REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.20428 of 2007)
M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ..Appellant(s)
Versus
Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others ..Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010
(Arising out of SLP (C) NO.12766 OF 2008)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These two appeals, one at the instance of the
builder and the other at the instance of the
Corporation Bank, have been filed impugning the
Order of National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission (hereinafter, the said Commission).
13. In the case of the builder, the said Commission has
not given any reason and dismissed the revision
petition by passing a cryptic order dated 31.8.2007
which reads as under:
“Heard.
In view of the concurrent findings of the
State Commission, we do not find any
force in this revision petition.
The revision Petition is dismissed.”
4. In so far as the case of the builder is concerned,
this Court is of the opinion that the said
Commission cannot, considering the way it is
structured, dismiss the revision petition by
refusing to give any reasons and by just affirming
the order of the State Commission.
5. The said Commission has been defined under Section
2(k) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
(hereinafter CP Act) as follows:
“2(k) “National Commission” means the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission established under clause (c)
of Section 9;”
6. Under section 9(c) of CP Act, the said Commission
has been established by the Central Government by a
notification.
27. The composition of the said Commission has been
provided under Section 20 of the CP Act and
wherefrom it is clear that the said Commission is a
high-powered adjudicating forum headed by a sitting
or a retired judge of the Supreme Court.
8. Section 21 of the CP Act provides for the
jurisdiction of the said Commission.
9. In order to appreciate the questions involved in
this case, the provision relating to jurisdiction of
the said Commission is set out hereunder:
“21. Jurisdiction of the National
Commission.- Subject to the other
provisions of this Act, the National
Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
(i) complaints where the value
of the goods or services
and compensation, if any,
claimed exceeds [rupees one
crore]; and
(ii) appeals against the orders
of any State Commission;
and
(b) to call for the records and pass
appropriate orders in any consumer
dispute which is pending before or
has been decided by any State
Commission where it appears to the
National Commission that such State
Commission has exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it by
law, or has failed to exercise a
3jurisdiction so vested, or has acted
in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally or with material
irregularity.”
10. Under Section 23 of the CP Act, an appeal would lie
against the order of the said Commission passed in
exercise of its powers under Section 21(1)(a), to
this Court, within 30 days, subject to extension of
time by this Court on sufficient cause being shown.
Under Section 21(1)(b), the said Commission
exercises revisional power over orders of State
Commission.
11. The power and procedure applicable to the said
Commission has been provided under Section 22 of the
CP Act. A perusal of Section 22(1) would show that
Sections 12, 13 and 14 of CP Act, with necessary
modification, are applicable to the decision making
process by the said Commission. Under Section 13 of
the CP Act, the District Forum has been vested, in
certain matters, with the powers of a Civil Court
while trying a suit. Section 13(4) of CP Act is
applicable to the said Commission in view of Section
22(1) thereof. Similarly, Sections 13(5), (6) and
4(7) will also apply to the said Commission in view
of Section 22(1).
12. On a perusal of Sections 13(4), (5), (6) and (7) of
the CP Act, it is clear that the said Commission has
been vested with some of the powers of a Civil
Court. The following powers have been vested on the
said Commission:
“13(4) For the purposes of this section,
the District Forum shall have the same
powers as are vested in a civil court
under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) while trying a suit in respect of
the following matters, namely:-
(i) the summoning and enforcing
the attendance of any
defendant or witness and
examining the witness on
oath,
(ii) the discovery and production
of any document or other
material object producible as
evidence,
(iii) the reception of evidence on
affidavits,
(iv) the requisitioning of the
report of the concerned
analysis or test from the
appropriate laboratory or
from any other relevant
source,
(v) issuing of any commission for
the examination of any
witness, and
(vi) any other matter which may be
prescribed.
513. Under Section 13(5) of CP Act, every proceeding of
the said Commission will be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and
228 of the Indian Penal Code, and the said
Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for
the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
14. The above provisions make it clear that the said
Commission has the trappings of a Civil Court and is
a high-powered quasi-judicial forum for deciding lis
between the parties.
15. The necessity of giving reason by a body or
authority in support of its decision came up for
consideration before this Court in several cases.
Initially this Court recognized a sort of
demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-
judicial orders but with the passage of time the
distinction between the two got blurred and thinned
out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the
judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others
vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970
SC 150.
616. In Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of
India and others reported in AIR 1973 SC 389, this
Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord
Denning in Rigina vs. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim
[(1970) 2 WLR 1009] and quoted him as saying “that
heresy was scotched in Ridge and Boldwin, 1964 AC
40”.
