provide for the Constitution of a Central Council of Indian Medicine and the maintenance of a Central Register of Indian Medicine and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(1) of this Act gives the definition clause and Clauses (b), (c), (d), (e), (j) and (h) of Section 2(1) read as follows: 
"(b) "Board" means a Board, Council, Examining Body or Faculty of Indian Medicine (by whatever name called) constituted by the State Government under any law for the time being in force regulating the award of medical qualifications in, and registration of practitioners of, Indian medicine; 
(c) "Central Council" means the Central Council of Indian Medicine constituted under section 3; 
(d) "Central Register of Indian Medicine" means the register maintained by the Central Council under this Act. 
(e) "Indian Medicine" means the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb whether supplemented or not by such modern advances as the Central Council may declare by notification from time to time. 
'(ea) "medical college" means a college of Indian medicine, whether known as such or by any other name, in which a person may undergo a course of study or training including any post-graduate course of study or training which will qualify him for the award of a recognized medical qualification;'. 
(f) "medical institution" means any institution within or without India, which grants degrees, diploma or licenses in Indian medicine. 
( g) "prescribed" means prescribed by regulation; 
(h) "recognised medical qualification" means any of the medical qualifications, including Post-graduate medical qualification, of Indian medicine included in the Second, Third or Fourth Schedule; 
(i) "regulation" means a regulation made under section 36; 
(j) "State Register of Indian Medicine" means a register or registers maintained under any law for the time being in force in any State regulating the registration of practitioners of Indian Medicine;" 



Section 2(1)(e) shows that "Indian Medicine" means the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb. Allopathic system of medicine is not at all included in the aforesaid definition. Chapter III of this Act deals with recognition of medical qualifications and Section 14 thereof provides that the medical qualifications granted by any University, Board or other medical institution in India which are included in the Second Schedule shall be recognised medical qualifications for the purposes of this Act. The Second Schedule to the Act gives a long list of recognised medical qualifications in Indian medicine granted by Universities. Boards and other Medical Institutions in India, Part 1 of this Schedule deals with Ayurveda and Siddha and Part II deals with Unani. Section 17(1) of this Act provides that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act any medical qualification included in the Second Schedule shall be sufficient qualification for enrolment on any State Register of Indian Medicine. Sub¬section (2) of Section 17 imposes certain restrictions and Clause (b) thereof lays down that no person other than a practitioner of Indian medicine who possesses a recognised medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian Medicine shall practise Indian Medicine in any State. This provision clearly shows that unless a person possesses a recognised medical qualification as laid down in the Schedule of the Act and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian Medicines, he cannot practise Indian Medicine. A similar restriction is contained in Clause (a) of Section 17(2) namely, that unless a person possesses a recognised medical qualification and is enrolled on a State Register or the Central Register of Indian medicine, he cannot hold office as Vaidya, Siddha. Hakim or Physician or any other office in Government or in any institution maintained by a local or other authority. Sub-Section (3) of Section 17 provides for by mentioning that nothing contained in sub-section (2) of Section 17 shall effect the right of practitioner of Indian Medicine. Section 17(4) provides that any person who acts in contravention of any provisions of Sub-section (2) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 
On the parameters of the provisions quoted above, issue as raised by petitioner is being examined by this Court. 
The scope of Section 15 of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 has been considered before the Apex Court in the case of Poonam Varma Vs. Ashwin Patel 1996 (4) SCC 332, wherein the practitioner registered under Bombay Homoeopathic and Biochemic Practitioner Act, 1959 proceeded to administer modern medicine, then Apex Court took the view, that he was not qualified to practice Allopathic, and had entered into prohibited field of Allopathic. Relevant extract of the said judgement is as follows: 
"31. The impact of the above provisions is that no person can practice medicine in any State unless he Possesses the requisite qualification and is enrolled as a Medical Practitioner on State Medical Register. The consequences for the breach of these provisions are indicated in Sub-section 
32. If a person practices medicine without possessing either the requisite qualification or enrollment under the Act on any State Medical Register, he becomes liable to be punished with imprisonment or fine or both. 
32. Apart from the Central Act mentioned above, there is the Maharashtra Medical Council Act 7 1965 dealing with the registration of Medical Practitioners and recognition of qualification and medical institutions. Section 2 (d) defines 'Medical Practitioner' or 'Practitioner' as under : "Medical Practitioner or Practitioner means a person who is engaged in the practice of modern scientific medicine in any of its branches including surgery and obstetrics, but not including Veterinary medicine or surgery or the Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathic or Biochemic system of medicine 
(emphasis supplied) 
33. It will be seen that the definition consists of two distinct parts; the first part contains the conclusive nature of phraseology and the latter part is the exclusionary part which specifically excludes Homoeopathic or Biochemic System of Medicine. A register of Medical Practitioners is to be maintained in terms of the mandate contained in Section 16(1) of the Act Under Sub-section (3), a person possessing requisite qualification and on payment of requisite fee can apply for registration of his name in the aforesaid Register. 
34. A combined reading of the aforesaid Acts, namely, the Bombay Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959, the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Maharashtra Medical Council Act, 1965 indicates that a person who is registered under the Bombay Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959 can practice Homoeopathy only and that he cannot be registered under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 or under the State Act, namely, the Maharashtra Medical Council, Act, 1965, because of the restriction on registration of persons not possessing the requisite qualification. So also, a person possessing the qualification mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 or the Maharashtra Medical Counsel Act, 1965 cannot be registered as a Medical Practitioner under the Bombay Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1959, as he does not possesse any qualification in Homoeopatnic System of Medicine. The significance of mutual exclusion is relevant inasmuch as the right to practice in any particular system of medicine is dependent upon registration which is permissible only if qualification) and that too, recognised qualification, is possessed by a person in that System. 
