Showing posts with label sc. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sc. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

SC- Compromise is not a bar to file further cases for maintenance

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 11800 OF 2013
                   [Arising out of C.C. No. 1297 of 2012]

Nagendrappa Natikar                                .. Petitioner
                                   Versus
Neelamma                                               .. Respondent
                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1.    Delay condoned.


2.    The question that is raised for consideration in this case is  whether
a compromise entered into by husband and wife under Order XXIII  Rule  3  of
the Code of Civil  Procedure  (CPC),  agreeing  for  a  consolidated  amount
towards  permanent  alimony,  thereby  giving  up  any  future   claim   for
maintenance, accepted by the Court in a proceeding under Section 125 of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), would preclude  the  wife  from  claiming
maintenance in a suit filed under Section  18  of  the  Hindu  Adoption  and
Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short “the Act’).

3.    The marriage between the petitioner (husband)  and  respondent  (wife)
took place on 24.5.1987.  Alleging that the petitioner  is  not  maintaining
his wife, respondent filed an application under Section 125 CrPC  for  grant
of maintenance before the 1st Additional JMFC at Gulbarga, being Misc.  Case
No. 234 of  1992.    While  the  matter  was  pending,  an  application  was
preferred by the parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC  on  3.9.1994  stating
that the parties had arrived at a compromise, by which  the  respondent  had
agreed to receive an amount of  Rs.8,000/-  towards  permanent  alimony  and
that she would not make any claim for maintenance in future  or  enhancement
of maintenance.  Consent letter dated 30.3.1990, which is  in  Kannada,  the
English translation of the same reads as follow:
       “Consent letter:
            I,  Neelamma  W/o  Nagendra  Natikar,  Age  23  years,  R/o  Old
       Shahabad, do hereby execute this  consent  letter  in  favour  of  my
       husband Nagendra Natikar with free will and consent without  coercion
       and misrepresentation.  After my marriage with  Nagendra  Natikar,  I
       could not lead marital life happy with  my  husband  due  to  my  ill
       health as prior  to  my  marriage  I  was  suffering  from  backache,
       Paralysis stroke to my left hand and left leg and was also  suffering
       from epilepsy (Fits disease) and therefore I have myself  decided  to
       withdraw from marital life.  I  have  given  my  consent  for  mutual
       divorce.  I have no objection if my  husband  would  contract  second
       marriage with someone.  Prior to my marriage  I  was  suffering  from
       chronic disease.  I had asked my father not to celebrate her marriage
       with anyone.   My  father  forcibly  got  marriage  with  Nagendrappa
       Natikar.  Henceforth I will not make  any  further  claims  and  also
       forfeit my rights in future and I  will  not  claim  compensation  or
       maintenance or alimony.  I am satisfied with the payment of Rs.8000/-
       and I will not make any further claims against my husband.


            I have executed this consent letter in  favoaur  of  my  husband
       without any force of  anybody  and  free  from  misrepresentation  or
       coercion.   My father-mother or nay  other  family  members  have  no
       objection for executing this consent letter.


                                                      Signature of Executant


                                                                    Neelamma


                                                        (Signed in Kannada))


       Signature of witnesses:


    1.  Tippanna (signed in Kannada)


    2.  Devindrappa (signed in Kannada)
    3. Syed Zabiullah Sahab  (signed scribe)”



The Court, on the same day, passed the following order:
      “Parties both present.  Both parties and  advocates  files  compromise
      petition.  The contents of the compromise petition is  read  over  and
      explained to them.  They admit the execution of the same before court.
        Respondent paid Rs.8000/- (eight thousand) before court towards full
      satisfaction of the maintenance as per compromise recorded.   In  view
      of the compromise, petition dismissed.”

4.    Respondent wife then filed a Misc. Application no. 34 of  2003  under
Section 127 Cr.P.C. before the Family Court, Gulbarga for  cancellation  of
the earlier order and also  for  awarding  future  maintenance,  which  was
resisted by the petitioner stating that the parties had already  reached  a
compromise with regard to the claim for maintenance on 3.9.1994  and  hence
the application for cancellation of the earlier order is not  maintainable.
The Court accepted the plea of the husband and took  the  view  that  since
such an order was still in force and not set aside by a competent Court, it
would not be possible to entertain an application under Section 127 Cr.P.C.
 The application was, therefore, dismissed on 31.7.2006.

5.    We notice, while  the  application  under  Section  127  Cr.P.C.  was
pending, respondent wife filed O.S. No. 10 of 2005 before the Family Court,
Gulbarga under Section 18 of the Act claiming maintenance at  the  rate  of
Rs.2,000/- per month.  The claim was resisted  by  the  petitioner  husband
contending that, in view of the compromise reached between the  parties  in
Misc. Case No. 234 of 1992 filed under Section 125 CrPC,  respondent  could
not claim any monthly maintenance and hence the suit filed under Section 18
of the Act was not  maintainable.   The  question  of  maintainability  was
raised as a preliminary issue.  The Family Court held by  its  order  dated
15.9.2009 that the  compromise  entered  into  between  the  parties  in  a
proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. would not be  bar  in  entertaining  a
suit under Section 18 of the Act.

6.    The suit was then finally heard on 30.9.2010  and  the  Family  Court
decreed the suit  holding  that  the  respondent  is  entitled  to  monthly
maintenance of Rs.2,000/- per month from the  defendant  husband  from  the
date of the filing of the suit.

7.    Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner took up the matter before the
High Court by filing an appeal, being M.F.A. No. 31979 of 2010,  which  was
dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated 28.3.2011, against  which
this SLP has been preferred.

8.     Shri  Raja  Venkatappa  Naik,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
petitioner, husband, submitted that suit filed under Section 18 of the  Act
is not maintainable, in view of the order  dated  3.9.1994,  accepting  the
consent terms and ordering a consolidated amount towards maintenance  under
Section 125 Cr.P.C.

9.    We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the  Family  Court
and confirmed by the High Court that the suit under Section 18 of  the  Act
is perfectly maintainable, in spite of the compromise reached  between  the
parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C. and accepted by the  Court  in  its
order dated 3.9.1994.

10.   Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a piece of social legislation  which  provides
for a summary and speedy relief by way of maintenance  to  a  wife  who  is
unable to maintain herself and her children.   Section 125 is not  intended
to provide for a full and final determination of the  status  and  personal
rights of parties, which is in the nature of a civil proceeding, though are
governed by the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the order made under  Section
125 Cr.P.C. is tentative and is  subject  to  final  determination  of  the
rights in a civil court.

11.   Section 25 of the Contract Act provides that any agreement  which  is
opposed to public policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law and  such  an
agreement is void, since the object is unlawful.  Proceeding under  Section
125 Cr.P.C. is summary in nature and intended to provide a speedy remedy to
the wife and any order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C.  by  compromise  or
otherwise cannot foreclose the remedy available to  a  wife  under  Section
18(2) of the Act.

12.   The above being the legal position, we find  no  error  in  the  view
taken by the Family Court, which has been affirmed by the High Court.   The
Petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine.



                                        …………………………………J.
                                        (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)






                                        …………………………………J.
                                        (DIPAK MISRA)


New Delhi,
March 15, 2013

Sunday, December 15, 2013

Rohini Court, Delhi - Kamini Lau Woman only can claim right on the property of her husband and NOT her Parents-in-laws' Property

Rohini Court, Delhi  - Kamini Lau - Woman only can claim right on the property of her husband and NOT on her Parents-in-laws' Property

IN THE COURT OF Dr. KAMINI LAU: ADDL. SESSIONS 

JUDGE­II (NORTH­WEST) : ROHINI COURTS: DELHI

CA No. 62/2013

Chetna Kapoor
W/o Dheeraj Kapoor
Permanent Resident of 253, 3rd  Floor
Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi. 
Presently at: 7/11, Tilak Nagar, Delhi.
................. Appellant

Versus

Suman Bala Kapur
W/o Subhash Chander Kapoor
R/o H. No. 253, 3rd  Floor
Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi. 
................. Respondent

6.11.2013

ORDER

Present: Sh. Vivek Aggarwal, Advocate with appellant. 

