Saturday, September 25, 2010

Married or no, women maintenance a must- Deserted long-term live-in partner entitled to support, says SC


Married or no, women maintenance a must - Deserted long-term live-in partner entitled to support, says apex court

FULL TEXT
                                                    REPORTABLE





                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION





                CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010

       (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15071 of 2009)





Chanmuniya                                     ..Appellant(s)





                           Versus





Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha & Anr.           ..Respondent(s)





                        J U D G M E N T





GANGULY, J.





1. Leave granted.





2. One   Sarju   Singh   Kushwaha   had   two   sons,   Ram   Saran


  (elder   son)   and   Virendra   Kumar   Singh   Kushwaha



  (younger   son   and   the   first   respondent).   The



  appellant,   Chanmuniya,   was   married   to   Ram   Saran   and



  had   2   daughters-Asha,   the   first   one,   was   born   in





                                1


  1988   and   Usha,   the   second   daughter,   was   born   in



  1990. Ram Saran died on 7.03.1992.





3. Thereafter,   the   appellant   contended   that   she   was


  married   off   to   the   first   respondent   as   per   the



  customs   and   usages   prevalent   in   the   Kushwaha



  community   in   1996.   The   custom   allegedly   was   that



  after   the   death   of   the   husband,   the   widow   was



  married   off   to   the   younger   brother   of   the   husband.



  The appellant was married off in accordance with the



  local   custom   of   Katha   and   Sindur.   The   appellant



  contended   that   she   and   the   first   respondent   were



  living   together   as   husband   and   wife   and   had



  discharged   all   marital   obligations   towards   each



  other.   The   appellant   further   contended   that   after



  some time the first respondent started harassing and



  torturing the appellant, stopped her maintenance and



  also   refused   to   discharge   his   marital   obligations



  towards her.





4. As a result, she initiated proceedings under Section


  125   of   the   Cr.P.C.   for   maintenance   (No.20/1997)





                                2


  before   the   1st  Additional   Civil   Judge,   Mohamadabad,



  Ghazipur. This proceeding is pending.   





5. She   also   filed   a   suit   (No.42/1998)   for   the


  restitution   of   conjugal   rights   under   Section   9   of



  the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955   in   the   Court   of   1st



  Additional District Judge, Ghazipur. 





6. The  Trial Court  decreed the  suit for  restitution of


  conjugal   rights   in   favour   of   the   appellant   on



  3.1.2004 as it was of the opinion that the appellant



  had   remarried   the   first   respondent   after   the   death



  of   Ram   Saran,   and   the   first   respondent   had   deserted



  the   appellant   thereafter.   Thus,   it   directed   the



  first   respondent   to   live   with   the   appellant   and



  perform his marital duties.





7. Hence, the first respondent preferred a first appeal


  (No.110/2004) under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage



  Act.   The   main   issue   in   appeal   was   whether   there   was



  any   evidence   on   record   to   prove   that   the   appellant



  was the legally wedded wife of the first respondent.





                                 3


  The   High   Court   in   its   judgment   dated   28.11.2007   was



  of   the   opinion   that   the   essentials   of   a   valid   Hindu



  marriage,   as   required   under   Section   7   of   the   Hindu



  Marriage   Act,   had   not   been   performed   between   the



  first respondent and the appellant and held that the



  first   respondent   was   not   the   husband   of   the



  appellant   and   thus   reversed   the   findings   of   the



  Trial Court.





8. Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   judgment   of   the   High


  Court,   the   appellant   sought   a   review   of   the   order



  dated   28.11.2007.   The   review   petition   was   dismissed



  on   23.01.2009   on   the   ground   that   there   was   no   error



  apparent   on   the   face   of   the   record   of   the   judgment



  dated 28.11.2007.





9. Hence, the appellant approached this Court by way of


  a special leave petition against the impugned orders



  dated 28.11.2007 and 23.01.2009.