35. It is true that in all the aforesaid Systems of Medicine, the patient is always a human being. It is also true that Anatomy and Physiology of every human being all over the world, irrespective of the country, the habitat and the region to which he may belong, is the same. He has the same faculties and same systems. The Central Nervous System, the Cardio-Vascular System, the Digestive and Reproductive systems etc. are similar all over the world. Similarly, Emotions, namely, anger, sorrow, happiness, pain etc. are naturally possessed by every human being. 
36. But merely because the Anatomy and Physiology are similar, it does not mean that a person having studied one System of Medicine can claim to treat the patient by drugs of another System which he might not have studied at any stage. No doubt, study of Physiology and Anatomy is common in all Systems of Medicines and the students belonging to different Systems of Medicines may be taught physiology and Anatomy together, but so far as the study of drugs is concerned, the pharmacology of all systems is entirely different. 
37. an ailment, if it is not surgical, is treated by medicines or drugs. Typhoid Fever, for example, can be treated not only under Allopathic System of medicine, but also under the Ayurvedic, Unani and Homoeopathic Systems of Medicine by drugs prepared and manufactured according to their own formulate and pharmacopoeia . Therefore, a person having studied one particular System of Medicine cannot possibly claim deep and complete knowledge about the drugs of the other System of Medicine. 
38. The bane of Allopathic medicine is that it always has a side-effect. A warning to this effect is printed on the trade label for the use of the person (Doctor) having studied that System of Medicine. 
39. Since the law, under which Respondent No. 1 was registered as a Medical Practitioner, required him to practice in HOMOEOPATHY ONLY, he was under a statutory duty not to enter the field of any other System of Medicine as, admittedly, he was not qualified in the other system, Allopathy, to be precise. He trespassed into a prohibited field and was liable to be prosecuted under Section 15(3) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. His conduct amounted to an actionable negligence particularly as the duty of care indicated by this Court in DR. LAXMAN JOSHI'S CASE (SUPRA) WAS BREACHED BY HIM ON ALL THE THREE COUNTS INDICATED THEREIN. 
41. A person who does not have knowledge of a particular System of Medicine but practices in that System is a Quack and a mere pretender to medical knowledge or skill, or to put it differently, a Charlatan. 
As per the said judgement right to practice in particular system of medicine is dependent upon registration which is permissible only if qualification is there, and that too, if recognised qualification is possessed by a person in that system. Apex Court further made it clear that merely because the subject of Anatomy and Physiology are similar, it does not mean that a person having studied one System of Medicine can claim to treat the patient by drugs of another System which he might not have studied at any stage. 
Thereafter once again before the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and others Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (1998) 7 SCC 579, issue was raised as to whether an incumbent who is engaged in medical practice in Indian medicines can he be permitted to practise in modern medicine based on the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 vis-a vis the provisions of 1956 Act and 1970 Act. The answer has been in negative as follows: 
"However, the claim of those who have been notified by Ste Government under clause (iii) of Rule 2(ee) of the Drugs Rues and those who possess degrees in integrated courses to practice allopathic medicine is sought to be supported form the definition of Indian medicine is Sence 2(e) of the 1970 Act, referred to above , meaning the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ash tang Ayurvedic, Sridhar or USANi Tabb whether supplemented or not by such modern advances as the Central Council may declare by notification from time to time. A lot of emphasis is laid on the words italicized to show that they indicate modern scientific medicine have been included in the syllabi. A degree-holder in integrated courses is imparted not only the therorticalknowledge of modern scenic medicine but also training there under, is the claim. We shall examine the notifications issued by the Central Council to ascertain the import of those words. In its resolution dated 11-3-1987. The Central Council elucidated the concept of "modern advances" as follows; 
"This meeting of the Central Council hereby unanimously resolved that in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of of Section 2 of the 1970 Act of the IMCC Act, ''the modern advances;, the drug had made advances under the various branches of modern scientific system of medicine, clinical, non-clinical biosciences, also technological innovations made from time to time and declare that the courses and curriculum conducted and recognized by the CCIM are supplemented by such modern advances." 
On 30-10-1996, a clarificatiory notification was issued, which reads ads under: 
"As per proven under Section 2(1) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, hereby the Central Council of Indian Medicine notifies that "institutionally qualified practitioners of Indian system of medicine(Ayurvedic, Sridhar and Unani) are eligible to practice Indian system of medicine and modern medicine including surgery, gynecology and obstetrics based on their training and teaching which are included in the syllabi of courses of ISM prescribed by the Central Council of Indian Medicine after approval of the Government of India. 
The meaning of the word "modern medicine" (advances) means advances made in various branches of modern scientific medicine, clinical, non-clinical biosciences, also technological innovations made from time to tome and notify that the courses and curriculum conducted and recognized by the Central Council of Indian Medicine are supplemented by such modern advances" 
Based on those clarifications, the arguments proceed that persons who registered under the 1970 Act and have done integrated courses, are entitled to practice allopathic medicine. In our view, all that the definition of "Indian medicine" and the clarifications issued by the Central Council enable such practitioners of Indian Medicine id to make use of the modern advances in various sciences such as radiology report, (X-ray), complete blood picture report, lipids report, ECG, etc. for purposes of practicing in their own system. However, it any State Act recognizes the qualification of integrated course as sufficient qualification for registration in the State Medical Register of that State, the prohibition of Section 15(2)(b) will not be attracted. 
47. A harmonious reading of Section 15 of the 1956 Act and Section 17 of the 1970 Act leads to the conclusion that there is no scope for a person enrolled on the State Register of Indian Medicine or the Central Register of Indian Medicine to practice modern scientific medicine in any of its branches unless that person is also enrolled on a State Medical Register within the meaning of the 1956 Act. 
48. The right to practice modern scientific medicine or Indian system of medicine cannot be based on the provisions of the Drugs Rules and declaration made there under by State Government. 
"Neither it is averred in the writ petition nor it has been urged that the petitioner is enrolled on a State Medical register as defined in Section 2(k) of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and, therefore, he is not entitled to practise modern scientific medicine or to prescribe allopathic drugs. Learned counsel has also referred to certain provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules but in our opinion they are wholly irrelevant as they deal with import manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs and they neither confer nor deal with the right to practise medicine." 