(1) This appeal under Section 29 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has been filed against the order of  Ld.  MM  dated   7.10.2013   dismissing   the   application   filed   on behalf of  the appellant   dated   25.6.2013   for   modification   / alteration   of   order   dated   4.6.2013 on the ground   that   the respondent has abused and misused the process of law by making false submissions which are contrary to the pleadings given by the respondent in her petition under Section 12 of DV Act, and obtained the order dated 4.6.2013.  It is pleaded that the Ld. Trial Court   has   totally   ignored   the  report of   the protection   officer holding  that   the appellant  had been  residing at   the above said premises with the respondent which fact was not disclosed by the respondent while obtaining the order dated 4.6.2013. It s further pleaded that the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of  Nitu Mittal Vs. Kanta Mittal & Ors., 152 (2008) DLT 691, was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case since the respondent has no absolute power to throw out the appellant from the share household accommodation and there is no justified and lawful grounds for the withdrawal of the benefits given to her.  It is alleged that by their acts, the respondent have taken away appellant's valuable right to lead her life with dignity, honour and reputation. It is pleaded that the order dated 7.10.2013 is contrary to the letter and spirit and intention of the legislature in Section 2 (s) which defines the share household accommodation and also to the provisions of Section 2 (f) which defines  the domestic relationship. It is submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to exercise its judicial power and discretion judiciously and totally ignored the material facts and the acts of the respondent is sheer misuse and abuse of process of law. It is also submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent in collusion and connivance of her son has dispossessed the appellant from the share household accommodation on 24.5.2013 and when she returned from the job she  saw  the  locks on  the  share household accommodation  i.e. house no. 253, 3rd Floor, Pitampura and hence the dishonest and fraudulent conduct on the part of the respondent totally disentitled her for claiming any release form the court and hence it is prayed that the impugned order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the Ld. Trial Court be set aside.

(2) After going through the impugned order and the grounds raised before me,  no notice has been  issued  to  the  respondent  as no requirement for the same was felt.

(3) At   the very outset  I  may observe  that I may observe  that   the Protection   from Domestic Violence Act,   2005  covers   those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household and are  related by consanguinity,  marriage or  a relationship in the nature  of  marriage, or adoption; in  addition relationship with family members living  together as a joint family are also included. “Domestic   violence” includes actual abuse or the threat  of abuse  that   is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic. One of the most important features of the Act is the woman’s   right   to   secure   housing. The Act provides for the woman’s right to reside in the matrimonial or shared household. This is an act meant to save a women from destitution. Under these circumstances the Courts of Law are under obligations to ensure that while dealing with the rights of the parties, the rights of daughter ­in­law are equitably balanced with the rights of other women which include the mother-­in-­law, as happened in the present case.

(4) It is not disputed that the property in question is owned by the respondent/ mother-­in-­law who is the owner in possession of the said property bearing No. 253, 3rd  Floor, Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi.   It has not been disputed that the respondent Suman Bala Kapur and her husband i.e. the parents­-in­laws of the appellant  are  the  registered and exclusive owners of  the above said property vide registered sale deed dated 16.6.2010 whereas her husband Dheeraj has no share in the same.

(5) The husband of the appellant i.e. Dr.Dheeraj Kapoor is working and residing separately at Chandigarh for the past several years. The matrimonial house of the appellant under the given circumstances is the place where her husband is working and residing and not where she herself chose to reside of her free will.

(6) It is also not disputed that the appellant Chetna Kapoor is herself a doctor in a Government hospital and is drawing House Rent Allowance. Hence, under the given circumstances the argument of the appellant that by her acts the respondent (mother­-in­-law) has allegedly taken away the constitutional rights of appellant to live with dignity, honour and reputation is devoid of merits.  The Right of a daughter in law does not over­ride the constitutional and statutory rights of her parents­-in-­law to enjoy their self acquired property in the manner they want.  If it is anybody from whom she is entitled to relief, it is her husband  Dr. Dheeraj Kapoor and her parents-­in-­law who are the senior citizens cannot be held liable for any kind of burdens. Here, I totally agree with the view taken by the Ld. MM which is in confirmation with the observations made in the case of Neetu Mittal Vs. Kanta Mittal  & Ors., wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:

“.........  where the house is self acquired house of  parents, son whether married or unmarried has no  legal right to live in that house or he can live in that  only at the mercy of parents upto the time  parents allow. Merely because parents have allowed him to live in house so long as his relations with the parents are cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden   throughout  the life. The  parents cannot be forced to keep a son or daughter  in law with them nor there is any statutory provision  which compels parents to suffer because of the acts of residence and his son or daughter in law. A woman has her rights of maintenance against her husband as sons/daughters. She can assert   her rights, if any, against the property of her husband  but she cannot thrust herself against the wishes of  parents of her husband nor can claim a right to live  in the house of parents of her husband, against their consult and wishes .......”

(7) The Hon'ble Apex Court while being confronted with a similar situation  in the case of  S.R. Batra Vs. Smt. Taruna Batra reported in  AIR 2007 SC 1118(1)  had an occasion to deal with the same wherein  it observed that there was no law in India similar to the law in UK i.e. British Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 and that the Rights available to a woman under any law can only be against the husband and not against the father-in-law and mother-in-law. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme court had also observed that the house in question belonged to the mother in law and therefore the daughter in law cannot claim any right to live in the said house. In the said case the Hon'ble Apex Court  was of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a shared household within the meaning of Section 2(s) of  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court was also of the view that the Definition  of 'Shared  Household' in Section 2 (s) was not happily worded and appeared to be a result of clumsy drafting and hence an interpretation which is sensible and does not lead to a chaos in the society as to be given.

(8) By application of the logic and ratio of the Hon'ble Apex Court to the facts of the present case, I hereby hold that the appellant Dr. Chetna Kapoor is only entitled to claim the Right of residence in a shared household  which shared household  as contemplated under Section 2 (s) of  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act would mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by her husband or the house which belong to the joint family of which the husband is a member. In the present case, the property in question i.e. 253, 3rd  Floor, Rajdhani Enclave, Pitampura, Delhi is the exclusive property of the respondent who is the mother-in-law of the appellant with the husband Dheeraj Kapoor having no share in the same and hence the property in question in respect of which the appellant is seeking Right of  Residence cannot   be called a shared household within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

(9) Assuming for a moment that the appellant was permitted by her parents-­in­-law to live in the house, it does not create any legal right the violation of which would be actionable rather on the contrary under no circumstances the parents can  be  made to suffer the burdens of their sons and their estranged daughter ­in­ laws. If it is anybody against whom or against whose property she can assert her rights, is the husband but under no circumstances can she thrust herself on the parents of her husband or can claim a right to live on their house against their consult and wishes.

(10) Lastly, keeping in view the problems and the disputes which have arisen between the parties and considering the background that the respondent is herself a working lady and in a position to maintain herself being doctor in Government Hospital, drawing House Rent Allowance, allowing her to reside in the premises of  her parents-­in-­law against their wishes will  only aggravate  the existing domestic problems and create numerous hassles for these senior citizens, which this court will not permit.  

(11) In view of my above discussion, I hereby hold that the impugned order dated  7.10.2013 passed by  Ld. Trial  Court  warrants no interference.The appeal is devoid of  merits and is hereby dismissed. Copy of   this order  be placed before  the Ld.  Trial Court. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room. 

Announced in the open Court        

(Dr. KAMINI LAU)
Dated: 6.11.2013    ASJ (NW)­II: ROHINI
Chetna Kapoor Vs. Suman Bala Kapur, (CA 62/13) Page 8 of 8

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Supreme Court - Live-in relationship neither a crime nor a sin, Amend law to protect women and children in live-in relationships

Supreme Court - Live-in relationship neither a crime nor a sin, Amend law to protect women and children in live-in relationships