17. The expression ‘speaking order’ was first coined by
Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange
context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the
ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with
errors on the face of the record and pointed out
that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking
order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of
the report)
18. This Court always opined that the face of an order
passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an
administrative authority affecting the rights of
parties, must speak. It must not be like the
‘inscrutable face of a Sphinx’.
719. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam
Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669,
the question of recording reasons came up for
consideration in the context of a refusal by
Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons,
shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such
refusal, the transferee moved the High Court
contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala
fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court
rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to
file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the
Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of
Indian Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed.
Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed
another application for transfer of his shares which
was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the
Central Government quashed the resolution passed by
the Company and directed the Company to register the
transfer. However, in passing the said order,
Government did not give any reason. The company
challenged the said decision before this Court.
20. The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra)
was whether the Central Government, in passing the
8appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable
to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.
21. Even though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was
administrative, this Court insisted on the
requirement of recording reason and further held
that in exercising appellate powers, the Central
Government acted as a tribunal in exercising
judicial powers of the State and such exercise is
subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.
Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively
exercised if reasons are not given by the Central
Government in support of the order (Para 23, page
1678-79).
22. Again in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India
and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606, the Constitution Bench
of this Court examined the question whether the
Central Government was bound to pass a speaking
order while dismissing a revision and confirming the
order of the State Government in the context of
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55
of Mineral and Concessions Rules. The Constitution
9Bench held that in exercising its power of revision
under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity (See para 8 page 1610).
Where the State Government gives a number of reasons
some of which are good and some are not, and the
Central Government merely endorses the order of the
State Government without specifying any reason, this
Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article
136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are
the grounds on which Central Government upheld the
order of the State Government (See para 9 page
1610). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons
being given for the order.
23. In M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of
U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC 1302, while dealing with
U.P. Sugar Dealers License Order under which the
license was cancelled, this Court held that such an
order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be
a speaking one. This Court further held that merely
giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and
further pointed out where the order is subject to
appeal, the necessity to record reason is even
greater. The learned Judges held that the recording
10of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed
claim ensures that the decision is not a result of
caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after
considering the relevant law and that the decision
was just. (See para 7 page 1304).
24. In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The
Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 862, the
Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of
the Central Government under the then Section 36 of
the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, held that the
Central Government was actually exercising judicial
power of the State and in exercising judicial power
reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on
two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved
gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons
are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record
reasons operates as a deterrent against possible
arbitrary action by the executive authority invested
with the judicial power (See para 11 page 865-866).
25. In M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers
Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this
Court while considering an award under Section 11 of
11Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of
giving reasons in support of conclusions in the
Award. The Court held that the very requirement of
giving reason is to prevent unfairness or
arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second
principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine
that justice should not only be done, it should also
appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said
that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not
appear to be just to those who read the same.
Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will
also have the appearance of justice. The third
ground is that such awards are subject to Article
136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of
reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain
whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5
page 2761).
26. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others,
AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the
question of selection under Indian Administrative
Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by
Promotion Regulation) held that the expression
“reasons for the proposed supersession” should not
12be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must
disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter
for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a
decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial.
This Court held that the reasons in such context
would mean the link between materials which are
considered and the conclusions which are reached.
Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two
(See para 28 page 98).
27. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of
India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and another, AIR
1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too
well settled that an authority in making an order in
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record
reasons in support of the order it makes. The
learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi-
judicial order must be supported by reasons. The
rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi-
judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as
following the principles of natural justice. And the
rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere
pretence of compliance would not satisfy the
requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789).
1328. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr.,
AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a decision of great
jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional
law, Chief Justice Beg, in a concurring but
different opinion held that an order impounding a
passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page
612). The learned Chief Justice also held when an
administrative action involving any deprivation of
or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the
authorities must see that justice is not only done
but manifestly appears to be done as well. This
principle would obviously demand disclosure of
reasons for the decision.
29. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was)
in a concurring but a separate opinion also held
that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a
passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and
is to be done very sparingly and only when it is
fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon
situation.
1430. The learned Judge further held that law cannot
permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep
the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing
so is to keep the reasons away from judicial
scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613).
31. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of
Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held
that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial
in character. One of the attributes of quasi-
judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in
support of decisions taken and the other requirement
is following the principles of natural justice.
Learned Judge held that natural justice requires
reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See
para 14 page 1922).
32. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors.,
(1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service
matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held
that “rubber-stamp reason” is not enough and
virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra)
to the extent that reasons “are the links between
15the materials on which certain conclusions are based
and the actual conclusions.” (See para 18 page 377).
33. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while
giving the majority judgment Chief Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud referred to Broom’s Legal Maxims (1939
Edition, page 97) where the principle in Latin runs
as follows:
“Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex”
34. The English version of the said principle given by
the Chief Justice is that:
“Reason is the soul of the law, and when the
reason of any particular law ceases, so does
the law itself.” (See para 29 page 11)
35. In M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of
India and Others, AIR 1984 SC 160, this Court held
that while disposing of applications under
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the
duty of the Government is to give reasons for its
order. This court made it very clear that the faith
16of the people in administrative tribunals can be
sustained only if the tribunals act fairly and
dispose of the matters before them by well
considered orders. In saying so, this Court relied
on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra) and
Siemens Engineering (supra), discussed above.
36. In Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, AIR
1986 SC 1173, this Court was dealing with the
appellate provisions under the Railway Servants
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the
mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in the context
of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rule.
This Court held that the word “consider” occurring
to the Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway Board shall
duly apply its mind and give reasons for its
decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to
give reason is an incident of the judicial process
and emphasized that in discharging quasi-judicial
functions the appellate authority must act in
accordance with natural justice and give reasons for
its decision (Para 4, page 1176).
1737. In M/s. Star Enterprises and others vs. City and
Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra
Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC 280, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court held that in the present day set
up judicial review of administrative action has
become expansive and is becoming wider day by day
and the State has to justify its action in various
field of public law. All these necessitate
recording of reason for executive actions including
the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held
that disclosure of reasons in matters of such
rejection provides an opportunity for an objective
review both by superior administrative heads and for
judicial process and opined that such reasons should
be communicated unless there are specific
justification for not doing so (see Para 10, page
284-285).
38. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher
Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi and others,
(1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court held that even in
domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute
non-recording of reason may not be violative of the
principles of natural justice but where facts are
18disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry
officer, on consideration of the materials on
record, should record reasons in support of the
conclusion reached (see para 22, pages 738-739)
39. In the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones
Nigam Limited and others, (1996) 3 SCC 119, this
Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the
Telegraph Act and held that since the said award
affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in
the award. It was also held that such reasons are to
be recorded so that it enables the High Court to
exercise its power of judicial review on the
validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).
40. In Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital and
others, AIR 2000 SC 3138, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP Act,
held that the authorities under the Act exercise
quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer
disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such
a body should arrive at conclusions based on
reasons. This Court held that the said Act, being
one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is
19intended to protect a large body of consumers from
exploitation as the said Act provides for an
alternative mode for consumer justice by the process
of a summary trial. The powers which are exercised
are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such
a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons
and held that requirement of recording reasons is
“too obvious to be reiterated and needs no
emphasizing”. (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report)
41. Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a
different note in two of its Constitution Bench
decisions, the first of which was rendered in the
case of Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India and
others, AIR 1969 SC 414, Mr. Justice Ramaswami
delivering the judgment for the unanimous
Constitution Bench held that provisions of Sections
164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order
confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be
supported by reasons. The Court held that an order
confirming such proceedings does not become illegal
if it does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421-
422 of the report).
2042. About two decades thereafter, a similar question
cropped up before this Court in the case of S.N.
Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. A
unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through
Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier decision
in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000 of the
report and held reasons are not required to be
recorded for an order confirming the finding and
sentence recorded by the Court Martial.
43. It must be remembered in this connection that the
Court Martial as a proceeding is sui generis in
nature and the Court of Court Martial is different,
being called a Court of Honour and the proceeding
therein are slightly different from other
proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial and
its proceedings the observations of Winthrop in
Military Law and Precedents are very pertinent and
are extracted herein below:
“Not belonging to the judicial branch of the
Government, it follows that courts-martial
must pertain to the executive department; and
they are in fact simply instrumentalities of
the executive power, provided by Congress for
the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid
him in properly commanding the Army and Navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.”
2144. Our Constitution also deals with Court Martial
proceedings differently as is clear from Articles
33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.
45. In England there was no common law duty of recording
of reasons. In Marta Stefan vs. General Medical
Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, “the
established position of the common law is that there
is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to
record reasons”. It has been acknowledged in the
Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at
page 23 that “No single factor has inhibited the
development of English administrative law as
seriously as the absence of any general obligation
upon public authorities to give reasons for their
decisions”.
46. Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal
Board, ex parte Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All
ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very
strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a
case where the Court is acting in its discretion.