10.One   of   the   major   issues   which   cropped   up   in   the


  present   case   is   whether   or   not   presumption   of   a





                                 4


  marriage   arises   when   parties   live   together   for   a



  long   time,   thus   giving   rise   to   a   claim   of



  maintenance   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.     In   other



  words, the question is what is meant by `wife' under



  Section   125   of   Criminal   Procedure   Code   especially



  having regard to explanation under clause (b) of the



  Section.





11.Thus, the question that arises is whether a man and


  woman   living   together   for   a   long   time,   even   without



  a   valid   marriage,   would   raise   as   in   the   present



  case,   a   presumption   of   a   valid   marriage   entitling



  such a woman to maintenance.





12.On   the   question   of   presumption   of   marriage,   we   may


  usefully   refer   to   a   decision   of   the   House   of   Lords



  rendered   in   the   case   of  Lousia   Adelaide   Piers   &



  Florence A.M. De Kerriguen  v.  Sir Henry Samuel Piers



  [(1849)   II   HLC   331],   in   which   their   Lordships



  observed that the question of validity of a marriage



  cannot   be   tried   like   any   other   issue   of   fact



  independent of presumption.   The Court held that law





                                 5


  will   presume   in   favour   of   marriage   and   such



  presumption   could   only   be   rebutted   by   strong   and



  satisfactory evidence.





13.In   Lieutenant  C.W.   Campbell  v.  John   A.G.   Campbell


  [(1867)   Law   Rep.   2   HL   269],   also   known   as   the



  Breadalbane   case,   the   House   of   Lords   held   that



  cohabitation,   with   the   required   repute,   as   husband



  and   wife,   was   proof   that   the   parties   between



  themselves   had   mutually   contracted   the   matrimonial



  relation.   A   relationship   which   may   be   adulterous   at



  the   beginning   may   become   matrimonial   by   consent.



  This   may   be   evidenced   by   habit   and   repute.     In   the



  instant   case   both   the   appellant   and   the   first



  respondent   were   related   and   lived   in   the   same   house



  and   by   a   social   custom   were   treated   as   husband   and



  wife.     Their   marriage   was   solemnized   with   Katha   and



  Sindur.        Therefore,   following   the   ratio   of   the



  decisions   of   the   House   of   Lords,   this   Court   thinks



  there   is   a   very   strong   presumption   in   favour   of



  marriage.     The   House   of   Lords   again   observed   in



  Captain   De   Thoren  v.  The   Attorney-General  [(1876)   1



  AC   686],   that   the   presumption   of   marriage   is   much



                                 6


  stronger   than   a   presumption   in   regard   to   other



  facts.





14.Again   in  Sastry   Velaider   Aronegary   &   his   wife  v.


  Sembecutty Viagalie & Ors. [(1881) 6 AC 364], it was



  held   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are   proved   to   have



  lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the   law   will



  presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that



  they   were   living   together   in   consequence   of   a   valid



  marriage, and not in a state of concubinage.





15.In  India, the  same principles  have been  followed in


  the   case   of  A.   Dinohamy  v.  W.L.   Balahamy  [AIR   1927



  P.C.   185],   in   which   the   Privy   Council   laid   down   the



  general   proposition   that   where   a   man   and   woman   are



  proved   to   have   lived   together   as   man   and   wife,   the



  law   will   presume,   unless,   the   contrary   is   clearly



  proved,         that         they         were         living         together         in



  consequence   of   a   valid   marriage,   and   not   in   a   state



  of concubinage.





                                            7


16.In  Mohabbat   Ali   Khan  v.  Muhammad   Ibrahim   Khan   and


  Ors.  [AIR   1929   PC   135],   the   Privy   Council   has   laid



  down that the law presumes in favour of marriage and



  against   concubinage   when   a   man   and   woman   have



  cohabited continuously for number of years.





17.In   the   case   of  Gokal   Chand  v.  Parvin   Kumari  [AIR


  1952   SC   231],   this   Court   held   that   continuous   co-



  habitation   of   man   and   woman   as   husband   and   wife   may



  raise         the         presumption                   of         marriage,              but         the



  presumption   which   may   be   drawn   from   long   co-



  habitation                is         rebuttable               and         if         there            are



  circumstances                   which         weaken               and         destroy           that



  presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.