The provisions of Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 under the scheme of things provided for show that a person holding a qualification recognised by the aforesaid Act in the system of Indian medicine commonly known as Ashtang. Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani Tibb is entitled to practise only in the discipline in which he has acquired the qualification. The Act does not authorise him to practice in Allopathy system of medicine. The right to practice modern scientific medicine or Indian system of Medicine can not be based on the provisions of Drug Rules and for practising modern medicine, one has to have the qualifications provided for under 1956 Act, alongwith enrolment on State Medical Register. 
Contrary to the said view, as quoted above the most surprising feature of present writ petition is that petitioner is placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case, State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh, 1998-Laws (SC)-7-81, decided on 20.7.1998 wherein Apex Court has held as follows: 
"(1) For the last few days we have heard a batch of Civil matters in which sub-clause (iii), clause (ee) of Rule 2 of the The Drug and Cosmetics Rules 1945 has been the subject matter of debate in its widest spectrum. Prima facie conclusions drawn therefrom make us feel that the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted with. The respondent does come within the definition of a registered medical practitioner entitled to keep allopathic medicines by virtue of his degree and registration in the state of Bihar. We thus find nothing to interfere in this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed." 
Bare perusal of the said judgment would go to show, that on prima facie basis conclusions drawn by High Court has not been faulted with. Same Bench comprising of Hon'ble M.M. Punchi, C.J., and K.T. Thomas and S.M. Quadri J., based on hearing that is referred to in the judgment itself by mentioning that for last few days we have heard batch of Civil matters, wherein sub-clause (iii), clause (ee) of Rule 2 has been subject matter of debate in its widest spectrum, subsequent to the same have exhaustively dealt with the issue on 8.10.1998, while deciding the case of Dr. Mukhtar Chandra (Supra) and therein altogether different view, has been taken, then for all practical purposes,view as expressed on prima-facie basis in the case of State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh, as relied upon by petitioner, has to be accepted as virtually over-ruled. Subsequent reasoned judgment, by the same Bench will hold the field, and accordingly petitioner, cannot get any benefit or advantage of the judgment and order dated 29.7.1998, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Phool Singh. 
As lines were repeatedly being crossed by incumbents, who were not authorised to practice allopathic branch of medicine, on 25.04.2000 the Apex Court in the case of D.K. Joshi Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2000 (5) SCC 80 came heavily by issuing following directions: 
(i) All district Magistrates and the Chief Medical officers of the State shall be directed to identify, within a time limit to be fixed by the Secretary, all unqualified/ unregistered medical practitioners and to initiate legal actions against these persons immediately; 
(ii) Direct all District Magistrates and the Chief Medical Officers to monitor all legal proceedings initiated against such persons; 
(iii) The Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department shall give due publicity of the names of such unqualified/ unregistered medical practitioners so that people do not approach such persons for medical treatment. 
(iv) The Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department Shall monitor the action taken by all District Magistrates and all Chief Medical Officers of the State and issue necessary directions from time to time to these officers so that such unauthorized persons cannot pursue their medical profession in the State 
This Court also had an occasion to consider whether the persons holding degrees in Indian Medicines such as Ashang, Ayurved, Siddha, Unani Tibb are authorized to practice Allopathic system of medicines in the case of Dr. Mehboob Alam vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (06.09.2001) W.P.(Cr.) 5896 of 2000 reported in [(2001) 2 JIC 774 (All)] and after analysis of provisions of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 took the view that the medicine means modern scientific medicine for all its branches and includes surgery, and same is entirely different from the Indian Medicine and only a person who possess the qualification enumerated in the first schedule of this order which have been recognized and entitled to be enrolled on any State register, can only practice. A person holding qualification recognised under 1970 Act, does not authorise him to practice Allopathy system of medicine. 
This Court once again on issue being raised as to whether incumbents who has got to his credit degree in Indian Medicine can he be permitted to practice in modern medicine, proceeded to consider the matter at length in the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (II) Vs. A.P. Verma, reported in 2004 (2) ESC (All) 960, and repelled the submission, so advanced. 
Division Bench of this Court once again reiterated the same principal in the case of Ravinder Kumar Goel vs. State of U.P. 2004 (2) ESC 976, that a person with Ayurvedic and Unani qualification, if is practising Allopathic, same is illegal. 
The field of practice thus stands demarcated i.e. the doctors enrolled in their branch of medicine should not be allowed to practice in any other branch of medicine of which he has not acquired knowledge or has little knowledge. Under the scheme of things provided for, there is mutual exclusion i.e. one is not allowed to practice in any other branch of medicine of which he has not acquired knowledge. 
Petitioner has next proceeded to place reliance on the Government Notification dated 25.11.1992, issued by Government of Maharashtra, under Maharashtra Medical Practitioners Act, 1961, as well as on the notification dated 22.01.2004, issued by Central Council of Indian Medicine. 
Petitioner will not succeed on this score also, for the reason that the provisions of Maharashtra Medical Practitioner Act, 1961, cannot be pressed in reference of practice of modern medicine in the State of U.P. Coupled with this, the circular as has been issued, the same has been interpreted by Kerela High Court in the case of National Integrated Medical Association and another Vs. State of Kerala WA No. 1260 of 2006 (A) decided on the 12.12.2006 wherein the High Court of Kerela at Ernakulam held that the modern advances mentioned in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1970 can only be advanced in Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani and not Allopathic medicine. By virtue of Section 15(2) (b) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 the persons having the prescribed qualifications included in the schedules alone are eligible to practice modern medicine. The words "modern medicine" would be referable to the modern advances made in the respective fields of Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani. The Kerela High Court followed Mukhtar Chand Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1999 SC 468. In support of the observations made by it and reiterated that modern advances mentioned in Section 2(3) of the Act of 1970 cannot be interpreted to mean Allopathic Medicines. 
Against the judgment of Kerela High Court dated 12.12.2006, Special Leave to Appeal NO.6116 of 2007 had been filed, and the same has also been dismissed on 23.7.2007. Thereafter, Central Council of Indian Medicine, taking note of judicial proceedings in its 158th Meeting dated 28.6.2010 has decided to withdraw all earlier resolutions. Madras High Court also in Writ Petition No.13696 of 2009, D.J. Kaleem Nawaz, BUMS vs. State of Tamilnadu, decided on 29.10.2010, wherein prayer was made to the similar effect, not to interfere in administering allopathic medicine, very clearly ruled that such a prayer cannot be accorded and clarifications issued by Central Council of Indian Medicine are of no consequence, wherein it has been mentioned that practitioners of Indian System of Medicine who practised modern scientific system of medicine, allopathic medicine are protected under Section 17(3)(b) of 1970 Act is not correct as provisions of 1956 Act have been ignored. 
This Court, also approves of the same view, and further clarifies that a statutory body created under Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 such as Central Council of Indian Medicine, at the point of time when it proceeds to exercise its statutory authority the same has to be in connection with "Indian Medicine" and not at all beyond the same. Words "Modern advances" has to be contextually interpreted i.e "Modern advances" in the field of Ayurveda, Sidha and Unani and not at all in context of "Modern Medicines". In the context of, practitioners of "Indian Medicine" the practitioners of "Indian Medicine" can make use of modern advances in various sciences such as radiology report (X-ray), complete blood picture report, lipids report, ECG etc for practising in their own system. This does not mean that practitioners of "Indian Medicine" would start acting as Radiologist/Pathologist/Cardiologist. Only for the purposes of practising "Indian Medicine" they can make use of the reports and this will not at all authorize the practitioners of "Indian Medicine" to administer and prescribe modern medicines (allopathic)" 
Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Bhanwar Kanwar Vs. R.K. Gupta and another reported in (2013) 4 SCC 252 has taken the view that wherein unauthorized medical treatment is administered, same is unfair trade practice and administering allopathic medicine by person who is qualified in Ayurvedic medicine cannot be approved of. Apex Court in the facts of case, enhanced the compensation amount from Rs.5 lacs to Rs. 15 lacs. 
In the said judgment benefit has been sought to be taken of the Government Order dated 24.02.2003. Qua the same, Apex Court has mentioned that in connection with some cases, the High Court Allahabad has issued direction to take action against the quacks who are practising Allopathic medicine but not registered with Medical Council. In order to put restrain from practising modern medicine two further Government Orders have been issued by the State Government on 04.03.2008 and 08.06.2012 wherein State Government has clearly proceeded to issue guidelines mentioning therein that any incumbent who is authorized to practice under Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 is not at all entitled and authorized to prescribe medicines under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. Said Government Orders still hold the field and same are in consonance with the repeated view taken by this Court and by the Apex Court that an incumbent who has obtained degree under 1970 Act cannot be permitted to prescribe modern medicine as provided for under 1956 Act. 
Under the scheme of things provided for it is clear and categorical that the definition as has been provided for under Rule 2(ee) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 will not at all come to the rescue and reprieve of the petitioner. Said definition has been used in different context and same does not authorize incumbent having qualification under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 to start prescribing medicine which the incumbents registered under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 only can administer. 
Petitioner cannot be permitted to prescribe allopathic/modern medicine as is provided for under Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, by any means, as a person having studied one particular system of medicine cannot possibly claim deep and complete knowledge about the drugs of the other system of medicine, and specially when right to health and medical care is fundamental right under Article 21 read with Articles 39(c), 41 and 43 of Constitution, as expressed by Apex Court, in the case of Consumer Education and Research Centre Vs. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 922, and by further providing that right to life includes protection of health and strength and the minimum requirement to enable the persons to live with dignity. Petitioner will have to practice in his own branch, and it would be a extremely grave situation, to allow petitioner to treat and prescribe a sick incumbent with allopathic medicine. The transgression into other branches of medicine as has been prayed for is not permissible, as same would tantamount to quackery and exposing petitioner to cancellation of registration and prosecution. 
Petitioner at last stated before this Court that there is dearth of doctors, in such a situation in this background such resources should be utilized. 
This is not at all case of the petitioner that he has acquired degree or qualification as is provided for under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and is registered in the State register, maintained in this regard then, in such a situation and in this background, the petitioner cannot be permitted to administer the medicine connected with the modern medicine and it may be true on the ground that large number of poorer sections of the society, being rendered service by him and various other similarly situated but the same cannot be a criteria to flout the statuary provisions, the same being in the realm of policy decision of other constitutional functionaries. Apex Court in the case of Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in JT 2009 (3) SC 351 has repelled such an argument wherein plea has been raised that incumbent was rendering service to treat the poor people and there is dearth of Doctors, and accordingly, he should be permitted to prescribe medicine. 
In terms of above, prayer made by the petitioner cannot be entertained, accordingly, present writ petition is dismissed. 




