Thursday, August 25, 2011

SC - DV Act could not be maintained as long as the decree of divorce remain in force. Quashes domestic violence case by woman against ex-husband after a mutual consent divorce

                                                                     REPORTABLE


                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1635 of 2011
           (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 7787 of 2010)


Inderjit Singh Grewal                                       ...Appellant

                                          Versus

State of Punjab & Anr.                                      ...Respondents


                                J U D G M E N T



Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.


1.   Leave granted.


2. The instant appeal reveals a very sorry state of affair where

the wife files a criminal complaint before the competent court

to initiate criminal proceedings against her husband alleging

that they had obtained decree of divorce by playing fraud upon

the court without realising that in such a fact-situation she

herself   would     be   an    accomplice   in     the   crime   and    equally

responsible   for    the      offence.   More   so,   the   appeal     raises   a

substantial question of law as to whether the judgment and

decree of a competent Civil Court can be declared null and void

in collateral proceedings, that too, criminal proceedings.


3. This criminal appeal arises from the judgment and final order

dated 9.8.2010 in Criminal Misc. No. M-29339 of 2009 (O&M)
passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, by

which the High Court has dismissed the application filed by the

appellant under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(hereinafter called as `Cr.P.C.') for quashing the complaint

No. 87/02/09 dated 12.6.2009 filed by             respondent no. 2 under

Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence

Act, 2005 (hereinafter called the `Act 2005').


4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to present case are as

under:

A. That   the   appellant     and    respondent   no.   2   got   married   on

23.9.1998 at Jalandhar as per Sikh rites and from the said

wedlock a son, namely, Gurarjit Singh was born on 5.10.1999.

The parties to the marriage could not pull on well together

because of temperamental differences and decided to get divorce

and, therefore, filed HMA Case No. 168 of 19.9.2007 before the

District Judge, Ludhiana under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage

Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the `Act 1955') for dissolution

of marriage by mutual consent.          In the said case, statements of

appellant and respondent no. 2 were recorded on 19.9.2007 and

proceedings were adjourned for a period of more than six months

to enable them     to ponder over the issue.

B. The parties again appeared before the court on 20.3.2008 on

second motion and their statements            were recorded and both of

them   affirmed   that   it    was    not   possible    for   them   to   live

                                                                      2
together and, therefore, the learned District Judge, Ludhiana

vide    judgment      and    order      dated     20.3.2008          allowed    the     said

petition and dissolved their marriage.

C.         Respondent        no.    2     filed      a    complaint     before     Senior

Superintendent        of    Police, Ludhiana against the appellant                        on

4.5.2009 under the provisions of the Act 2005 alleging that the

decree of divorce obtained by them was a sham transaction.

Even    after      getting    divorce,        both       of   them    had   been   living

together as husband and wife.                     She was forced to leave the

matrimonial        home.    Thus,    she      prayed      for   justice.        The     said

complaint     was     sent    to    SP,    City-I,        Ludhiana      for    conducting

inquiry.        The    said    SP,      City-I       conducted       the    full-fledged

inquiry and submitted the report on 4.5.2009                               to the effect

that the parties had been living separately after divorce and,

no case was made out against the present appellant. However, he

suggested       to seek legal opinion             in the matter.

D. Accordingly, legal opinion dated 2.6.2009 was sought, wherein

it was opined that the parties had obtained the divorce decree

by mutual consent and the allegations made by                         respondent no. 2

against the appellant were false and baseless and the purpose

of filing the complaint was only to harass the appellant.

E.     Respondent no. 2 subsequently filed a complaint under the

Act    2005   on    12.6.2009.          The    learned        Magistrate       issued    the

summons to the appellant on the same date.                       The Magistrate vide


                                                                                   3
order dated 3.10.2009 summoned the minor child for counseling.

The appellant, being aggrieved of the order of Ld. Magistrate

dated     12.6.2009,       filed    application       dated     13.10.2009        under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the complaint dated 12.6.2009.

F. In    the   meanwhile,     respondent       no.    2    filed   Civil      Suit   on

17.7.2009      in    the   court    of   Civil       Judge    (Senior   Division),

Ludhiana,      seeking     declaration       that    the     judgment   and    decree

dated 20.3.2008, i.e. decree of divorce, was null and void as

it had been obtained by fraud. The said suit is still pending.



G.                  Respondent     no.   2   also     filed    application        dated

17.12.2009 under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for grant of

custody and guardianship of the minor child Gurarjit Singh and

the same is pending for consideration before the Additional

Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana.

H.        Respondent no. 2 on 11.2.2010 also lodged an FIR under

Sections 406, 498-A, 376, 120-B of               the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter called `IPC') against the appellant and his mother

and sister.