18.Further, in the case of Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director


  of   Consolidation   &   Ors.  [(1978)   3   SCC   527],   the



  Supreme   Court   held   that   a   strong   presumption   arises



  in   favour   of   wedlock   where   the   partners   have   lived



  together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband   and   wife.



  Although   the   presumption   is   rebuttable,   a   heavy





                                                8


  burden   lies   on   him   who   seeks   to   deprive   the



  relationship of legal origin.





19.Again, in  Tulsa and Ors.  v.  Durghatiya & Ors.  [2008


  (4)   SCC   520],   this   Court   held   that   where   the



  partners   lived   together   for   a   long   spell   as   husband



  and   wife,   a   presumption   would   arise   in   favour   of   a



  valid wedlock.





20.Sir   James   Fitz   Stephen,   who   piloted   the   Criminal



  Procedure   Code   of   1872,   a   legal   member   of   Viceroy's



  Council,   described   the   object   of   Section   125   of   the



  Code (it was Section 536 in 1872 Code) as a mode of



  preventing   vagrancy   or   at   least   preventing   its



  consequences. 





21.Then came the 1898 Code in which the same provision


  was   in   Chapter   XXXVI   Section   488   of   the   Code.   The



  exact   provision   of   Section   488(1)   of   the   1898   Code



  runs as follows:



     "488.   (1)   If   any   person   having   sufficient

     means   neglects   or   refuses   to   maintain   his

     wife   or   his   legitimate   or   illegitimate

     child   unable   to   maintain   itself,   the





                                 9


     District         Magistrate,          a         Presidency

     Magistrate,   a   Sub-divisional   Magistrate   or

     a   Magistrate   of   the   first   class   may,   upon

     proof   of   such   neglect   or   refusal,   order

     such   person   to   make   a   monthly   allowance

     for   the   maintenance   of   his   wife   or   such

     child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding

     five   hundred   rupees   in   the   whole   as   such

     Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same

     to such person as the Magistrate from time

     to time directs."





22.In  Jagir   Kaur   &   Anr.  v.  Jaswant   Singh  [AIR   1963   SC


  1521],   the   Supreme   Court   observed   with   respect   to



  Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C. of 1898 that provisions for



  maintenance   of   wives   and   children   intend   to   serve   a



  social   purpose.   Section   488   prescribes   forums   for   a



  proceeding   to   enable   a   deserted   wife   or   a   helpless



  child,   legitimate   or   illegitimate,   to   get   urgent



  relief.





23.In  Nanak   Chand  v.  Chandra   Kishore   Aggarwal   &   Ors.


  [1969   (3)   SCC   802],   the   Supreme   Court,   discussing



  Section   488   of   the   older   Cr.P.C,   virtually   came   to



  the   same   conclusion   that   Section   488   provides   a



  summary   remedy   and   is   applicable   to   all   persons



  belonging   to   any   religion   and   has   no   relationship



  with the personal law of the parties.





                                10


24.In  Captain
               
                
                    Ramesh
                                Chander   Kaushal  v.  Veena   Kaushal



  and   Ors.  [AIR   1978   SC   1807],   this   Court   held   that



  Section 125 is a reincarnation of Section 488 of the



  Cr.P.C.   of   1898   except   for   the   fact   that   parents



  have   also   been   brought   into   the   category   of   persons



  entitled   for   maintenance.   It   observed   that   this



  provision   is   a   measure   of   social   justice   specially



  enacted   to   protect,   and   inhibit   neglect   of   women,



  children,   old   and   infirm   and   falls   within   the



  constitutional   sweep   of   Article   15(3)   reinforced   by



  Article   39.   Speaking   for   the   Bench   Justice   Krishna



  Iyer   observed   that-   "We   have   no   doubt   that   sections



  of   statutes   calling   for   construction   by   courts   are



  not   petrified   print   but   vibrant   words   with   social



  functions   to   fulfill.   The   brooding   presence   of   the



  constitutional   empathy   for   the   weaker   sections   like



  women   and   children   must   inform   interpretation   if   it



  is   to   have   social   relevance.   So   viewed,   it   is



  possible   to   be   selective   in   picking   out   that



  interpretation out of two alternatives which advance



  the   cause-   the   cause   of   the   derelicts."   (Para   9   on



  pages 1809-10)