(Suneet Kumar, J.) (V.K. Shukla,J.) 



Order Date :- 16.12.2013 

Thursday, December 26, 2013

True test of nature of a person is during adversity, Bombay HC bares allegations commonly levelled by woman seeking Divorce

True test of nature of a person is during adversity, Bombay HC bares allegations commonly levelled by woman seeking Divorce 

Bombay High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY APPELLATE SIDE

FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 28  OF  2013

Rupali Ravindra Jadhav )
@ Rupali Ravindra Jadhav )
residing at E/7, Micheal Sadan,  )
Laxmi Udyog Nagar, )
Kanjur Marg (West), Mumbai – 400 078. ) ... Appellant

Vs.

Mr. Sachin M. Sawant )
G/7, Sai Ganesh Apartment, )
B Wing, Sai Baba Nagar, )
Bhyander (East), Dist.  Thane ) ... Respondent
Mr. Mukesh J. Pabari, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. Sachin M. Sawant, Respondent in person present. 

CORAM: 
SMT. V. K. TAHILRAMANI  &  V. L. ACHLIYA, JJ.

DATED: 12th December, 2013.

ORAL JUDGMENT :­ (Per Smt. V. K. Tahilramani, J.)

Heard the learned Advocate for the appellant and the respondent who is present in person.

2. The appellant­ Rupali  was married to the respondent­ Sachin on 10th May,  2007. It is admitted fact that thereafter the respondent was admitted in the hospital as he was suffering from cancer. On 8th August, 2008, the appellant had left the matrimonial house and did not return back.  Thereafter, she filed Petition No. A­1335 of 2010 before the Family Court, Mumbai at Bandra for dissolution of marriage on the ground of  cruelty. The Petition came to be dismissed by Judgment and Order dated 9th October,2012. Hence the appellant approached this Court.  

3. It is admitted fact that the marriage of the appellant ­Rupali and the   respondent­ Sachin   took     place   on 10th  May, 2007. Both   the appellant and the respondent were related to each other   prior to the marriage. They fell in love and there was courtship period of 5 years. Thereafter,   they got  married on 10th May, 2007.    From 8th   August, 2008,   the parties were separated. No  issue  is born out  of   the  said wedlock. 

4. The appellant sought for dissolution of marriage on the following grounds :­
(a) That  the   husband   and   his family members were using abusive words on regular basis. 
(b) That the husband and his family members used to torture petitioner mentally and physically.
(c) That the husband treated the petitioner like a slave.
(d) That the husband  and  his  parents  did  not  allow  the appellant to meet and talk to her relatives and neighbour.
(e) That  the  husband  was  insisting  to  bring money from petitioner's father.
(f) That the   husband   forcefully mortgaged the petitioner's  Stridhan.
(g) That the husband was having habit of excessive drinking.
(h) That the husband had T.B. and Venereal disease.

5. The   respondent   filed   written   statement   and   denied   all   the contentions raised by the appellant. To prove her claim, the appellant examined herself as PW1 and her sister Prachi as PW2. On the otherhand, the respondent­Sachin has examined himself as DW1. There is no other evidence on record.  In her examination­in­chief, the appellant reiterated the contentions of the Petition.  

6. The first grievance of the appellant is that the respondent and his family  members  were   using   abusive words   on   regular   basis. This according to her caused mental torture.  It is pertinent to note that she has not  given any details  about   the date,   time and place when  the respondent and his family members used abusive words to abuse her. She has not stated who abused her and the words used to abuse her. The further claim of the appellant is that she was physically assaulted for illegal  demands.   Again, she has not given any details about the date, time and place when she was physically assaulted and role played either by the respondent or any of his family members and the injury sustained by her due to such assault.   According to the appellant the respondent and his parents threatened to throw acid and kerosene on her.  Though the appellant has made allegations against the parents of the   respondent,   it   is   pertinent   to   note   that   her sister   Prachi   has  specifically   stated   that   she   knew  the   nature   of   the   parents   of   the respondent and that they are good by nature.  In view of the categorical  admission made by Prachi, the sister of the appellant, the averment of the   appellant   that   the   respondent   and   his   parents   abused   her   or assaulted her or threatened her does not appear to be true.  