Indra Sarma vs V.K.V.Sarma on 26 November, 2013
Author: ………………………….……J.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2009 OF 2013
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.4895 OF 2012)
Indra Sarma … Appellant
Versus
V.K.V. Sarma … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
Leave granted.
2. Live-in or marriage like relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country. The decision to marry or not to marry or to have a heterosexual relationship is intensely personal.
3. We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether a “live-in relationship” would amount to a “relationship in the nature of marriage” falling within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “the DV Act”) and the disruption of such a relationship by failure to maintain a women involved in such a relationship amounts to “domestic violence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.
FACTS:
4. Appellant and respondent were working together in a private company. The Respondent, who was working as a Personal Officer of the Company, was a married person having two children and the appellant, aged 33 years, was unmarried. Constant contacts between them developed intimacy and in the year 1992, appellant left the job from the above-mentioned Company and started living with the respondent in a shared household. Appellant’s family members, including her father, brother and sister, and also the wife of the respondent, opposed that live-in-relationship. She has also maintained the stand that the respondent, in fact, started a business in her name and that they were earning from that business. After some time, the respondent shifted the business to his residence and continued the business with the help of his son, thereby depriving her right of working and earning. Appellant has also stated that both of them lived together in a shared household and, due to their relationship, appellant became pregnant on three occasions, though all resulted in abortion. Respondent, it was alleged, used to force the appellant to take contraceptive methods to avoid pregnancy. Further, it was also stated that the respondent took a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the appellant stating that he would buy a land in her name, but the same was not done. Respondent also took money from the appellant to start a beauty parlour for his wife. Appellant also alleged that, during the year 2006, respondent took a loan of Rs.2,50,000/- from her and had not returned. Further, it was also stated that the respondent, all along, was harassing the appellant by not exposing her as his wife publicly, or permitting to suffix his name after the name of the appellant. Appellant also alleged that the respondent never used to take her anywhere, either to the houses of relatives or friends or functions. Appellant also alleged that the respondent never used to accompany her to the hospital or make joint Bank account, execute documents, etc. Respondent’s family constantly opposed their live-in relationship and ultimately forced him to leave the company of the appellant and it was alleged that he left the company of the appellant without maintaining her.
5. Appellant then preferred Criminal Misc. No. 692 of 2007 under Section 12 of the DV Act before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, seeking the following reliefs:
1) Pass a Protection Order under Section 18 of the DV Act prohibiting the respondent from committing any act of domestic violence against the appellant and her relatives, and further prohibiting the respondent from alienating the assets both moveable and immoveable properties owned by the respondent;
2) Pass a residence order under Section 19 of the DV Act and direct the respondent to provide for an independent residence as being provided by the respondent or in the alternative a joint residence along with the respondent where he is residing presently and for the maintenance of Rs.25,000/- per month regularly as being provided earlier or in the alternative to pay the permanent maintenance charges at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for the rest of the life;
3) Pass a monetary order under Section 20 of the DV Act directing the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards the operation, pre and post operative medication, tests etc and follow up treatments; 4) Pass a compensation order under Section 22 of the DV Act to a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- towards damages for misusing the funds of the sister of the appellant, mental torture and emotional feelings; and 5) Pass an ex-parte interim order under Section 23 of the DV Act directing the respondent to pay Rs.75,000/- towards the medical expenses and pay the maintenance charges @ Rs.25,000/- per month as being paid by the respondent earlier.
6. Respondent filed detailed objections to the application stating that it was on sympathetical grounds that he gave shelter to her in a separate house after noticing the fact that she was abandoned by her parents and relatives, especially after the demise of her father. She had also few litigations against her sister for her father’s property and she had approached the respondent for moral as well as monetary support since they were working together in a Company. The respondent has admitted that he had cohabited with the appellant since 1993. The fact that he was married and had two children was known to the appellant. Pregnancy of the appellant was terminated with her as well as her brother’s consent since she was not maintaining good health. The respondent had also spent large amounts for her medical treatment and the allegation that he had taken money from the appellant was denied. During the month of April, 2007, the respondent had sent a cheque for Rs.2,50,000/- towards her medical expenses, drawn in the name of her sister which was encashed. Further, it was stated, it was for getting further amounts and to tarnish the image of the respondent, the application was preferred under the DV Act. Before the learned Magistrate, appellant examined herself as P.W.1 and gave evidence according to the averments made in the petition. Respondent examined himself as R.W.1. Child Development Project Officer was examined as R.W.2. The learned Magistrate found proof that the parties had lived together for a considerable period of time, for about 18 years, and then the respondent left the company of the appellant without maintaining her. Learned Magistrate took the view that the plea of “domestic violence” had been established, due to the non-maintenance of the appellant and passed the order dated 21.7.2009 directing the respondent to pay an amount of Rs.18,000/- per month towards maintenance from the date of the petition.
7. Respondent, aggrieved by the said order of the learned Magistrate, filed an appeal before the Sessions Court under Section 29 of the DV Act. The Appellate Court, after having noticed that the respondent had admitted the relationship with appellant for over a period of 14 years, took the view that, due to their live-in relationship for a considerable long period, non-maintenance of the appellant would amount to domestic violence within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act. The appellate Court also concluded that the appellant has no source of income and that the respondent is legally obliged to maintain her and confirmed the order passed by the learned Magistrate.
8. The respondent took up the matter in appeal before the High Court. It was contended before the High Court that the appellant was aware of the fact that the respondent was a married person having two children, yet she developed a relationship, in spite of the opposition raised by the wife of the respondent and also by the appellant’s parents. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of this Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 and submitted that the tests laid down in Velusamy case (supra) had not been satisfied. The High Court held that the relationship between the parties would not fall within the ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the tests laid down in Velusamy case (supra) have not been satisfied. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Courts below. Aggrieved by the same, this appeal has been preferred.
9. Shri Anish Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the relationship between the parties continued from 1992 to 2006 and since then, the respondent started avoiding the appellant without maintaining her. Learned counsel submitted that the relationship between them constituted a “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which takes in every relationship by a man with a woman, sharing household, irrespective of the fact whether the respondent is a married person or not. Learned counsel also submitted that the tests laid down in Velusamy case (supra) have also been satisfied.
10. Ms. Jyotika Kalra, learned amicus curiae, took us elaborately through the provisions of the DV Act as well as the objects and reasons for enacting such a legislation. Learned amicus curiae submitted that the Act is intended to provide for protection of rights of women who are victims of violence of any type occurring in the family. Learned amicus curiae also submitted that the various provisions of the DV Act are intended to achieve the constitutional principles laid down in Article 15(3), reinforced vide Article 39 of the Constitution of India. Learned amicus curiae also made reference to the Malimath Committee report and submitted that a man who marries a second wife, during the subsistence of the first wife, should not escape his liability to maintain his second wife, even under Section 125 CrPC. Learned amicus curiae also referred to a recent judgment of this Court in Deoki Panjhiyara v. Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Another (2013) 2 SCC 137 in support of her contention.
11. Mr. Nikhil Majithia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, made extensive research on the subject and made available valuable materials. Learned counsel referred to several judgments of the Constitutional Courts of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc. and also referred to parallel legislations on the subject in other countries. Learned counsel submitted that the principle laid down in Velusamy case (supra) has been correctly applied by the High Court and, on facts, appellant could not establish that their relationship is a “relationship in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within Section 2(f) of the DV Act. Learned counsel also submitted that the parties were not qualified to enter into a legal marriage and the appellant knew that the respondent was a married person. Further, the appellant was not a victim of any fraudulent or bigamous marriage and it was a live-in relationship for mutual benefits, consequently, the High Court was right in holding that there has not been any domestic violence, within the scope of Section 3 of the DV Act entitling the appellant to claim maintenance.
12. We have to examine whether the non maintenance of the appellant in a broken live-in-relationship, which is stated to be a relationship not in the nature of a marriage, will amount to “domestic violence” within the definition of Section 3 of the DV Act, enabling the appellant to seek one or more reliefs provided under Section 12 of the DV Act.
13. Before examining the various issues raised in this appeal, which have far reaching consequences with regard to the rights and liabilities of parties indulging in live-in relationship, let us examine the relevant provisions of the DV Act and the impact of those provisions on such relationships.
D.V. ACT
14. The D.V. Act has been enacted to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence of domestic violence in the society. The DV Act has been enacted also to provide an effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.
15. “Domestic Violence” is undoubtedly a human rights issue, which was not properly taken care of in this country even though the Vienna Accord 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) had acknowledged that domestic violence was undoubtedly a human rights issue. UN Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in its general recommendations had also exhorted the member countries to take steps to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, a phenomenon widely prevalent in India. Presently, when a woman is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives, it is an offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. The Civil Law, it was noticed, did not address this phenomenon in its entirety. Consequently, the Parliament, to provide more effective protection of rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution under Articles 14, 15 and 21, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring in the family, enacted the DV Act.
16. Chapter IV is the heart and soul of the DV Act, which provides various reliefs to a woman who has or has been in domestic relationship with any adult male person and seeks one or more reliefs provided under the Act. The Magistrate, while entertaining an application from an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the DV Act, can grant the following reliefs: 1) Payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the adult male member, with a prayer for set off against the amount payable under a decree obtained in Court;
2) The Magistrate, under Section 18 of the DV Act, can pass a “protection order” in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from:
a) committing any act of domestic violence;
b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
3) The Magistrate, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, can pass a “residence order” under Section 19 of the DV Act, in the following manner:
“19. Residence orders.- (1) While disposing of an application under sub- section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order-
a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
(4) An aggrieved person, while filing an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, is also entitled, under Section 20 of the DV Act, to get “monetary reliefs” to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but is not limited to,-
“20. Monetary reliefs.- (1) While disposing of an application under sub- section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited to,-
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ) or any other law for the time being in force.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
The monetary reliefs granted under the above mentioned section shall be adequate, fair, reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which an aggrieved person is accustomed and the Magistrate has the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance.
(5) The Magistrate, under Section 21 of the DV Act, has the power to grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent.
(6) The Magistrate, in addition to other reliefs, under Section 22 of the DV Act, can pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent.
17. Section 26 of the DV Act provides that any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. Further, any relief referred to above may be sought for in addition to and along with any other reliefs that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. Further, if any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.
18. Section 3 of the DV Act deals with “domestic violence” and reads as under:
“3. Definition of domestic violence.- For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it-
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I.- For the purposes of this section,-
(i)  "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes-
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) "economic abuse" includes-
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II.- For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes" domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.”
19. In order to examine as to whether there has been any act, omission, or commission or conduct so as to constitute domestic violence, it is necessary to examine some of the definition clauses under Section 2 of the DV Act. Section 2(a) of the DV Act defines the expression “aggrieved person” as follows:
“2(a). “Aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.”
Section 2(f) defines the expression “domestic relationship” as follows: “2(f). “Domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.”
Section 2(q) defines the expression “respondent” as follows: “2(q). “Respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.”
Section 2(s) defines the expression “shared household” and reads as follows:
“2(s). “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.”
20. We are, in this case, concerned with a “live-in relationship” which, according to the aggrieved person, is a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and it is that relationship which has been disrupted in the sense that the respondent failed to maintain the aggrieved person, which, according to the appellant, amounts to “domestic violence”. The respondent maintained the stand that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent was not a relationship in the nature of marriage but a live-in-relationship simplicitor and the alleged act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent would not constitute “domestic violence” so as to claim any protection orders under Section 18, 19 or 20 of the DV Act.
21. We have to first examine whether the appellant was involved in a domestic relationship with the respondent. Section 2(f) refers to five categories of relationship, such as, related by consanguinity, marriage, relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, family members living together as a joint family, of which we are, in this case, concerned with an alleged relationship in the nature of marriage.
22. Before we examine whether the respondent has committed any act of domestic violence, we have to first examine whether the relationship between them was a “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the definition of Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the DV Act. Before examining the term “relationship in the nature of marriage”, we have to first examine what is “marriage”, as understood in law.