                                    11


25.Again in  Vimala (K)  v.  Veeraswamy (K)  [(1991) 2 SCC


  375],   a   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   held   that



  Section  125  of  the  Code  of  1973  is  meant  to  achieve



  a   social   purpose   and   the   object   is   to   prevent



  vagrancy and destitution.   Explaining the meaning of



  the word `wife' the Court held:




     "...The   object   is   to   prevent   vagrancy   and

     destitution.   It   provides   a   speedy   remedy

     for   the   supply   of   food,   clothing   and

     shelter   to   the   deserted   wife.   When   an

     attempt is made by the husband to negative

     the   claim   of   the   neglected   wife   depicting

     her   as   a   kept-mistress   on   the   specious

     plea   that   he   was   already   married,   the

     court   would   insist   on   strict   proof   of   the

     earlier   marriage.   The   term   `wife'   in

     Section   125   of   the   Code   of   Criminal

     Procedure,   includes   a   woman   who   has   been

     divorced   by   a   husband   or   who   has   obtained

     a   divorce   from   her   husband   and   has   not

     remarried.   The   woman   not   having   the   legal

     status   of   a   wife   is   thus   brought   within

     the   inclusive   definition   of   the   term

     `wife' consistent with the objective... "





26.Thus,   in   those   cases   where   a   man,   who   lived   with   a


  woman   for   a   long   time   and   even   though   they   may   not



  have   undergone   legal   necessities   of   a   valid



  marriage,   should   be   made   liable   to   pay   the   woman



  maintenance if he deserts her. The man should not be



  allowed   to   benefit   from   the   legal   loopholes   by



  enjoying   the   advantages   of   a         de   facto     marriage




                                  12


  without undertaking the duties and obligations.   Any



  other   interpretation   would   lead   the   woman   to



  vagrancy   and   destitution,   which   the   provision   of



  maintenance in Section 125 is meant to prevent.





27.The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System,


  headed   by   Dr.   Justice   V.S.   Malimath,   in   its   report



  of   2003   opined   that   evidence   regarding   a   man   and



  woman   living   together   for   a   reasonably   long   period



  should   be   sufficient   to   draw   the   presumption   that



  the   marriage   was   performed   according   to   the



  customary rites of the parties. Thus, it recommended



  that   the   word   `wife'   in   Section   125   Cr.P.C.   should



  be   amended   to   include   a   woman   who   was   living   with



  the man like his wife for a reasonably long period.





28.The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Mohammad


  Ahmed   Khan  v.  Shah   Bano   Begum   &   Ors.  reported   in



  [(1985)   2   SCC   556],   considering   the   provision   of



  Section   125   of   the   1973   Code,   opined   that   the   said



  provision   is   truly   secular   in   character   and   is



  different   from   the   personal   law   of   the   parties.   The





                                13


  Court   further   held   that   such   provisions   are



  essentially   of   a   prophylactic   character   and   cut



  across   the   barriers   of   religion.   The   Court   further



  held   that   the   liability   imposed   by   Section   125   to



  maintain   close   relatives,   who   are   indigent,   is



  founded   upon   the   individual's   obligation   to   the



  society to prevent vagrancy and destitution.