7. The appellant has stated that the Respondent and his parents treated her like a slave.  During the day the appellant was working so was the Respondent, hence, there is no question of the appellant being treated as a slave during this time.  Before the appellant left for office and after   she came back  from office  the parents of   the Respondent would be at home and as they were good by nature, they would not treat her like a slave nor allow their son to do so.  Thus this contention  of the appellant does not appear probable.  

8. The next grievance of the appellant is that she was not allowed to meet  her  parents,   family members and neighbours and she was not even allowed to make phone­calls to them.   As far as these contentions are concerned, it is admitted that the appellant was working since prior to the marriage and she continued to work after the marriage.   In such case, when she used to go to work everyday, it was very much possible for her to make calls to her parents and other persons as well as to meet them  on   the  way   to   and   fro from work. It   is   also   seen   that   the respondent was working, therefore, during whole day he was busy at his work place and in natural course, there would be no occasion for him to put alleged restriction on the appellant.  As stated earlier, Prachi­ sister of the appellant has admitted that the parents of the respondent were good by nature.  Therefore, stand taken by the appellant that the respondent   and his   family members did not  allow her   to meet  her parents, family members  and neighbours  appears   to be  improbable. 

The appellant has admitted that she was working and getting salary. This shows that she was educated and having financial independence to some extent.  If she was working then she was free to call her parents, family members and neighbours and to visit them.   As stated earlier respondent was also working, in such circumstances, the averment that she was  not  allowed  to meet  her  parents  and  family members  and neighbours appears to be improbable.

9. The next grievance raised by the appellant is that the respondent was in habit of excessive drinking.   Mere drinking is not sufficient to constitute matrimonial offence unless it is coupled with overtact, which is sufficient   to   make   it   difficult   for   the   either   party   to   perform matrimonial   obligations. At   this stage, it  may   be   stated   that   the respondent  was suffering from cancer.    Soon after  the marriage, the cancer was detected.   In such case, it is not expected that when the respondent   was   undergoing   treatment   for   cancer   and   was   even admitted in ICU, he would be taking excessive drinks. A person who was  undergoing   treatment   for   cancer   can   hardly   continue   drinking habit.

10. The further case of the appellant is that when the respondent was admitted in the hospital in ICU due to his cancer ailment, money was demanded from her father to pay for the treatment and she  was made to mortgage her Stridhan.   It is most unfortunate fact that within two  months  of   the marriage, respondent was diagnosed  to be  suffering from cancer and he was admitted in ICU.  The case of the respondent is that when he was in ICU, the appellant left him.  He has further stated that appellant had not bothered to take care of him during such crucial period.  It is pertinent to note that Prachi, the sister of the appellant admitted in cross­examination that it is true that her sister i.e. appellant never went to see respondent­Sachin, when he was admitted in ICU and after his discharge.   Obviously, when the appellant did not even go to see the Respondent in hospital, there was no question of demanding any money from her.  As it is an admitted fact that the appellant never went   to   see   the  Respondent  when   he  was   in   hospital   or   after   his discharge the case that she was made to mortgage her Stridhan does not appear to be probable.  

11. It is to be noted that the respondent in his evidence has stated that to buy another house,  he had given money to his father­in­law. This averment has remained unshaken in the cross­examination. This shows  that  in fact the respondent had given money to father of the  appellant   to purchase a house.  In such circumstances, it  cannot  be believed that the family members of respondent would demand money for treatment or otherwise from the parents of the appellant.  Moreover, the appellant has admitted that in the marriage she was given a big Mangalsutra and bangles by the respondent.  Looking at these facts, it appears to be improbable that when the respondent was in ICU, money was demanded from her parents to pay for his treatment. 

12. According  to  the appellant   the  respondent  had T.B.  This can hardly be a ground to seek divorce. T.B. is not a permanent disease and it is very much curable.  Thereafter, the case of the appellant is that the respondent had venereal disease.  In relation to this contention it is to be noted that no such averment is made  in the petition for divorce. Moreover the petition for divorce is only under section 13(i)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 that is cruelty and not under section 13(v) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which cites venereal disease as a ground  for divorce. Thus this averment in her evidence before the Court will not help her. 

13. It is stated that true test of nature of a person is during adversity. The evidence of the appellant in relation to cruelty is found very vague. Looking at the material aspects of the case, the same is not corroborated by independent and reliable witness. On the contrary, the  actual  period of cohabitation between the parties was very small i.e. merely two months. When the respondent was suffering from cancer, the appellant left  him. This in fact, reveals the true nature of the appellant.   

14. The  term  'cruelty'   is  not  defined,   therefore,   there cannot  be a straight jacket formula for determining whether there  is cruelty or not. Each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances.  The conduct complained of should  be grave and weighty.  It should touch a pitch of severity to satisfy the  conscience   of   Court   that   parties   cannot   live together with each other any more without mental agony, distress and torture. Keeping in mind the above settled legal principles and after scrutinizing the entire evidence on record.  We find that there was not a single   incident  which  can be   called as   intolerable  and was  of   such nature   that   it  was  making   it  difficult   for   appellant   to   continue   the matrimonial relations.

15. In matrimonial disputes, first the allegations have to be proved, thereafter   question   arises   whether  proved   facts   are   sufficient   to constitute   cruelty   or   not. The   appellant   has   failed   to   prove   the allegations itself, therefore, there was no question of cruelty.

16. In the present case, it appears that as soon as appellant came to  know that   the   respondent was suffering   from  cancer   and   he   was admitted in ICU, appellant left him which is clear from the evidence of her sister Prachi.   It appears that the appellant is taking advantage of her own wrong while claiming relief. She has left the company of respondent when he was suffering from cancer.  There is nothing in her evidence to show that inspite of all odds, she was ready to continue the relations, however, the conduct of respondent was making it difficult to discharge the matrimonial obligations.    

17. On going through the entire evidence on record, in our opinion the appellant has totally failed to prove her case.   We find no merit in the Appeal.  Appeal is dismissed.

(V.L.ACHLIYA, J.)           (SMT V.K.TAHILRAMANI, J.)