I.        The High Court vide impugned judgment and order dated

9.8.2010 dismissed the application filed by the appellant.

        Hence, this appeal.


5. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellant has submitted that the High Court erred in rejecting

                                                                              4
the application of the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as

none of the reliefs claimed by the respondent no.2 could be

entertained      by    the    criminal      court       while    dealing    with        the

complaint;      the    complaint      itself       is   time     barred,    thus,      the

Magistrate      Court     could      not    take        cognizance    thereof.          The

complaint has been filed because of malice in order to extract

money from the appellant. More so, the plea of fraud alleged by

the respondent no.2 in the complaint for obtaining the decree

of    divorce    before      the Civil Court as per her own version,

succinctly reveals that she herself had been a party to this

fraud. The High Court failed to appreciate as to what extent

her    version    could       be   accepted        as   she     herself    being       the

accomplice in the said offence of fraud committed upon the

court. Even if the allegations made therein are true, she is

equally liable for punishment under Section 107 IPC. More so,

the reliefs claimed by the respondent no. 2 in the civil suit

for declaring         the decree of divorce as                null and void and in

another suit for getting the custody of the child referred to

hereinabove, would meet her requirements.                         Thus, the appeal

deserves to be allowed.


6. On the contrary, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing

for    the   respondent       no.2    has    vehemently         opposed    the       appeal

contending that decree of divorce is a nullity as it has been

obtained by fraud. The relationship of husband and wife between

                                                                                 5
the     appellant      and    respondent   no.2   still   subsists   and     thus,

complaint is maintainable. The court has to take the complaint

on its face value and the allegations made in the complaint

require adjudication on facts. The                 issue of limitation etc.

can be examined by the Magistrate Court itself.                      The appeal

lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

7. We    have    considered the rival submissions made by learned

counsel for the parties and perused the record.


8. Before we proceed to determine the case on merit, it is

desirable to highlight the admitted facts of the case:

I. Appellant and respondent no.2 are              highly qualified persons.

Both     of     them    are    employed     and   economically   independent.

Appellant is an Assistant Professor and respondent no. 2 is a

Lecturer.       The    appellant     is    Ph.D   and   respondent    no.2    has

registered herself for Ph.D.               They are competent to understand

the complications of law and other facts prevailing in the

case.


II.           Both of them got married in year 1998 and had been

blessed with a son in year 1999. There was no complaint by

respondent no.2 against the appellant of any cruelty, demand of

dowry etc. before getting the decree of divorce dated 20.3.2008

by mutual consent.




                                                                        6
III.         The decree of divorce has been obtained under Section

13-B of the Act 1955. Respondent no.2 was examined by the court

on first motion on 19.9.2007 wherein she stated,             inter-alia,

as under:

       "We are living separately from each other since
       23.9.2005. Now there is no chance of our living
       together as husband and wife."
IV.Respondent no.2 was examined in the second motion by the

learned    District   Judge,   Ludhiana   on   20.3.2008,   wherein   she

stated as under:

          "My   statement     was   recorded  on   19.9.2007
          alongwith the statement of my husband Inderjit
          Singh Grewal.     Six months time was given to us
          to ponder over the matter but we could not
          reconcile. One child was born from our wedlock
          namely Gurarjit Singh Grewal whose custody has
          been handed over by me to my husband Inderjit
          Singh Grewal and he shall look after the welfare
          of the said child. We have settled all our
          disputes regarding dowry articles and past and
          future permanent alimony. Now there is nothing
          left out against each other. A draft of
          Rs.3,00,000/- ....has been received by me towards
          permanent alimony and maintenance and in lieu of
          dowry articles left by me in the matrimonial
          home. We are living separately since 23.9.2005.
          After that there is no co-habitation between us.
          There is no scope of our living together as
          husband and wife. I will remain bound by the
          terms and conditions as enshrined in the
          petition.    I have left with no claim against
          petitioner No.1. Our marriage may be dissolved
          by passing a decree of divorce by mutual
          consent."


V. The learned District Judge, Ludhiana granted the decree of

divorce dated 20.3.2008 observing as under:



                                                                 7
        "They have settled all their disputes regarding
        dowry articles, past and future alimony....They
        are living separately from each other since
        23.9.2005...The petitioners have not been able to
        reconcile....The petitioners have settled all
        their disputes regarding dowry, stridhan and
        past and future permanent alimony....The custody
        of the son of the petitioners is handed over to
        Inderjit Singh Grewal by Amandeep Kaur. The
        petition is allowed. The marriage between the
        petitioners is henceforth declared dissolved...."