29.In a subsequent decision, in  Dwarika Prasad Satpathy


  v.  Bidyut   Prava   Dixit   &   Anr.  [(1999)   7   SCC   675],



  this   Court   held   that   the   standard   of   proof   of



  marriage   in   a   Section   125   proceeding   is   not   as



  strict   as   is   required   in   a   trial   for   an   offence



  under   Section   494   of   IPC.   The   learned   Judges



  explained   the   reason   for   the   aforesaid   finding   by



  holding that an order passed in an application under



  Section 125 does not really determine the rights and



  obligations   of   parties   as   the   section   is   enacted



  with a view to provide a summary remedy to neglected



  wives to obtain maintenance. The learned Judges held



  that   maintenance   cannot   be   denied   where   there   was



  some   evidence   on   which   conclusions   of   living



  together could be reached. (See para 9)



                               14


30.However,   striking   a   different   note,   in  Yamunabai


  Anantrao   Adhav       v.       Anantrao   Shivram   Adhav   and



  another,   reported   in   AIR   1988   SC   644,   a   two-Judge



  Bench   of   this   Court   held   that   an   attempt   to   exclude



  altogether         personal         law         of         the         parties         in



  proceedings under Section 125 is improper. (See para



  6).  The learned Judges also held (paras 4 & 8) that



  the   expression   `wife'   in   Section   125   of   the   Code



  should   be   interpreted   to   mean   only   a   legally   wedded



  wife.





31.Again   in   a   subsequent   decision   of   this   Court   in


  Savitaben   Somabhat   Bhatiya  v.  State   of   Gujarat   and



  others,   reported   in   AIR   2005   SC   1809,   this   Court



  held   however   desirable   it   may   be   to   take   note   of



  plight   of   an   unfortunate   woman,   who   unwittingly



  enters   into   wedlock   with   a   married   man,   there   is   no



  scope to include a woman not lawfully married within



  the   expression   of   `wife'.   The   Bench   held   that   this



  inadequacy   in   law   can   be   amended   only   by   the



  Legislature.   While   coming   to   the   aforesaid   finding,





                                      15


  the   learned   Judges   relied   on   the   decision   in   the



  Yamunabai case (supra).





32.It is, therefore, clear from what has been discussed


  above that there is a divergence of judicial opinion



  on   the   interpretation   of   the   word   `wife'   in   Section



  125.





33.We   are   inclined   to   take   a   broad   view   of   the


  definition   of   `wife'   having   regard   to   the   social



  object   of   Section   125   in   the   Code   of   1973.   However,



  sitting   in   a   two-Judge   Bench,   we   cannot,   we   are



  afraid,   take   a   view   contrary   to   the   views   expressed



  in the abovementioned two cases.





34.However,  law in  America has  proceeded on  a slightly


  different   basis.   The   social   obligation   of   a   man



  entering   into   a   live-in   relationship   with   another



  woman,   without   the   formalities   of   a   marriage,   came



  up   for   consideration   in   the   American   courts   in   the



  leading   case   of  Marvin  v.  Marvin  [(1976)   18   Cal.3d



  660].   In   that   context,   a   new   expression   of





                                 16


  `palimony'   has   been   coined,   which   is   a   combination



  of `pal' and `alimony', by the famous divorce lawyer



  in the said case, Mr. Marvin Mitchelson.





35.In   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   the   plaintiff,   Michelle


  Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered into



  an   oral   agreement   which   provided   that   while   "the



  parties   lived   together   they   would   combine   their



  efforts and earnings and would share equally any and



  all   property   accumulated   as   a   result   of   their



  efforts whether individual or combined." The parties



  allegedly further agreed that Michelle would "render



  her   services   as   a   companion,   homemaker,   housekeeper



  and cook." Michelle sought a judicial declaration of



  her   contract   and   property   rights,   and   sought   to



  impose   a   constructive   trust   upon   one   half   of   the



  property         acquired         during         the         course         of         the



  relationship.     The   Supreme   Court   of   California   held



  as follows:



     (1)   The   provisions   of   the   Family   Law   Act   do   not


     govern   the   distribution   of   property   acquired


     during   a   non-marital   relationship;   such   a


     relationship   remains   subject   solely   to   judicial


     decision.



                                      17


     (2)   The   courts   should   enforce   express   contracts


     between non-marital partners except to the extent


     that   the   contract   is   explicitly   founded   on   the


     consideration of meretricious sexual services.