Woman says did not know husband's religion, seeks to nullify marriage, Bombay HC dismisses claim

Woman says did not know husband's religion, seeks to nullify marriage, Bombay HC dismisses claim





Bombay High Court
1
FCA124.13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 124 OF 2013
NIRANJANI ROSHAN RAO )
residing at 303 A, Vashishtha Building )
Saptarshi Park, Opp. Vasant Garden )
Swapna Nagari, Mulund West, )
MUMBAI 400 080 ).. APPELLANT 
(Orig.Petitioner )
VERSUS
ROSHAN MARK PINTO )
residing at H-No. 5-112, Snehalaya,  )
Chandanagar Post, Ranga Reddy Dist., )
HYDERABAD 500050 ).. RESPONDENT
Mr. Rahul Nerlekar, Advocate for the appellant 
Mr. Ananth Iyengar, Advocate for the respondent
CORAM:-SMT. V.K. TAHILRAMANI &
V. L. ACHLIYA, JJ.
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT 
IS RESERVED: 27th November, 2013 
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT 
IS PRONOUNCED: 24
th
December, 2013.
JUDGMENT: (Per Smt. V. K. Tahilramani, J.)
The appellant/original petitioner-wife has preferred
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this appeal against the order dated 18/4/2013 passed in Family Court
Petition No. 2877 of 2011. 
2 In brief the facts leading to filing of the appeal are
summarized as under:
(i) The appellant/original petitioner-wife had filed the
petition seeking decree of nullity of marriage and alternatively
claimed the decree of divorce. In nutshell, the appellant had
approached with the case that on 13/1/1999, she was married to
respondent as per Hindu rites and rituals. At the time of marriage
the appellant was Hindu and respondent was Christian. After the
marriage they continued to profess their respective religion. At the
time of filing of the petition also they continue to practice and
follow their respective religion. 
(ii) The appellant had filed petition u/s 11 of Hindu
Marriage Act 1955, seeking decree of nullity on the ground that
their marriage was null and void as same being in contravention of
essential condition of valid marriage provided u/s 5 of Hindu
Marriage Act. By way of alternate relief, the appellant had claimed
decree of divorce u/s 13(1)(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act, on the
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ground of cruelty. Since the learned Judge of Family Court has
rejected the petition of the appellant in exercise of powers under
Order VII Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, it is not necessary for us
to state in detail the facts pleaded in the petition as well as the case
of the respondent.
(iii) In view of the fact that respondent i.e. the husband has
admitted the fact that at the time of the marriage and since thereafter
he continued to be Christian though their marriage was performed as
per Hindu rights and rituals the appellant had taken out the
application under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC seeking decree of
nullity of marriage on the ground of admission given by the
respondent. The learned Judge of the Family Court on consideration
of the application taken out by the petitioner-appellant and the
pleadings on record, reached to prima facie conclusion that the
petition discloses no cause of action which needs to be adjudicated
by the court and issued notice to appellant to show cause as to why
the petition shall not be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) & (d) of
CPC. 
(iv) Although the petitioner-appellant has not filed say to
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the notice issued by the learned Judge of the Family Court, but filed
written arguments. The learned Judge of the Family Court, after
hearing the parties and considering the facts pleaded in the petition
that at the time of marriage the petitioner-wife was Hindu by
religion and respondent-husband was Christian and continued to
practice and profess their respective religion, rejected the petition in
exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C, as the petition
discloses no triable cause of action. Being aggrieved by the order
of rejection of petition, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
3 We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the
appellant as well as the respondent. After carefully scrutinizing the
impugned order in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the
relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for the reasons
mentioned herein above, we are of the view that the order impugned
by way of this appeal is perfectly legal and calls for no interference
in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, by this court.
4 The appellant is seeking decree of nullity of marriage
under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 11 of the
Hindu Marriage Act reads thus:-4/16
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FCA124.13
11. Void marriages:- Any marriage solemnized
after the commencement of this Act shall be null
and void and may, on a petition presented by either
party thereto [against the other party], be so
declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any
one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv)
and (v) of Section 5.
Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act clearly states that the
petition can be filed by the parties who are both Hindus. Section 5
of the Hindu Marriage Act provides the conditions for a Hindu
marriage. In the beginning itself, it is provided that the marriage
must be solemnized between any two Hindus. As mentioned above,
the appellant herself has stated that the respondent was not a Hindu
at the time of marriage or even thereafter. If this condition is not
fulfilled and there was no contravention of provisions laid down
under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Family Court was
right in observing that the appellant has no right to file such a
petition. 
5 In the present case, there is no contravention of the
clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of
Section 5 reads thus:-5/16
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6
FCA124.13
5. Conditions for a Hindu Marriage- A marriage
may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely :-i. neither party has a spouse living at the time of
the marriage;
ii. ........................
iii. .......................
iv. the parties are not within the degrees of
prohibited relationship, unless the custom or usage
governing each of them permits of a marriage
between the two;
v. the parties are not sapindas of each other,
unless the custom or usage governing each of them
permits of a marriage between the two.
It is not the case of the appellant that she or the
respondent were earlier married and hence, had a spouse living
at the time of the marriage. It is not even her case that they
were within the degrees of prohibited relationship or were
sapindas of each other. In such case, the marriage cannot be
held to be null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu
Marriage Act.
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6 If, we consider the undisputed facts then fact is not in
dispute that at the time of marriage the appellant was Hindu by
religion and respondent was Christian. They performed marriage as
per Hindu rites and rituals. It is also not in dispute that after their
marriage, they continue to practice and profess their respective
religion. Therefore, the first and foremost question falls for our
consideration is whether at all the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act
1955 can be invoked by petitioner to claim any relief. In this
context it is useful to refer the provision of Section 2 of Hindu
Marriage Act 1955, which provides for applicability of the
provisions of the said Act. Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
reads as follows:
“2. Application of Act (1) This Act applies-(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any
of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a
Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya
Samaj;
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by
religion and 
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© to any other person domiciled in the territories to
which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian,
Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such
personwould not have been governed by the Hindu Law
or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect
of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not
been passed. (emphasis supplied).
Explanation.-The following persons are Hindus,
Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may
be:-(a) ….............;
(b) …..............; and 
© …...............
(2) …...............
(3) The expression “Hindu” in any portion of this Act
shall be construed as if it included a person who, though
not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to
whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions
contained in this  section.