MARRIAGE AND MARITAL RELATIONSHIP:
23. Marriage is often described as one of the basic civil rights of man/woman, which is voluntarily undertaken by the parties in public in a formal way, and once concluded, recognizes the parties as husband and wife. Three elements of common law marriage are (1) agreement to be married (2) living together as husband and wife, (3) holding out to the public that they are married. Sharing a common household and duty to live together form part of the ‘Consortium Omnis Vitae” which obliges spouses to live together, afford each other reasonable marital privileges and rights and be honest and faithful to each other. One of the most important invariable consequences of marriage is the reciprocal support and the responsibility of maintenance of the common household, jointly and severally. Marriage as an institution has great legal significance and various obligations and duties flow out of marital relationship, as per law, in the matter of inheritance of property, successionship, etc. Marriage, therefore, involves legal requirements of formality, publicity, exclusivity and all the legal consequences flow out of that relationship.
24. Marriages in India take place either following the personal Law of the Religion to which a party is belonged or following the provisions of the Special Marriage Act. Marriage, as per the Common Law, constitutes a contract between a man and a woman, in which the parties undertake to live together and support each other. Marriage, as a concept, is also nationally and internationally recognized. O’Regan, J., in Dawood and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) noted as follows:
“Marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance. Entering into and sustaining a marriage is a matter of intense private significance to the parties to that marriage for they make a promise to one another to establish and maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be faithful to one another. Such relationships are of profound significance to the individuals concerned. But such relationships have more than personal significance at least in part because human beings are social beings whose humanity is expressed through their relationships with others. Entering into marriage therefore is to enter into a relationship that has public significance as well.
The institutions of marriage and the family are important social institutions that provide for the security, support and companionship of members of our society and bear an important role in the rearing of children. The celebration of a marriage gives rise to moral and legal obligations, particularly the reciprocal duty of support placed upon spouses and their joint responsibility for supporting and raising children born of the marriage. These legal obligations perform an important social function. This importance is symbolically acknowledged in part by the fact that marriage is celebrated generally in a public ceremony, often before family and close friends....”
25. South African Constitutional Court in various judgments recognized the above mentioned principle. In Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC), Du Toit and Another v. Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC), the Constitutional Court of South Africa recognized the right “free to marry and to raise family”. Section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Constitution of South Africa, in substance makes provision for the recognition of “marriages concluded under the tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law.” Section 9(3) of the Constitution of South Africa reads as follows: “The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”
26. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) provides that:
“1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.”
27. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 provides that:
“1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at it dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”
28. Parties in the present case are Hindus by religion and are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The expression “marriage”, as stated, is not defined under the Hindu Marriage Act, but the “conditions for a Hindu marriage” are dealt with in Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act and which reads as under:
“5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage - A marriage may be solemnized between any two hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:-
(i)  neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party-
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity; (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty- one years and the bride the age of eighteen years at the time of the marriage; (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
(v)  the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two.”
29. Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the “Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage” and reads as follows:
“7. Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage. -
(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the saptapadi (that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.”
30. Entering into a marriage, therefore, either through the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act or any other Personal Law, applicable to the parties, is entering into a relationship of “public significance”, since marriage being a social institution, many rights and liabilities flow out of that legal relationship. The concept of marriage as a “civil right” has been recognised by various courts all over the world, for example, Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 US 535 (1942), Perez v. Lippold 198 P.2d 17, 20.1 (1948), Loving v. Virginia 388 US 1 (1967).
31. We have referred to, in extenso, about the concept of “marriage and marital relationship” to indicate that the law has distinguished between married and unmarried people, which cannot be said to be unfair when we look at the rights and obligations which flow out of the legally wedded marriage. A married couple has to discharge legally various rights and obligations, unlike the case of persons having live-in relationship or, marriage-like relationship or defacto relationship.
32. Married couples who choose to marry are fully cognizant of the legal obligation which arises by the operation of law on solemnization of the marriage and the rights and duties they owe to their children and the family as a whole, unlike the case of persons entering into live-in relationship. This Court in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) 2 SCALE 198 held that marital relationship means the legally protected marital interest of one spouse to another which include marital obligation to another like companionship, living under the same roof, sexual relation and the exclusive enjoyment of them, to have children, their up-bringing, services in the home, support, affection, love, liking and so on.
RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE:
33. Modern Indian society through the DV Act recognizes in reality, various other forms of familial relations, shedding the idea that such relationship can only be through some acceptable modes hitherto understood. Section 2(f), as already indicated, deals with a relationship between two persons (of the opposite sex) who live or have lived together in a shared household when they are related by:
a) Consanguinity
b) Marriage
c) Through a relationship in the nature of marriage
d) Adoption
e) Family members living together as joint family.
34. The definition clause mentions only five categories of relationships which exhausts itself since the expression “means”, has been used. When a definition clause is defined to “mean” such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive. Section 2(f) has not used the expression “include” so as to make the definition exhaustive. It is in that context we have to examine the meaning of the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”.
35. We have already dealt with what is “marriage”, “marital relationship” and “marital obligations”. Let us now examine the meaning and scope of the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” which falls within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act. Our concern in this case is of the third enumerated category that is “relationship in the nature of marriage” which means a relationship which has some inherent or essential characteristics of a marriage though not a marriage legally recognized, and, hence, a comparison of both will have to be resorted, to determine whether the relationship in a given case constitutes the characteristics of a regular marriage.
36. Distinction between the relationship in the nature of marriage and marital relationship has to be noted first. Relationship of marriage continues, notwithstanding the fact that there are differences of opinions, marital unrest etc., even if they are not sharing a shared household, being based on law. But live-in-relationship is purely an arrangement between the parties unlike, a legal marriage. Once a party to a live-in- relationship determines that he/she does not wish to live in such a relationship, that relationship comes to an end. Further, in a relationship in the nature of marriage, the party asserting the existence of the relationship, at any stage or at any point of time, must positively prove the existence of the identifying characteristics of that relationship, since the legislature has used the expression “in the nature of”.
37. Reference to certain situations, in which the relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or would not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage, would be apposite. Following are some of the categories of cases which are only illustrative:
a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived together in a shared household, will fall under the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence, the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and the aggrieved person can always seek reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act.
b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult women knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.
c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Situations may also arise where an adult married woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with an unmarried adult male, the question is whether such a relationship would fall within the expression relationship “in the nature of marriage”. d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male: An unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and such a relationship may be a relationship in the “nature of marriage”, so far as the aggrieved person is concerned. e) Domestic relationship between same sex partners (Gay and Lesbians): DV Act does not recognize such a relationship and that relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marriage under the Act. Legislatures in some countries, like the Interpretation Act, 1984 (Western Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999 (New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (South Africa), the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, 2004 (U.K.), have recognized the relationship between the same sex couples and have brought these relationships into the definition of Domestic relationship.
38. Section 2(f) of the DV Act though uses the expression “two persons”, the expression “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) takes in only “woman”, hence, the Act does not recognize the relationship of same sex (gay or lesbian) and, hence, any act, omission, commission or conduct of any of the parties, would not lead to domestic violence, entitling any relief under the DV Act.
39. We should, therefore, while determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence”, have a common sense/balanced approach, after weighing up the various factors which exist in a particular relationship and then reach a conclusion as to whether a particular relationship is a relationship in the “nature of marriage”. Many a times, it is the common intention of the parties to that relationship as to what their relationship is to be, and to involve and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, that primarily governs that relationship. Intention may be expressed or implied and what is relevant is their intention as to matters that are characteristic of a marriage. The expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”, of course, cannot be construed in the abstract, we must take it in the context in which it appears and apply the same bearing in mind the purpose and object of the Act as well as the meaning of the expression “in the nature of marriage”. Plight of a vulnerable section of women in that relationship needs attention. Many a times, the women are taken advantage of and essential contribution of women in a joint household through labour and emotional support have been lost sight of especially by the women who fall in the categories mentioned in (a) and (d) supra. Women, who fall under categories (b) and (c), stand on a different footing, which we will deal with later. In the present case, the appellant falls under category (b), referred to in paragraph 37(b) of the Judgment.
40. We have, therefore, come across various permutations and combinations, in such relationships, and to test whether a particular relationship would fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”, certain guiding principles have to be evolved since the expression has not been defined in the Act.
41. Section 2(f) of the DV Act defines “domestic relationship” to mean, inter alia, a relationship between two persons who live or have lived together at such point of time in a shared household, through a relationship in the nature of marriage. The expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” is also described as defacto relationship, marriage – like relationship, cohabitation, couple relationship, meretricious relationship (now known as committed intimate relationship) etc.
42. Courts and legislatures of various countries now began to think that denying certain benefits to a certain class of persons on the basis of their marital status is unjust where the need of those benefits is felt by both unmarried and married cohabitants. Courts in various countries have extended certain benefits to heterosexual unmarried cohabitants. Legislatures too, of late, through legislations started giving benefits to heterosexual cohabitants.
43. In U.K. through the Civil Partnership Act, 2004, the rights of even the same-sex couple have been recognized. Family Law Act, 1996, through the Chapter IV, titled ‘Family Homes and Domestic Violence’, cohabitants can seek reliefs if there is domestic violence. Canada has also enacted the Domestic Violence Intervention Act, 2001. In USA, the violence against woman is a crime with far-reaching consequences under the Violence Against Women Act, 1994.
44. The Interpretation Act, 1984 (Australia) has laid down certain indicators to determine the meaning of “de facto relationship”, which are as follows:
“13A . De facto relationship and de facto partner, references to
(1) A reference in a written law to a de facto relationship shall be construed as a reference to a relationship (other than a legal marriage) between 2 persons who live together in a marriage-like relationship.
(2) The following factors are indicators of whether or not a de facto relationship exists between 2 persons, but are not essential —
(a) the length of the relationship between them;
(b)   whether the 2 persons have resided together;
(c)   the nature and extent of common residence;
(d)   whether there is, or has been, a sexual relationship between them;
(e) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them; (f)  the ownership, use and acquisition of their property (including property they own individually);
(g) the degree of mutual commitment by them to a shared life;
(h)  whether they care for and support children;
(i)  the reputation, and public aspects, of the relationship between them.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
45. The Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act, 2012 (Queensland) has defined the expression “couple relationship” to mean as follows”: “18. Meaning of couple relationship
1) xxx xxx xxx
2) In deciding whether a couple relationship exists, a court may have regard to the following –
a) the circumstances of the relationship between the persons, including, for example–
(i) the degree of trust between the persons; and
(ii) the level of each person’s dependence on, and commitment to, the other person;
b) the length of time for which the relationship has existed or did exist;
c) the frequency of contact between the persons;
d) the degree of intimacy between the persons.
3) Without limiting sub-section (2), the court may consider the following factors in deciding whether a couple relationship exists-
a) Whether the trust, dependence or commitment is or was of the same level;
b) Whether one of the persons is or was financially dependent on the other;
c) Whether the persons jointly own or owned any property; d) Whether the persons have or had joint bank accounts; e) Whether the relationship involves or involved a relationship of a sexual nature;
f) Whether the relationship is or was exclusive.
4) A couple relationship may exist even if the court makes a negative finding in relation to any or all of the factors mentioned in subsection (3).
5) A couple relationship may exist between two persons whether the persons are of the same or a different gender.
6) A couple relationship does not exist merely because two persons date or dated each other on a number of occasions.”
46. The Property (Relationships) Act, 1984 of North South Wales, Australia also provides for some guidelines with regard to the meaning and content of the expression “de facto relationship”, which reads as follows:
1 “4 De facto relationships
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a de facto relationship is a relationship between two adult persons:
(a) who live together as a couple, and
(b) who are not married to one another or related by family. (2) In determining whether two persons are in a de facto relationship, all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including such of the following matters as may be relevant in a particular case:
(a) the duration of the relationship,
(b) the nature and extent of common residence,
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists,
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between the parties,
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property, (f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life, (g) the care and support of children,
(h) the performance of household duties,
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. (3) No finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2) (a)-(i), or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the existence of a de facto relationship, and a court determining whether such a relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
(4) Except as provided by section 6, a reference in this Act to a party to a de facto relationship includes a reference to a person who, whether before or after the commencement of this subsection, was a party to such a relationship.”
47. “In Re Marriage of Lindsay, 101 Wn.2d 299 (1984), Litham v. Hennessey 87 Wn.2d 550 (1976), Pennington 93 Wash.App. at 917, the Courts in United States took the view that the relevant factors establishing a meretricious relationship include continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, and the pooling of resources and services for joint projects. The Courts also ruled that a relationship need not be “long term” to be characterized as meretricious relationship. While a long term relationship is not a threshold requirement, duration is a significant factor. Further, the Court also noticed that a short term relationship may be characterized as a meretricious, but a number of other important factors must be present.
48. In Stack v. Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432, Baroness Hale of Richmond said: “Cohabitation comes in many different shapes and sizes. People embarking on their first serious relationship more commonly cohabit than marry. Many of these relationships may be quite short-lived and childless. But most people these days cohabit before marriage….. So many couples are cohabiting with a view to marriage at some later date – as long ago as 1998 the British Household Panel Survey found that 75% of current cohabitants expected to marry, although only a third had firm plans: John Ermisch, Personal Relationships and Marriage Expectations (2000) Working Papers of the Institute of Social and Economic Research: Paper 2000-27. Cohabitation is much more likely to end in separation than is marriage, and cohabitations which end in separation tend to last for a shorter time than marriages which end in divorce. But increasing numbers of couples cohabit for long periods without marrying and their reasons for doing so vary from conscious rejection of marriage as a legal institution to regarding themselves ‘as good as married’ anyway: Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 179, Part 2, para 2.45.”
49. In MW v. The Department of Community Services [2008] HCA 12, Gleeson, CJ, made the following observations:
“Finn J was correct to stress the difference between living together and living together ‘as a couple in a relationship in the nature of marriage or civil union’. The relationship between two people who live together, even though it is a sexual relationship, may, or may not, be a relationship in the nature of marriage or civil union. One consequence of relationships of the former kind becoming commonplace is that it may now be more difficult, rather than easier, to infer that they have the nature of marriage or civil union, at least where the care and upbringing of children are not involved.”
50. In Lynam v. The Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128, the Court considered whether a man and a woman living together ‘as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis’ and Fitzgerald, J. said: “Each element of a relationship draws its colour and its significance from the other elements, some of which may point in one direction and some in the other. What must be looked at is the composite picture. Any attempt to isolate individual factors and to attribute to them relative degrees of materiality or importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error. The endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities means that there will be an almost infinite variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. In any particular case, it will be a question of fact and degree, a jury question, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the statutory test.”
51. Tipping, J. in Thompson v. Department of Social Welfare (1994) 2 SZLR 369 (HC), listed few characteristics which are relevant to determine relationship in the nature of marriage as follows:
“(1) Whether and how frequently the parties live in the same house. (2) Whether the parties have a sexual relationship. (3) Whether the parties give each other emotional support and companionship.
(4) Whether the parties socialize together or attend activities together as a couple.
(5) Whether and to what extent the parties share the responsibility for bringing up and supporting any relevant children. (6) Whether the parties share household and other domestic tasks. (7) Whether the parties share costs and other financial responsibilities by the pooling of resources or otherwise. (8) Whether the parties run a common household, even if one or other partner is absent for periods of time.
(9) Whether the parties go on holiday together.
(10) Whether the parties conduct themselves towards, and are treated by friends, relations and others as if they were a married couple.”
52. Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 2006 SC 2522] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations.
53. Section 125 Cr.P.C., of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnization of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, through, the DV Act, the Parliament has recognized a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simplicitor.
54. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship, in other words, all facets of the interpersonal relationship need to be taken into account. We cannot isolate individual factors, because there may be endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities and a variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. Invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
55. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationships.
1) Duration of period of relationship
Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared household
The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further elaboration.
(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor.
(4) Domestic Arrangements
Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual Relationship
Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc. (6) Children
Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialization in Public
Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
(8) Intention and conduct of the parties
Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.
STATUS OF THE APPELLANT
56. Appellant, admittedly, entered into a live-in-relationship with the respondent knowing that he was married person, with wife and two children, hence, the generic proposition laid down by the Privy Council in Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. Wiketunge Liyanapatabendage Balshamy, AIR 1927 PC 185, that where a man and a woman are proved to have lived together as husband and wife, the law presumes that they are living together in consequence of a valid marriage will not apply and, hence, the relationship between the appellant and the respondent was not a relationship in the nature of a marriage, and the status of the appellant was that of a concubine. A concubine cannot maintain a relationship in the nature of marriage because such a relationship will not have exclusivity and will not be monogamous in character. Reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Badri Prasad v. Director of Consolidation 1978 (3) SCC 527 and Tulsa v. Durghatiya2008 (4) SCC 520. In Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari AIR 1952 SC 231 this Court held that the continuous cohabitation of man and woman as husband and wife may raise the presumption of marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabition is a rebuttable one and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them. Polygamy, that is a relationship or practice of having more than one wife or husband at the same time, or a relationship by way of a bigamous marriage that is marrying someone while already married to another and/or maintaining an adulterous relationship that is having voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person who is not one’s husband or wife, cannot be said to be a relationship in the nature of marriage.
57. We may note, in the instant case, there is no necessity to rebut the presumption, since the appellant was aware that the respondent was a married person even before the commencement of their relationship, hence the status of the appellant is that of a concubine or a mistress, who cannot enter into relationship in the nature of a marriage. Long standing relationship as a concubine, though not a relationship in the nature of a marriage, of course, may at times, deserves protection because that woman might not be financially independent, but we are afraid that DV Act does not take care of such relationships which may perhaps call for an amendment of the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which is restrictive and exhaustive.
58. Velusamy case (supra) stated that instances are many where married person maintain and support such types of women, either for sexual pleasure or sometimes for emotional support. Woman, a party to that relationship does suffer social disadvantages and prejudices, and historically, such a person has been regarded as less worthy than the married woman. Concubine suffers social ostracism through the denial of status and benefits, who cannot, of course, enter into a relationship in the nature of marriage.
59. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that inequities do exist in such relationships and on breaking down such relationship, the woman invariably is the sufferer. Law of Constructive Trust developed as a means of recognizing the contributions, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, perhaps comes to their aid in such situations, which may remain as a recourse for such a woman who find herself unfairly disadvantaged. Unfortunately, there is no express statutory provision to regulate such types of live-in relationships upon termination or disruption since those relationships are not in the nature of marriage. We can also come across situations where the parties entering into live-in-relationship and due to their joint efforts or otherwise acquiring properties, rearing children, etc. and disputes may also arise when one of the parties dies intestate.
60. American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Vol. 24 (2008) speaks of Rights and Remedies of property accumulated by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under void marriage, which reads as under: “Although the courts have recognized the property rights of persons cohabiting without benefit of marriage, these rights are not based on the equitable distribution provisions of the marriage and divorce laws because the judicial recognition of mutual property rights between unmarried cohabitants would violate the policy of the state to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage, as demonstrated by its abolition of common-law marriage.”
61. Such relationship, it may be noted, may endure for a long time and can result pattern of dependency and vulnerability, and increasing number of such relationships, calls for adequate and effective protection, especially to the woman and children born out of that live-in-relationship. Legislature, of course, cannot promote pre-marital sex, though, at times, such relationships are intensively personal and people may express their opinion, for and against. See S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another (2010) 5 SCC 600.
62. Parliament has to ponder over these issues, bring in proper legislation or make a proper amendment of the Act, so that women and the children, born out of such kinds of relationships be protected, though those types of relationship might not be a relationship in the nature of a marriage.
63. We may now consider whether the tests, we have laid down, have been satisfied in the instant case. We have found that the appellant was not ignorant of the fact that the respondent was a married person with wife and two children, hence, was party to an adulterous and bigamous relationship. Admittedly, the relationship between the appellant and respondent was opposed by the wife of the respondent, so also by the parents of the appellant and her brother and sister and they knew that they could not have entered into a legal marriage or maintained a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties never entertained any intention to rear children and on three occasions the pregnancy was terminated. Having children is a strong circumstance to indicate a relationship in the nature of marriage. No evidence has been adduced to show that the parties gave each other mutual support and companionship. No material has been produced to show that the parties have ever projected or conducted themselves as husband and wife and treated by friends, relatives and others, as if they are a married couple. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the appellant that the respondent had never held out to the public that she was his wife. No evidence of socialization in public has been produced. There is nothing to show that there was pooling of resources or financial arrangements between them. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the appellant that the respondent had never opened any joint account or executed any document in the joint name. Further, it was also submitted that the respondent never permitted to suffix his name after the name of the appellant. No evidence is forthcoming, in this case, to show that the respondent had caused any harm or injuries or endangered the health, safely, life, limb or well- being, or caused any physical or sexual abuse on the appellant, except that he did not maintain her or continued with the relationship.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTION
64. Appellant had entered into this relationship knowing well that the respondent was a married person and encouraged bigamous relationship. By entering into such a relationship, the appellant has committed an intentional tort, i.e. interference in the marital relationship with intentionally alienating respondent from his family, i.e. his wife and children. If the case set up by the appellant is accepted, we have to conclude that there has been an attempt on the part of the appellant to alienate respondent from his family, resulting in loss of marital relationship, companionship, assistance, loss of consortium etc., so far as the legally wedded wife and children of the respondent are concerned, who resisted the relationship from the very inception. Marriage and family are social institutions of vital importance. Alienation of affection, in that context, is an intentional tort, as held by this Court in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal case (supra), which gives a cause of action to the wife and children of the respondent to sue the appellant for alienating the husband/father from the company of his wife/children, knowing fully well they are legally wedded wife/children of the respondent..
65. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant, having been fully aware of the fact that the respondent was a married person, could not have entered into a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage. All live-in- relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage. Appellant’s and the respondent’s relationship is, therefore, not a “relationship in the nature of marriage” because it has no inherent or essential characteristic of a marriage, but a relationship other than “in the nature of marriage” and the appellant’s status is lower than the status of a wife and that relationship would not fall within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. If we hold that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is a relationship in the nature of a marriage, we will be doing an injustice to the legally wedded wife and children who opposed that relationship. Consequently, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent in connection with that type of relationship, would not amount to “domestic violence” under Section 3 of the DV Act.
66. We have, on facts, found that the appellant’s status was that of a mistress, who is in distress, a survivor of a live-in relationship which is of serious concern, especially when such persons are poor and illiterate, in the event of which vulnerability is more pronounced, which is a societal reality. Children born out of such relationship also suffer most which calls for bringing in remedial measures by the Parliament, through proper legislation.
67. We are conscious of the fact that if any direction is given to the respondent to pay maintenance or monetary consideration to the appellant, that would be at the cost of the legally wedded wife and children of the respondent, especially when they had opposed that relationship and have a cause of action against the appellant for alienating the companionship and affection of the husband/parent which is an intentional tort.
68. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
………………………….……J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
………………………………J.
(Pinaki Chandra Ghose)
New Delhi
November 26, 2013