VI.The complaint dated 4.5.2009 filed by respondent no. 2 before

the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana was investigated

by the Superintendent of Police, City-I, Ludhiana.              He recorded

statements of several neighbours and maid servant working in

appellant's house and submitted the report to the effect that as

the husband and wife could not live together, they obtained the

decree of divorce by mutual consent. However, the complainant

Amandeep Kaur had alleged that she was induced by her husband to

get divorce for settling in the United States and it was his

intention          to kick her out from the house.             However, the

husband stated that she had been paid Rs.3,00,000/- in the court

by   draft   and    Rs.27,00,000/-   in   cash   for   which   the   husband

Inderjit Singh Grewal had entered into an agreement to sell his

ancestral property.       The complainant had not been living with

the appellant after the decree of divorce and they were not

having physical relationship with each other.             It was further

suggested in the report that legal opinion may also be taken.



                                                                     8
VII.          Legal opinion dated 2.6.2009                had been to the effect

that the parties had taken divorce by mutual consent due to

their differences. The allegation to the extent that they had

been living together even after divorce were false and baseless

and had been labelled only to harass the appellant.


9. The    instant      case     is   required       to    be   considered    in    the

aforesaid factual backdrop.

      So far as the complaint dated 12.6.2009 is concerned, there

had    been   allegation       of    mis-behaviour        against    the    appellant

during the period of year 2005. Respondent no. 2 alleged that

during    that      period     she   had    not    been    treated    well    by   the

appellant, thus, she had to take shelter in the house of her

parents; all her belongings including the dowry articles were

kept by the appellant and his parents.                     She has further given

details how both of them have obtained decree of divorce by

mutual consent as they wanted to settle in United States and

therefore, they had decided to get divorce on paper so that the

appellant     may    go   to    U.S.A.     and    get    American    citizenship    by

negotiating a marriage of convenience with some U.S. citizen and

divorce her and again re-marry the complainant.                         She further

alleged that even after decree of divorce she had been living

with the appellant till 7.2.2009 and continued co-habitation

with him. They had visited several places together during this

period. The child had been forcibly snatched from her by the

                                                                              9
appellant. Therefore, she was entitled to the custody of the

minor child along with other reliefs.


10.The question does arise as to whether reliefs sought in the

complaint can be granted by the criminal court so long as the

judgment and decree of the Civil Court dated 20.3.2008 subsists.

Respondent no.2      has prayed as under:

          "It is therefore prayed that the respondent no.1
          be directed to hand over the custody of the
          minor child Gurarjit Singh Grewal forthwith. It
          is also prayed that the respondent no.1 be
          directed to pay to her a sum of Rs.15,000/- per
          month   by way of rent    of the premises to be
          hired by her at Ludhiana for her residence. It
          is also prayed that all the respondents be
          directed to restore to her all the dowry
          articles as detailed in Annexure A to C or in
          the alternative they be directed to pay to her a
          sum of Rs.22,95,000/- as the price of the dowry
          articles. Affidavit attached."

               Thus, the reliefs sought have been threefolds:

(a) Custody of the minor son; (b) right of residence; and (c)

restoration of dowry articles.


11.It     is   a   settled legal proposition that where a person gets

      an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud

upon the competent authority, such order cannot be sustained in

the eyes of the law as fraud unravels everything.              "Equity is

always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new

subtleties invented to evade law".             It is a trite that "Fraud

and     justice    never   dwell   together"    (fraus   et   jus   nunquam


                                                                    10
cohabitant).      Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a

design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. Fraud

and   deception     are   synonymous.       "Fraud    is   an    anathema    to    all

equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be

perpetuated    or    saved    by    the     application         of   any   equitable

doctrine". An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously.

(Vide: Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., (2010) 8

SCC 383)


12.However,    the    question     does     arise    as    to    whether      it   is

permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order as null

and void without getting it set aside from the competent court.

           The issue is no more res integra and stands settled by

a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an

order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate

forum.   (Vide:     State    of    Kerala    v.     M.K.   Kunhikannan      Nambiar

Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 906; and

Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt.

Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1240).


13.In Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1377,

this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an

order is void or voidable, the same requires to be set aside by

the competent court.




                                                                             11
14.In M. Meenakshi & Ors. v. Metadin Agarwal (dead) by Lrs. &

Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 470, this Court considered the issue at

length and observed that if the party feels that the order

passed by the court or a statutory authority is non-est/void, he

should   question   the    validity   of    the   said   order     before      the

appropriate forum resorting to the appropriate proceedings. The

Court observed as under:­

         "It is well settled principle of law that even a
         void order is required to be set aside by a
         competent Court of law, inasmuch as an order may
         be void in respect of one person but may be
         valid in respect of another. A void order is
         necessarily not non-est. An order cannot be
         declared to be void in collateral proceedings
         and that too in the absence of the authorities
         who were the authors thereof."         (Emphasis
         added)


     Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh

Gupta v. Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 194.