The learned Master of Rolls said:
22“..It is a corollary of the discretion
conferred upon the board that it is their duty
to set out their reasoning in sufficient form
to show the principles on which they have
proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ’s
observations (in R vs. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal, ex p Khan (Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER
420 at 423, (1983) QB 790 at 794-795), the
reasons for the lower amount is not obvious.
Mr. Cunningham is entitled to know, either
expressly or inferentially stated, what it was
to which the board were addressing their mind
in arriving at their conclusion. It must be
obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is
left with a burning sense of grievance. They
should be sensitive to the fact that he is
left with a real feeling of injustice, that
having been found to have been unfairly
dismissed, he has been deprived of his just
desserts (as he sees them)”.
47. The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by
saying:
“..thus, in the particular circumstances
of this case, and without wishing to establish
any precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to
spell out an obligation on this board to give
succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of
Mr. Cunningham at rest. I would therefore
allow this application.”
48. But, however, the present trend of the law has been
towards an increasing recognition of the duty of
Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping
Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1
WLR 2397). It has been acknowledged that this trend
is consistent with the development towards openness
in Government and judicial administration.
2349. In English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited,
(2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been held that justice
will not be done if it is not apparent to the
parties why one has won and the other has lost. The
House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord
Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the
requirement of reason held, “First, they impose a
discipline … which may contribute to such decisions
being considered with care. Secondly, reasons
encourage transparency … Thirdly, they assist the
Courts in performing their supervisory function if
judicial review proceedings are launched.” (Para 7,
page 1769 of the report)
50. The position in the United States has been indicated
by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph
11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held
that in the United States the Courts have always
insisted on the recording of reasons by
administrative authorities in exercise of their
powers. It was further held that such recording of
reasons is required as “the Court cannot exercise
their duty of review unless they are advised of the
24considerations underlying the action under review”.
In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) this court relied on the
decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942)
87 Law Ed 626 and John T. Dunlop vs. Walter
Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its
opinion discussed above.
51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to
record reasons, even in administrative decisions,
if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in
support of its conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to
serve the wider principle of justice that justice
must not only be done it must also appear to be
done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid
restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
25e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision making process as
observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by
administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review
by superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries
committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions
based on relevant facts. This is virtually the
life blood of judicial decision making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these
days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions
serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate
by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for
26sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice
delivery system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
judicial accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not
candid enough about his/her decision making
process then it is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,
clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a
valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine
qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision making not only makes the
judges and decision makers less prone to errors
but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor
(1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates
from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision
making, the said requirement is now virtually a
component of human rights and was considered part
27of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR
553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of
Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of European Convention of
Human Rights which requires, “adequate and
intelligent reasons must be given for judicial
decisions”.
o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a
vital role in setting up precedents for the
future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of the essence and is virtually a part of “Due
Process”.
52. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of
the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
and remand the matter to the said forum for deciding
the matter by passing a reasoned order in the light
of the observations made above. Since some time has
elapsed, this Court requests the forum to decide the
matter as early as possible, preferably within a
period of six weeks from the date of service of this
order upon it.
2853. In so far as the appeal filed by the Bank is
concerned, this Court finds that the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its order
dated 4th April 2008 has given some reasons in its
finding. The reasons, inter alia, are as under:
“We have gone through the orders of the
District Forum and the State Commission,
perused the record placed before us and
heard the parties at length. The State
Commission has rightly confirmed the order
of the District Forum after coming to the
conclusion that the Petitioner and the
Builder – Respondents No.3 and 4 have
colluded with each other and hence,
directed them to compensate the complainant
for the harassment caused to them.”
54. From the order of the State Commission dated 26.7.07
in connection with the appeal filed by the Bank, we
do not find that the State Commission has
independently considered Bank’s appeal. The State
Commission dismissed the Bank’s appeal for the
reasons given in its order dated 6.7.07 in
connection with the appeal of the builders.
55. This Court is of the view that since the Bank has
filed a separate appeal, it has a right to be heard
independently in support of its appeal. That right
has been denied by the State Commission. In that
view of the matter, this Court quashes the order
29dated 26.7.07 passed by the State Commission as also
the order of the National Commission dated 4th April
2008 which has affirmed the order of the State
Commission.
56. This case is remanded to the State Commission for
hearing on merits as early as possible, preferably
within a period of six weeks from the date of
service of this order to the State Commission.
57. It is expected that the State Commission will hear
out the matter independently and give adequate
reasons for its conclusions. We, however, do not
make any observations on the merits of the case.
58. Both these appeals are allowed. No order as to
costs.
.....................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
.....................J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
30New Delhi
September 08, 2010
31
No comments:
Post a Comment