SOURCE - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/192421140/

Saturday, February 23, 2013

SC allows couples to settle marital cruelty cases - admits 498a misuse and falase cases filed by wife, but still orders husband to pay 15 Lak alimony ! A reward to unscrupulous judicial abuser wife ?

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1794 OF 2013
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4782 of 2007)


K. SRINIVAS RAO                   …          APPELLANT

           Versus

D.A. DEEPA                        …          RESPONDENT


                                  JUDGMENT


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1.    Leave granted.


2.     This appeal, by special leave,  has  been  filed  by  the  appellant-
husband, being aggrieved by the judgment and order  dated  8/11/2006  passed
by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil  Miscellaneous  Appeal  No.797/03,
setting aside the decree of divorce granted in his favour.
3.    The appellant-husband is working as Assistant Registrar in the  Andhra
Pradesh High Court. The  marriage  between  the  appellant-husband  and  the
respondent-wife was solemnized on 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and  customs.
Unfortunately, on the very next day disputes arose  between  the  elders  on
both sides which resulted in their abusing each other and  hurling  chappals
at each other. As a consequence, on 27/4/1999, the newly married couple  got
separated  without  consummation  of  the  marriage   and   started   living
separately.  On 4/10/1999, the respondent-wife lodged a  criminal  complaint
against the appellant-husband before  the  Women  Protection  Cell  alleging
inter alia that the appellant-husband is harassing her for more dowry.  This
complaint is very crucial to this case.  We  shall  advert  to  it  more  in
detail a little later.  Escalated acrimony led  to  complaints  and  counter
complaints. The respondent-wife filed a petition  under  Section  9  of  the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights  before  the
Family Court, Secunderabad.  The  appellant-husband  filed  a  counter-claim
seeking dissolution of marriage on  the  ground  of  cruelty  and  desertion
under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

4.    The Family Court while dismissing  the  petition  for  restitution  of
conjugal rights and granting decree of divorce  inter  alia  held  that  the
respondent-wife stayed in the appellant-husband’s house only for a day,  she
admitted that she did not have any conversation with anyone  and  hence  any
amount of oral evidence adduced by her will not support her  plea  that  she
was harassed and driven out of the house; that the story that the appellant-
husband made a demand of dowry of Rs.10,00,000/- is false;  that  by  filing
false complaint against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  family,  alleging
offence under Section 498-A  of  the  IPC  in  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate
Court, Hyderabad and by filing complaints against the  appellant-husband  in
the High Court where  he  is  working,  the  respondent-wife  caused  mental
cruelty to the appellant-husband and that reunion  was  not  possible.   The
Family Court directed the appellant-husband to repay  Rs.80,000/-  given  by
the respondent-wife’s father to him with interest at 8% per annum  from  the
date of the marriage till payment.