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Thus the plain reading of Section 2 explicitly provides
that the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be availed and
applicable when both the spouses are Hindus and their marriage is
performed as per Hindu rites and rituals and the marriage is a valid
marriage within the meaning of Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act. It
is also necessary that at the time of filing petition, both the spouses
are Hindus by religion except for seeking remedy of divorce u/s
13(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act i.e. on the ground of person
ceases to be Hindu due to conversion to another religion. 
7 In the present case, according to the appellant, at the
time of performing the marriage with the respondent, the appellant
was Hindu by religion and the respondent was Christian. They
performed the marriage as per the Hindu rites and rituals. After
their marriage in the year 1999, they continued to profess their
respective religion till filing of this petition. The petitioner is
professing Hindu religion whereas the respondent continued to
practice and profess Christian religion. Thus at the time of their
marriage as well as at the time of filing of petition, both petitioner
and respondent were not Hindus by religion and same position is
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FCA124.13
continued till filing of petition. In view of this admitted position,
the learned Judge of the Family Court has held that petition
discloses no cause of action and so also the jurisdiction of the court
is barred under law to entertain and prosecute such petition under
the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act. On reaching to such
conclusion, the learned Judge has invoked powers under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC and rejected the petition. Therefore, in our view the
reasons recorded by the learned Judge in rejecting the petition is
legal and calls for no interference in exercise of appellate
jurisdiction.
8 The issue raised in this petition remains no more res
integra as the Division Bench of this court in the case of  Smt. Neeta
Kirti Desai vs. Bino Samuel George, 1998 (1) Bom. C.R. 263, has
laid down that when both the spouses are Hindus, they are regulated
under the Hindu Marriage Act. If one of the party to such marriage
is not Hindu the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be
invoked to seek the remedy under the said Act. The court has held
as under: 
“The Family Court Act creates a forum. The Family
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Court Act has not settled the rights and obligations
between the parties viz. restitution of conjugal rights,
judicial separation, nullity of marriage and divorce.
When both the spouses are Hindus, they are regulated
under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Undisputedly,
petition was presented on the ground that at the time of
marriage, petitioner's husband was a Christian. If that be
so, having regard to the provisions of section 2, the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has no application for seeking
any of the reliefs including the nullity of the marriage.
Petition, as present, was, therefore, untenable.”
9 Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the
consent to the marriage was obtained by fraud and hence, Section
12(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act would come into play. He
submitted that the petition ought to have been preferred under
Section 12(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 12 (c) reads as
under:-"12. Voidable marriages :- (1) Any marriage
solemnized, whether before or after the
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commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and
may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the
following grounds, namely:-(a) ................
(b) ................
(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the
consent of the guardian in marriage of the
petitioner [ was required under Section 5, as it
stood immediately before the commencement
of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment)
Act,1978 (2 of 1978)], the consent of such
guardian was obtained by force [or by fraud as
to the nature of the ceremony or as to any
material fact or circumstance concerning the
respondent]; or
(d) .........................
10 Though, this stand has been taken belatedly, we have
examined the same. As observed in foregoing paras, the appellant
has stated in her petition that her father and the respondent's father
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were close friends. The appellant and the respondent were
acquainted with each other since their childhood. Their marriage
was love marriage. In the petition itself, she has stated that she was
a Hindu by religion and the respondent was a Christian by religion
and he did not convert himself into Hindu religion. It is not the
case of the appellant anywhere in the petition that she came to know
just before filing of the petition that the respondent was a Christian.
11 The surname of the respondent is 'Pinto' which is
distinctly a Christian surname and can never be a Hindu surname.
Not only has the appellant not averred in the petition that she did not
know at the time of the marriage that the respondent was not a
Hindu but from the fact that surname of the respondent is 'Pinto' and
other facts, it was clearly to the knowledge of the appellant that the
respondent was a Christian at the time of the marriage. Thus, it is
too late in the day to contend that her consent to the marriage was
obtained by fraud and that the respondent had concealed from her
the fact that he was a Christian. It is pertinent to note that in the
petition, the appellant has stated that her parents in fact opposed the
marriage as she and the respondent were from different religions.
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Thus, now the appellant cannot contend that the respondent had
concealed the fact from her that he was a Christian and therefore,
she is entitled to a decree of nullity on the ground that her consent
was obtained by fraud by concealing the fact that the respondent
was a Christian.
12 Thus, in this view of the matter, as far as the prayer for
nullity of marriage is concerned, the petition does not disclose any
cause of action. The Family Court was right in holding that the
petition does not disclose the cause of action and the same is barred
by law under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) & (d) of CPC.
13 Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that
under the Hindu Marriage Act, the marriage can be performed only
between two Hindus and if any one of the parties or both are not
Hindus, the marriage would be a nullity. In support of his
contention, he has placed reliance on a decision in the case of
Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pawani @ Gullipili Pawani
1
.
We had carefully gone through the said decision. We find that in the
said case, the respondent-wife had filed a petition before the Family
1 (2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases 714
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Court under Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree
of nullity of the marriage. The main ground taken therein was
misrepresentation by the husband that he was a Hindu by religion.
In the said case, the wife was a Hindu and the husband was a
Christian and the marriage was performed under Hindu Marriage
Act and was also registered under Section 8 thereof. However, the
main distinction between the decision relied on and the present case
is that the respondent-husband therein had suppressed the fact that
he was a Christian at the time of the marriage and hence, the wife
married him thinking him to be a Hindu. Later on, when she came
to know that the husband was a Christian, she filed the petition
under Section 12(1)(c) for a decree of nullity of marriage on the
ground that she had been beguiled into the marriage by the husband
on fraudulent considerations, one of which was that he was a Hindu
at the time of marriage. Such are not the facts in the present case.
In the present case, the appellant knew since the beginning that the
respondent was a Christian, hence, there is no case of force or fraud
in the present case. No averments to that effect have also been
made in the petition before the Family Court. Thus, this decision
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cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.
14 In view of the conclusion to which we have reached,
we are of the view that order passed by the learned Judge of the
Family Court is perfectly legal and calls for no interference in
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 
15 In the result, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(V. L. ACHLIYA, J.) (SMT. V. K. TAHILRAMANI, J.)
md.saleem
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Sunday, December 15, 2013