           From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is

void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be obtained by

the person aggrieved       from the competent court. More so, such a

declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.


15.Respondent   no.2      herself   had    been   a   party   to   the        fraud

committed by the appellant upon the civil court for getting the

decree of divorce as alleged by her in the impugned complaint.



                                                                         12
Thus,     according to her own admission she herself is an abettor

to the crime.


              A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at

any   forum   as     explained     by   the   legal   maxim   "allegans    suam

turpetudinem non est audiendus". No one should have an advantage

from his own wrong (commondum ex injuria sua memo habere debet).

No action arises from an immoral cause (ex turpi cause non

oritur action).        Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of

action    (volenti    non   fit    injuria).    The   statements/allegations

made by the respondent no.2 patently and latently involve her in

the alleged fraud committed upon the court.                   Thus, she made

herself    disentitled for any equitable relief.

16.The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor

has instigated another or engaged with another in a conspiracy

to commit offence. (Vide: Faguna Kanta Nath v. The State of

Assam, AIR 1959 SC 673;           and Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar AIR

1967 SC 553).      If more than one person combining both in intent

and act, commit an offence jointly, each is guilty, as if he has

done the whole         act alone.        Offence has been defined under

Section 40 IPC and Section 43            IPC defines illegality.          Making

false statement on oath before the court is an offence under

Section 191 IPC and punishable under Section 193 IPC.




                                                                      13
17.While         granting      the    decree      of     divorce,     the   statement         of

respondent no.2 had been recorded in the first as well as in the

second motion as mentioned hereinabove. Period of more than 6

months was given to her to think over the issue. However, she

made a similar statement in the second motion as well.


18.As      per    the   statutory         requirement,          the   purpose    of    second

motion after a period of six months is that parties may make

further      efforts      for    reconciliation            in    order   to     save        their

marriage.         There is also obligation on the part of the court

under Section 23(2) of the Act 1955 to make every endeavour to

bring about a reconciliation between the parties.

                    In Jagraj Singh v. Birpal Kaur, AIR 2007 SC 2083,

this Court held that conjugal rights are not merely creature of

statute      but    inherent         in   the     very    institution       of   marriage.

Hence, the approach of a court of law in matrimonial matters

should be "much more constructive, affirmative and productive

rather than abstract, theoretical or doctrinaire".                               The court

should not give up the effort of reconciliation merely on the

ground that there is no chance for reconciliation or one party

or   the    other       says    that      there    is     no    possibility      of    living

together.         Therefore, it is merely a misgiving that the courts

are not concerned and obligated to save the sanctity of the

institution of marriage.



                                                                                       14
19.In Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, AIR 1992 SC 1304, this

Court held that mere filing the petition for divorce by mutual

consent    does   not   authorise   the   court   to   make   a   decree   for

divorce. The interregnum waiting period from 6 to 18 months is

obviously intended to give time and opportunity               to the parties

to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and

friends.     In this transitional period one of the parties may

have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with

the petition.     The court must be satisfied about the bona fides

and the consent of the parties for the reason that court gets

jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce only on mutual consent

at the time of enquiry.         The consent must continue to decree

nisi and must be valid subsisting consent when the case is

heard. Thus, withdrawal of consent can be unilateral prior to

second motion.     The Court further observed:

           "The 'living separately' for a period of one
          year   should  be  immediately   preceding  the
          presentation of the petition. It is necessary
          that immediately preceding the presentation of
          petition, the parties must have been living
          separately. The expression 'living separately',
          connotes to our mind not living like husband
          and wife. It has no reference to the place of
          living. The parties may live under the same
          roof by force of circumstances, and yet they
          may not be living as husband and wife. The.
          parties may be living in different houses and
          yet they could live as husband and wife. What
          seems to be necesssary is that they have no
          desire to perform marital obligations and with
          that mental attitude they have been living
          separately for a period of one year immediately
          preceding the presentation of the petition. The

                                                                     15
       second requirement that they 'have not been
       able to live together' seems to indicate the
       concept of broken down marriage and it would
       not be possible to reconcile themselves. The
       third requirement is that they have mutually
       agreed that the marriage should be dissolved."
       (Emphasis added)


20.For grant of divorce in such a case, the Court has to be

satisfied   about   the   existence   of   mutual   consent   between   the

parties on some tangible materials which demonstrably disclose

such consent. (Vide: Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR

2011 SC 1637).


21.Respondent no.2, who did not change her stand in the second

motion and obtained a sham decree of divorce as alleged by her

asked the criminal court to sit in appeal against the judgment

and decree of the competent Civil Court.              The complaint was

filed before the Magistrate, Jalandhar              while the decree of

divorce had been granted by the District Judge, Ludhiana i.e. of

another district. Therefore, it is beyond our imagination as

under what circumstances a subordinate criminal court             can sit

in appeal   against the judgment and order of the superior Civil

Court, having a different territorial jurisdiction.