     (3)   In   the   absence   of   an   express   contract,   the


     courts   should   inquire   into   the   conduct   of   the


     parties   to   determine   whether   that   conduct


     demonstrates   an   implied   contract,   agreement   of


     partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit


     understanding between the parties. The courts may


     also   employ   the   doctrine   of   quantum   meruit,   or


     equitable   remedies   such   as   constructive   or


     resulting   trusts,   when   warranted   by   the   facts   of


     the case.





36.Though in our country, law has not developed on the


  lines   of   the  Marvin   case  (supra),   but   our   social



  context   also   is   fast   changing,   of   which   cognizance



  has   to   be   taken   by   Courts   in   interpreting   a



  statutory   provision   which   has   a   pronounced   social



  content like Section 125 of the Code of 1973.





37.We   think   the   larger   Bench   may   consider   also   the


  provisions   of   the   Protection   of   Women   from   Domestic



  Violence   Act,   2005.   This   Act   assigns   a   very   broad



                                18


  and   expansive   definition   to   the   term   `domestic



  abuse'   to   include   within   its   purview   even   economic



  abuse.   `Economic   abuse'   has   been   defined   very



  broadly   in   sub-explanation   (iv)   to   explanation   I   of



  Section   3   of   the   said   Act   to   include   deprivation   of



  financial and economic resources.





38.Further, Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate


  to   direct   the   respondent   to   pay   monetary   relief   to



  the aggrieved person, who is the harassed woman, for



  expenses   incurred   and   losses   suffered   by   her,   which



  may   include,   but   is   not   limited   to,   maintenance



  under Section 125 Cr.P.C. [Section 20(1)(d)].





39.Section   22   of   the   Act   confers   upon   the   Magistrate,



  the   power   to   award   compensation   to   the   aggrieved



  person,   in   addition   to   other   reliefs   granted   under



  the Act.





40.In   terms   of   Section   26   of   the   Act,   these   reliefs


  mentioned   above   can   be   sought   in   any   legal



  proceeding,   before   a   civil   court,   family   court   or   a





                                 19


  criminal   court,   affecting   the   aggrieved   person   and



  the respondent.





41.Most   significantly,   the   Act   gives   a   very   wide


  interpretation   to   the   term   `domestic   relationship'



  as   to   take   it   outside   the   confines   of   a   marital



  relationship,           and          even         includes         live-in



  relationships   in   the   nature   of   marriage   within   the



  definition   of   `domestic   relationship'   under   Section



  2(f) of the Act.





42.Therefore,   women   in   live-in   relationships   are   also



  entitled to all the reliefs given in the said Act.





43.We   are   thus   of   the   opinion   that   if   the


  abovementioned   monetary   relief   and   compensation   can



  be   awarded   in   cases   of   live-in   relationships   under



  the   Act   of   2005,   they   should   also   be   allowed   in   a



  proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. It seems to



  us  that  the  same  view  is  confirmed  by  Section  26  of



  the said Act of 2005.





                                      20


44.We   believe   that   in   light   of   the   constant   change   in


  social   attitudes   and   values,   which   have   been



  incorporated   into   the   forward-looking   Act   of   2005,



  the   same   needs   to   be   considered   with   respect   to



  Section   125   of   Cr.P.C.   and   accordingly,   a   broad



  interpretation of the same should be taken.





45.We,   therefore,   request   the   Hon'ble   Chief   Justice   to


  refer   the   following,   amongst   other,   questions   to   be



  decided   by   a   larger   Bench.   According   to   us,   the



  questions are:





  1.    Whether the living together of a man and woman



        as   husband   and   wife   for   a   considerable   period



        of time would raise the presumption of a valid



        marriage   between   them   and   whether   such   a



        presumption         would         entitle         the         woman         to



        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?





  2.    Whether   strict   proof   of   marriage   is   essential



        for   a   claim   of   maintenance   under   Section   125



        Cr.P.C.   having   regard   to   the   provisions   of



        Domestic Violence Act, 2005?