5.    By the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the appeal carried  by
the respondent-wife against the said judgment and set aside  the  decree  of
divorce granted in favour of the appellant-husband.  The  High  Court  inter
alia observed that the finding of the Family Court that lodging a  complaint
with  the  police  against  the  appellant-husband  amounts  to  cruelty  is
perverse because it is not a ground for divorce  under  the  Hindu  Marriage
Act, 1955.  The High Court further held that the appellant-husband  and  the
respondent-wife did not live together for a long time  and,  therefore,  the
question  of  their  treating  each  other  with  cruelty  does  not  arise.
According to the High Court, the conclusion that the respondent-wife  caused
mental cruelty  to  the  appellant-husband  is  based  on  presumptions  and
assumptions.

6.    Mr. Jayanth  Muth  Raj,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-husband
assailed  the  conduct  of  the  respondent-wife  and  submitted   that   it
disentitles her from getting any relief from this Court.   Counsel  took  us
through the complaint lodged by the respondent-wife with the  Superintendent
of Police, Women Protection Cell, Hyderabad, making  defamatory  allegations
against the mother of the appellant-husband and drew our  attention  to  the
various legal proceedings initiated by  her  against  the  appellant-husband
and his family.  Counsel submitted that she also lodged complaints with  the
High Court asking for the removal of the  appellant-husband  from  his  job.
Counsel submitted that by lodging such false complaints the  respondent-wife
caused extreme mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.   Counsel  submitted
that the High Court fell into a grave error in observing  that  because  the
respondent-wife did not live with the appellant-husband for long  she  could
not have  caused  mental  cruelty  to  him.   Counsel  submitted  that  this
observation is erroneous and is contrary  to  the  law  laid  down  by  this
Court.  False and defamatory allegations made  in  the  pleadings  can  also
cause  mental  cruelty.    Counsel   submitted   that   the   marriage   has
irretrievably broken down and, therefore, it is necessary to dissolve it  by
a decree of divorce.  In support of his submissions counsel placed  reliance
on G.V.N. Kameswara Rao  vs.  G.  Jabilli[1],  Parveen  Mehta  vs.  Inderjit
Mehta[2],  Vijayakumar  R.  Bhate  vs.  Neela  Vijayakumar  Bhate[3],  Durga
Prasanna  Tripathy  vs.  Arundhati  Tripathy[4],  Naveen  Kohli  vs.   Neelu
Kohli[5] and Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh[6].

7.    Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel  for  the  respondent-wife,
on the other hand, submitted that the  father  of  the  respondent-wife  had
given Rs.80,000/- and 15 tolas of gold as dowry to  the  appellant-husband’s
family.  However, they demanded additional cash of Rs.10,00,000/-.   Because
this demand could not  be  met,  the  respondent-wife  and  her  family  was
humiliated and ill-treated. Therefore, the parents  of  the  respondent-wife
had to return to their house along  with  her  immediately  after  marriage.
The father of the respondent-wife made efforts to  talk  to  the  appellant-
husband’s family, but, they did not respond to his efforts.  They  persisted
with their demands and, therefore, the respondent-wife  had  no  alternative
but to lodge complaint against them under Section 498-A of  the  IPC  before
the Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.   The  appellant-husband  thereafter
gave a false assurance that he will  not  harass  her  and,  therefore,  she
withdrew the complaint and went to  the  matrimonial  house.   However,  the
approach of the appellant-husband and his family did not change. She had  to
therefore renew her complaint.  Counsel submitted that only because  of  the
obstinate and uncompromising  attitude  of  the  appellant-husband  and  his
family that the respondent-wife had to take recourse to  court  proceedings.
Counsel submitted that the respondent-wife values the matrimonial tie.   She
wants to lead a happy married life with  the  appellant-husband.   She  had,
therefore, filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which  should
have been allowed  by  the  Family  Court.   Counsel  submitted  that  after
properly evaluating all the circumstances the High  Court  has  rightly  set
aside the decree of divorce and granted a decree of restitution of  conjugal
rights.  The High Court’s judgment, therefore, merits no interference.

8.    The matrimonial dispute started with a quarrel between the  elders  of
both sides in which initially the appellant-husband and the  respondent-wife
were not involved.  The  ego  battle  of  the  elders  took  an  ugly  turn.
Parties  were  dragged  to  the  court  and  the  inevitable  happened.  The
relations between the two families got strained. With a fond  hope  that  we
could bring about a settlement we requested  the  counsel  to  talk  to  the
parties and convey our wishes that they should bury the  hatchet  and  start
living  together.  We  also  tried  to  counsel  them  in  the  court.   The
respondent-wife appears to be very keen to go back to the  matrimonial  home
and start life afresh, but the appellant-husband is  adamant.   He  conveyed
to us through his counsel that by filing repeated false  complaints  against
him and his family the respondent-wife has caused extreme  cruelty  to  them
and therefore it will not be possible to take her back.  In view of this  we
have no option but to proceed with the case.

9.    The High Court has taken a view that since the  appellant-husband  and
the respondent-wife did not stay together, there is  no  question  of  their
causing  cruelty  to  each  other.   The  High  Court  concluded  that   the
conclusion drawn by the Family Court that the respondent-wife caused  mental
cruelty to the appellant-husband is erroneous.  We are unable to agree  with
the High Court.

10.   Under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,  a  marriage
can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on a petition  presented  either  by
the husband or the wife on the  ground  that  the  other  party  has,  after
solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with  cruelty.   In  a
series of judgments  this  Court  has  repeatedly  stated  the  meaning  and
outlined the scope of the term ‘cruelty’.   Cruelty  is  evident  where  one
spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her  or
him as to cause in her or his mind reasonable apprehension that it  will  be
harmful or injurious  to  live  with  the  other  spouse.   Cruelty  may  be
physical or mental.

11.   In Samar Ghosh this Court set out illustrative cases  where  inference
of ‘mental cruelty’ can be drawn.  This list  is  obviously  not  exhaustive
because each case presents it’s own peculiar factual  matrix  and  existence
or otherwise of mental cruelty will have to be judged  after  applying  mind
to it.  We must quote the  relevant  paragraph  of  Samar  Ghosh.   We  have
reproduced only the instances which are relevant to the present case.


      “101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance,  yet  we
      deem it appropriate to enumerate some  instances  of  human  behaviour
      which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of  “mental  cruelty”.
      The  instances  indicated  in  the  succeeding  paragraphs  are   only
      illustrative and not exhaustive:


      (i) On consideration of complete  matrimonial  life  of  the  parties,
      acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible  for
      the parties to live with  each  other  could  come  within  the  broad
      parameters of mental cruelty.


      (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of  the
      parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such  that  the
      wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with  such  conduct
      and continue to live with other party.


      (iii)                  xxx   xxx  xxx


      (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of  deep  anguish,
      disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused  by  the  conduct  of
      other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.


      (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated
      to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.


      (vi) Sustained unjustifiable  conduct  and  behaviour  of  one  spouse
      actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The
      treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension  must
      be very grave, substantial and weighty.


      (vii)                  xxx   xxx  xxx


      (viii)                 xxx   xxx  xxx


      (ix)             xxx   xxx   xxx


      (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few  isolated
      instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty.  The  ill
      conduct must be persistent for a  fairly  lengthy  period,  where  the
      relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because  of  the  acts
      and behaviour of a  spouse,  the  wronged  party  finds  it  extremely
      difficult to live with the other  party  any  longer,  may  amount  to
      mental cruelty.


      (xi)             xxx   xxx   xxx


      (xii)                  xxx   xxx  xxx


      (xiii)                 xxx   xxx  xxx


      (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation,  it
      may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond  is  beyond  repair.
      The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by  a  legal  tie.  By
      refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve  the
      sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard  for  the
      feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it  may
      lead to mental cruelty.”


      It is pertinent to note that in this case the  husband  and  wife  had
lived separately for more than sixteen and a  half  years.   This  fact  was
taken  into  consideration  along  with  other  facts  as  leading  to   the
conclusion that matrimonial bond had been ruptured beyond repair because  of
the mental cruelty caused by the wife.  Similar view  was  taken  in  Naveen
Kohli.