22.In the facts and circumstances of the case, the submission

made on behalf of respondent no.2 that the judgment and decree

of a Civil Court granting divorce is null and void and they

continued to be the husband and wife, cannot be taken note of at

                                                                  16
this stage unless the suit filed by             the respondent no.2 to

declare the said judgment and decree dated 20.3.2008             is decided

in her favour.        In view thereof, the evidence adduced by her

particularly    the   record   of   the   telephone    calls,   photographs

attending a wedding together and her signatures in school diary

of the child cannot be taken into consideration so long as the

judgment and decree of the Civil Court subsists.           On the similar

footing,   the contention advanced by her counsel that even after

the   decree   of   divorce,   they   continued   to    live    together   as

husband and wife       and therefore the complaint under            the Act

2005 is maintainable, is not worth acceptance at this stage.


23.In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, this

Court considered the expression "domestic relationship" under

Section 2(f)        of the Act 2005 placing reliance on             earlier

judgment in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat &

Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 636 and held that relationship "in the nature

of marriage" is akin to a common law marriage. However,                    the

couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to

spouses in addition to fulfilling all other requisite conditions

for a valid marriage.

           The said judgments are distinguishable on facts as

those cases relate to live-in relationship without marriage. In

the instant case, the parties got married and the decree of

Civil Court for divorce still subsists.               More so, a suit to

                                                                    17
declare the said judgment and decree as a nullity is still

pending consideration before the competent court.


24.Submissions      made    by   Shri    Ranjit      Kumar   on   the    issue   of

limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C.,

that the complaint could be filed only within a period of one

year from the date of the incident seem to be preponderous in

view of the provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the Act 2005

read with Rule 15(6) of          The Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence   Rules,    2006    which      make   the    provisions    of    Cr.P.C.

applicable and stand fortified by the judgments of this court in

Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762; and

Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC

508.


25.In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that

permitting the Magistrate to proceed further with the complaint

under the provisions of the Act 2005 is not compatible and in

consonance with the decree of divorce which still subsists and

thus, the process amounts to abuse of the process of the court.

Undoubtedly, for quashing a complaint, the court has to take its

contents on its face value and in case the same discloses an

offence, the court generally does not interfere with the same.

However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix of this case,

permitting the court to proceed with the complaint would be


                                                                           18
travesty of justice. Thus, interest of justice warrants quashing

of the same.



26.    The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment

and order dated 9.8.2010 is hereby set aside. Petition filed by

the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed.                                    Complaint

No. 87/02/09 pending before the Magistrate, Jalandhar and all

orders passed therein are quashed.



             Before   parting   with        the           case,              we    clarify    that

respondent no.2 shall be entitled to continue with her other

cases and the court concerned may proceed in accordance with law

without being influenced by the observations made herein.                                      The

said observations have been made only to decide the application

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant.




                                      ........................................J.
                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)


                                  .........................................J.
                                  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
New Delhi
August 23,     2011




                                                                                         19
ITEM NO. 1-A               COURT No.8               SECTION IIB
( For Judgment )



               S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1635 OF 2011 @ SLP (Crl) No.7787/2010

INDERJIT SINGH GREWAL                        ..      Appellant(s)

                           Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                      ..      Respondent(s)




DATE : 23/08/2011      This APPEAL was called
                    on for pronouncement of judgment today.


For Appellant(s)    Mr.Ravindra Keshwarao Adsure, Adv.


For Respondent(s)   Mr.Rohit Kumar Singh, Adv.

                    Ms.Kavita Wadia, Adv.

                           ---

            Hon'ble Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan pronounced the
       judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.
       Sathasivam and His Lordship.

            Leave granted. The appeal is allowed.


           [ Usha Bhardwaj ]                [ Savita Sainani ]
              Court Master                     Court Master


        [ Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file ]




                                                              20



Source :- http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/sr%20778710p.txt

Media report
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-divorce-woman-files-domestic-violence-case-against-ex-husband/articleshow/9726197.cms



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