                                          21


  3.    Whether   a   marriage   performed   according   to



        customary          rites         and          ceremonies,               without



        strictly   fulfilling   the   requisites   of   Section



        7(1)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955,   or   any



        other   personal   law   would   entitle   the   woman   to



        maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?





46.We   are   of   the   opinion   that   a   broad   and   expansive


  interpretation should be given to the term `wife' to



  include   even   those   cases   where   a   man   and   woman   have



  been   living   together   as   husband   and   wife   for   a



  reasonably   long   period   of   time,   and   strict   proof   of



  marriage           should         not         be         a         pre-condition         for



  maintenance   under   Section   125   of   the   Cr.P.C,   so   as



  to   fulfil   the   true   spirit   and   essence   of   the



  beneficial   provision   of   maintenance   under   Section



  125.





47.We also believe that such an interpretation would be


  a   just   application   of   the   principles   enshrined   in



  the   Preamble   to   our   Constitution,   namely,   social



  justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.





                                           22


                         .....................J.

                         (G.S. SINGHVI)





                         .....................J.

                         (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)





New Delhi           

October 07, 2010





                         23




--------
OUR LEGAL CORRESPONDENT
New Delhi, Sept. 25: The Supreme Court has said that any woman in a long-term live-in relationship is entitled to maintenance if deserted.
It is immaterial whether the woman was legally married to the man or not, the court said. What matters is whether she was completely dependent on him for sustenance.
“Women can’t be left vagrant. Right to life (guaranteed under the Constitution) includes the right to live with dignity. It is not possible to live with dignity when a woman has no food and leads the life of a destitute,” said Justice A.K. Ganguly, sitting with senior judge G.S. Singhvi.
Justice Singhvi added: “Someone has to take care of her if she is not able to, just to prevent vagrancy.”
“Leaving women to vagrancy threatens social stability and public order,” Justice Ganguly underlined. Women are, after all, the source of all power, he said.
The two judges were hearing the petition of a woman, Chunmuniya, who claimed that after her husband Ram Sharan died on March 7, 1992, she was “married” off to his younger brother Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, as was the practice in her caste. Among some communities in northern India, the widow of an older brother is forced to live with any surviving brother. The marriage was performed simply by doing a katha, she said.
Virendra, who was 10 years younger than Ram Sharan, deserted her in 1996. She moved an application for maintenance on March 26, 1997, but he married another woman in 1998 while it was pending.
A family court upheld Chunmuniya’s plea for maintenance. But Virendra went to the high court denying that he had been married to her. He claimed she had fraudulently inserted her name as his wife in the family register with the panchayat to get a share of the property.
The high court ruled in his favour on November 11, 2007, saying Chunmuniya had not been able to prove marriage. Invocation before a sacred fire and saptapadi were the two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage, it said, setting aside the family court order. Chunmuniya then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decided that the issue needed consideration and appointed Altaf Ahmad and P.S. Patwalia as the amicus curiae to assist the judges in deciding the issue. Both contended that the law could be interpreted to include all such women in the definition of “wife” to enable them to get maintenance.
Ahmed said that if a woman marries under personal laws, she immediately gets several rights and obligations. Those who do not, do not get any rights. “If such dependent women are provided for, this trend (of living-in) will also be discouraged,” he contended.
The bench agreed that the status of a wife need not be a pre-requisite for getting maintenance before reserving orders in the case. A prolonged domestic relationship resembling marriage is enough to entitle a deserted woman to maintenance, it observed.
Patwalia said that living-in was a fast-catching “urban phenomenon” which the law must address. “Here, the man has no obligations or responsibilities of any kind. Let the law reach out to them,” he said.
The bench also expressed anguish over the use of such words as “illegitimate” children and “other woman” in various laws and blamed the “patriarchal” mindset of law-makers for this. “The use of the word illegitimate stigmatises these children the day they are born,” Justice Singhvi said.
At another point, the court criticised law-makers for enshrining Rs 500 as the maximum maintenance per month in a 1973 law. “Whoever fixed the amount was miserly,” the judges observed. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enshrines this as the maximum maintenance for all dependants — wife and children.

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