Rohini Court, Delhi - Kamini Lau Woman only can claim right on the property of her husband and NOT her Parents-in-laws' Property

Rohini Court, Delhi  - Kamini Lau - Woman only can claim right on the property of her husband and NOT on her Parents-in-laws' Property

IN THE COURT OF Dr. KAMINI LAU: ADDL. SESSIONS 

JUDGE­II (NORTH­WEST) : ROHINI COURTS: DELHI

CA No. 62/2013

Chetna Kapoor
W/o Dheeraj Kapoor
Permanent Resident of 253, 3rd  Floor
Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi. 
Presently at: 7/11, Tilak Nagar, Delhi.
................. Appellant

Versus

Suman Bala Kapur
W/o Subhash Chander Kapoor
R/o H. No. 253, 3rd  Floor
Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi. 
................. Respondent

6.11.2013

ORDER

Present: Sh. Vivek Aggarwal, Advocate with appellant. 

(1) This appeal under Section 29 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has been filed against the order of  Ld.  MM  dated   7.10.2013   dismissing   the   application   filed   on behalf of  the appellant   dated   25.6.2013   for   modification   / alteration   of   order   dated   4.6.2013 on the ground   that   the respondent has abused and misused the process of law by making false submissions which are contrary to the pleadings given by the respondent in her petition under Section 12 of DV Act, and obtained the order dated 4.6.2013.  It is pleaded that the Ld. Trial Court   has   totally   ignored   the  report of   the protection   officer holding  that   the appellant  had been  residing at   the above said premises with the respondent which fact was not disclosed by the respondent while obtaining the order dated 4.6.2013. It s further pleaded that the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of  Nitu Mittal Vs. Kanta Mittal & Ors., 152 (2008) DLT 691, was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case since the respondent has no absolute power to throw out the appellant from the share household accommodation and there is no justified and lawful grounds for the withdrawal of the benefits given to her.  It is alleged that by their acts, the respondent have taken away appellant's valuable right to lead her life with dignity, honour and reputation. It is pleaded that the order dated 7.10.2013 is contrary to the letter and spirit and intention of the legislature in Section 2 (s) which defines the share household accommodation and also to the provisions of Section 2 (f) which defines  the domestic relationship. It is submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to exercise its judicial power and discretion judiciously and totally ignored the material facts and the acts of the respondent is sheer misuse and abuse of process of law. It is also submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent in collusion and connivance of her son has dispossessed the appellant from the share household accommodation on 24.5.2013 and when she returned from the job she  saw  the  locks on  the  share household accommodation  i.e. house no. 253, 3rd Floor, Pitampura and hence the dishonest and fraudulent conduct on the part of the respondent totally disentitled her for claiming any release form the court and hence it is prayed that the impugned order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the Ld. Trial Court be set aside.

(2) After going through the impugned order and the grounds raised before me,  no notice has been  issued  to  the  respondent  as no requirement for the same was felt.

(3) At   the very outset  I  may observe  that I may observe  that   the Protection   from Domestic Violence Act,   2005  covers   those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household and are  related by consanguinity,  marriage or  a relationship in the nature  of  marriage, or adoption; in  addition relationship with family members living  together as a joint family are also included. “Domestic   violence” includes actual abuse or the threat  of abuse  that   is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic. One of the most important features of the Act is the woman’s   right   to   secure   housing. The Act provides for the woman’s right to reside in the matrimonial or shared household. This is an act meant to save a women from destitution. Under these circumstances the Courts of Law are under obligations to ensure that while dealing with the rights of the parties, the rights of daughter ­in­law are equitably balanced with the rights of other women which include the mother-­in-­law, as happened in the present case.

(4) It is not disputed that the property in question is owned by the respondent/ mother-­in-­law who is the owner in possession of the said property bearing No. 253, 3rd  Floor, Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi.   It has not been disputed that the respondent Suman Bala Kapur and her husband i.e. the parents­-in­laws of the appellant  are  the  registered and exclusive owners of  the above said property vide registered sale deed dated 16.6.2010 whereas her husband Dheeraj has no share in the same.

(5) The husband of the appellant i.e. Dr.Dheeraj Kapoor is working and residing separately at Chandigarh for the past several years. The matrimonial house of the appellant under the given circumstances is the place where her husband is working and residing and not where she herself chose to reside of her free will.

(6) It is also not disputed that the appellant Chetna Kapoor is herself a doctor in a Government hospital and is drawing House Rent Allowance. Hence, under the given circumstances the argument of the appellant that by her acts the respondent (mother­-in­-law) has allegedly taken away the constitutional rights of appellant to live with dignity, honour and reputation is devoid of merits.  The Right of a daughter in law does not over­ride the constitutional and statutory rights of her parents­-in-­law to enjoy their self acquired property in the manner they want.  If it is anybody from whom she is entitled to relief, it is her husband  Dr. Dheeraj Kapoor and her parents-­in-­law who are the senior citizens cannot be held liable for any kind of burdens. Here, I totally agree with the view taken by the Ld. MM which is in confirmation with the observations made in the case of Neetu Mittal Vs. Kanta Mittal  & Ors., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:

“.........  where the house is self acquired house of  parents, son whether married or unmarried has no  legal right to live in that house or he can live in that  only at the mercy of parents upto the time  parents allow. Merely because parents have allowed him to live in house so long as his relations with the parents are cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden   throughout  the life. The  parents cannot be forced to keep a son or daughter  in law with them nor there is any statutory provision  which compels parents to suffer because of the acts of residence and his son or daughter in law. A woman has her rights of maintenance against her husband as sons/daughters. She can assert   her rights, if any, against the property of her husband  but she cannot thrust herself against the wishes of  parents of her husband nor can claim a right to live  in the house of parents of her husband, against their consult and wishes .......”

(7) The Hon'ble Apex Court while being confronted with a similar situation  in the case of  S.R. Batra Vs. Smt. Taruna Batra reported in  AIR 2007 SC 1118(1)  had an occasion to deal with the same wherein  it observed that there was no law in India similar to the law in UK i.e. British Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 and that the Rights available to a woman under any law can only be against the husband and not against the father-in-law and mother-in-law. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme court had also observed that the house in question belonged to the mother in law and therefore the daughter in law cannot claim any right to live in the said house. In the said case the Hon'ble Apex Court  was of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a shared household within the meaning of Section 2(s) of  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court was also of the view that the Definition  of 'Shared  Household' in Section 2 (s) was not happily worded and appeared to be a result of clumsy drafting and hence an interpretation which is sensible and does not lead to a chaos in the society as to be given.

(8) By application of the logic and ratio of the Hon'ble Apex Court to the facts of the present case, I hereby hold that the appellant Dr. Chetna Kapoor is only entitled to claim the Right of residence in a shared household  which shared household  as contemplated under Section 2 (s) of  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act would mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by her husband or the house which belong to the joint family of which the husband is a member. In the present case, the property in question i.e. 253, 3rd  Floor, Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi is the exclusive property of the respondent who is the mother-in-law of the appellant with the husband Dheeraj Kapoor having no share in the same and hence the property in question in respect of which the appellant is seeking Right of  Residence cannot   be called a shared household within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

(9) Assuming for a moment that the appellant was permitted by her parents-­in­-law to live in the house, it does not create any legal right the violation of which would be actionable rather on the contrary under no circumstances the parents can  be  made to suffer the burdens of their sons and their estranged daughter ­in­ laws. If it is anybody against whom or against whose property she can assert her rights, is the husband but under no circumstances can she thrust herself on the parents of her husband or can claim a right to live on their house against their consult and wishes.

(10) Lastly, keeping in view the problems and the disputes which have arisen between the parties and considering the background that the respondent is herself a working lady and in a position to maintain herself being doctor in Government Hospital, drawing House Rent Allowance, allowing her to reside in the premises of  her parents-­in-­law against their wishes will  only aggravate  the existing domestic problems and create numerous hassles for these senior citizens, which this court will not permit.  

(11) In view of my above discussion, I hereby hold that the impugned order dated  7.10.2013 passed by  Ld. Trial  Court  warrants no interference.The appeal is devoid of  merits and is hereby dismissed. Copy of   this order  be placed before  the Ld.  Trial Court. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room. 

Announced in the open Court        

(Dr. KAMINI LAU)
Dated: 6.11.2013    ASJ (NW)­II: ROHINI
Chetna Kapoor Vs. Suman Bala Kapur, (CA 62/13) Page 8 of 8