12.   In V. Bhagat  v.  D. Bhagat[7]  in the divorce petition filed  by  the
husband the wife filed  written  statement  stating  that  the  husband  was
suffering from mental hallucination, that his was a morbid  mind  for  which
he needs expert  psychiatric  treatment  and  that  he  was  suffering  from
‘paranoid  disorder’.   In  cross-examination  her   counsel   put   several
questions to the husband suggesting  that  several  members  of  his  family
including his  grandfather  were  lunatics.   This  court  held  that  these
assertions cannot but constitute mental cruelty of such a  nature  that  the
husband cannot be asked to live with the wife  thereafter.   Such  pleadings
and questions it was held, are  bound  to  cause  immense  mental  pain  and
anguish to the husband.   In  Vijaykumar  Bhate  disgusting  accusations  of
unchastity and indecent familiarity  with  a  neighbour  were  made  in  the
written statement.  This  Court  held  that  the  allegations  are  of  such
quality, magnitude and consequence  as  to  cause  mental  pain,  agony  and
suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of  cruelty  in  matrimonial
law causing profound and lasting disruption and driving  the  wife  to  feel
deeply hurt and reasonably apprehend that it  would  be  dangerous  to  live
with her husband.  In Naveen Kohli the respondent-wife got an  advertisement
issued in a national newspaper that her husband was her employee.   She  got
another news  item  issued  cautioning  his  business  associates  to  avoid
dealing with him.  This  was  treated  as  causing  mental  cruelty  to  the
husband.

13.   In Naveen Kohli the  wife  had  filed  several  complaints  and  cases
against the husband.  This Court viewed her conduct  as  a  conduct  causing
mental cruelty and observed that the finding of the High  Court  that  these
proceedings could not be taken to be such which  may  warrant  annulment  of
marriage is wholly unsustainable.

14.   Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted  in  Samar
Ghosh, we could add  a  few  more.   Making  unfounded  indecent  defamatory
allegations against the spouse or his or her  relatives  in  the  pleadings,
filing of complaints or  issuing  notices  or  news  items  which  may  have
adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the spouse and  filing
repeated false complaints and cases in the court against the  spouse  would,
in the facts of a case, amount  to  causing  mental  cruelty  to  the  other
spouse.

15.   We shall apply the above principles to the present case.  Firstly,  it
is necessary to have a look at  the  legal  proceedings  initiated  by  both
sides against each other.  The facts  on  record  disclose  that  after  the
marriage, due to some dispute which arose between  the  elders,  both  sides
abused and virtually attacked each other.  The respondent-wife was taken  by
her parents to their house.  According to the  respondent-wife,  her  father
made efforts to bring about an amicable settlement but the  other  side  did
not respond favourably and, therefore, on 4/10/1999 she lodged  a  complaint
with the  Superintendent  of  Police,  Women  Protection  Cell  against  the
appellant-husband  and  members  of  his  family.    In  our  opinion,  this
complaint is, to a large extent, responsible for widening the  rift  between
the  parties.   In  this  complaint,  after   alleging   ill-treatment   and
harassment for dowry, it is alleged that  mother  of  the  appellant-husband
asked the respondent-wife  to  sleep  with  the  father  of  the  appellant-
husband. When she was cross-examined in the Family Court during the  hearing
of her petition for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights  the  respondent-wife
admitted that she had lodged the complaint. PW-2 her mother, in  her  cross-
examination stated  that  though  they  had  asked  her  not  to  lodge  the
complaint, the respondent-wife lodged  it.   She  told  them  that  she  had
lodged the complaint because the  appellant-husband  was  not  listening  to
her.  Thus, it appears that this complaint was  lodged  out  of  frustration
and anger and was a reaction to  the  appellant-husband’s  refusal  to  live
with her.  It was, perhaps, felt by her that  because  of  the  pressure  of
such a complaint the appellant-husband would take her  back  to  his  house.
Far from helping the respondent-wife, the complaint appears to  have  caused
irreparable harm  to  her.   It  increased  the  bitterness.   Perhaps,  the
respondent-wife was misguided by someone.  But,  such  evidence  is  not  on
record.  Even in this court, this complaint appears to  us  to  be  a  major
factor amongst others impeding settlement.  Pursuant to the said  complaint,
Crime No.8/2000 was registered by C.I.D.,  Hyderabad,  in  the  Metropolitan
Magistrate (Mahila Court), Hyderabad against the appellant-husband  and  his
family under Section 498-A of the IPC.  It  is  the  respondent-wife’s  case
that the appellant-husband gave an assurance before the police that he  will
not harass her.  She, therefore, withdrew the complaint.   The  police  then
filed a closure report.  According to the  respondent-wife,  the  appellant-
husband did not abide by the promise made by him and, therefore,  she  filed
a protest petition.  The Magistrate Court, Hyderabad, then, took  cognizance
of the case and renumbered the case as C.C.No.62/2002.

16.   In the meantime,  the  respondent-wife  filed  O.P.No.88/2001  in  the
Family  Court,  Secunderabad,  for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights.   The
appellant-husband filed a counter claim  for  divorce  on  27/12/2002.   The
Family Court dismissed the petition for restitution of conjugal  rights  and
allowed the counter claim for divorce filed by the  appellant-husband.   The
respondent-wife challenged the Family Court judgment in the High Court.   On
8/12/2006 the High Court reversed the Family Court’s order and  allowed  the
petition for restitution of conjugal rights.  The present  appeal  is  filed
by the appellant-husband against the said judgment.


17.   According to the respondent-wife, on 17/9/2007 when  she,  along  with
her mother, came out of the court after a case  filed  by  her  against  the
appellant-husband was adjourned, the appellant-husband beat her  mother  and
kicked  her  on  her  stomach.   Both  of  them  received  injuries.    She,
therefore, filed complaint for the offence punishable under Section  324  of
the IPC against the appellant-husband (C.C.No. 79/2009).  It may  be  stated
here that on 19/10/2009 the appellant-husband was acquitted in this case.


18.    On  24/6/2008  the  judgment  was  delivered  by   Additional   Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate,  Hyderabad  in  C.C.No.  62/2002.   The  appellant-
husband was convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and  was  sentenced  to
undergo six months simple imprisonment.  He and his parents  were  acquitted
of  the  offences  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act.   His  parents  were
acquitted of the offence  under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC.   After  this
judgment the respondent-wife and her parents filed a complaint in  the  High
Court saying that since the appellant-husband was  convicted  he  should  be
dismissed from service.  Similar letters were sent to the High Court by  the
maternal uncle of the respondent-wife.

19.   On 14/7/2008 the appellant-husband filed Criminal  Appeal  No.186/2008
challenging his conviction  under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  before  the
Metropolitan Sessions Judge.  It is pertinent to note that  the  respondent-
wife filed Criminal Appeal No.1219/2008 in the High  Court  questioning  the
acquittal of the appellant-husband and his parents  of  the  offences  under
the Dowry Prohibition Act and also the  acquittal  of  his  parents  of  the
offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC.  This appeal  is  pending
in the High Court.  Not being content with this, the  respondent-wife  filed
Criminal Revision Case No.1560/2008 in the High  Court  seeking  enhancement
of punishment awarded to the appellant-husband  for  offence  under  Section
498-A of the IPC.

20.   According to the appellant-husband on 6/12/2009  the  brother  of  the
respondent-wife came to their house and attacked  his  mother.   His  mother
filed a complaint and the police registered a complaint  under  Section  354
of the IPC.  The brother of the respondent-wife also lodged a complaint  and
an offence came to be registered.  Both the cases are pending.


21.   On 29/6/2010 Criminal Appeal No.  186/2010  filed  by  the  appellant-
husband challenging his conviction for the offence under  Section  498-A  of
the  IPC  was  allowed  by  the  Metropolitan  Sessions  Judge  and  he  was
acquitted.  The respondent-wife has filed criminal appeal in the High  Court
challenging the said acquittal which is pending.

22.   We need to now see the effect of the above events.   In  our  opinion,
the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the scurrilous,  vulgar  and
defamatory statement made by the  respondent-wife  in  her  complaint  dated
4/10/1999 addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection  Cell.
 The statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked her  to  sleep
with his  father  is  bound  to  anger  him.   It  is  his  case  that  this
humiliation of his parents caused great anguish to him.  He and  his  family
were traumatized by the false and indecent statement made in the  complaint.
 His grievance appears to us to be justified. This complaint is  a  part  of
the record.  It is a part of the pleadings.  That this  statement  is  false
is evident from the evidence of the mother of the respondent-wife, which  we
have already quoted.  This statement cannot be  explained  away  by  stating
that it was made because the respondent-wife was anxious to go back  to  the
appellant-husband.  This is not the way to win  the  husband  back.   It  is
well settled that such statements cause mental  cruelty.   By  sending  this
complaint the respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty  to  the  appellant-
husband.

23.     Pursuant to this complaint,  the  police  registered  a  case  under
Section 498-A of the IPC.  The appellant-husband  and  his  parents  had  to
apply for  anticipatory  bail,  which  was  granted  to  them.   Later,  the
respondent-wife withdrew the complaint.  Pursuant  to  the  withdrawal,  the
police filed a closure report.   Thereafter,  the  respondent-wife  filed  a
protest petition.  The trial court took cognizance of the case  against  the
appellant-husband and his parents (CC No. 62/2002).  What  is  pertinent  to
note is that the respondent-wife filed criminal appeal  in  the  High  Court
challenging the acquittal of the appellant-husband and his  parents  of  the
offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act  and  also  the  acquittal  of  his
parents of the offence punishable under Section  498-A  of  the  IPC.    She
filed criminal revision seeking enhancement of  the  punishment  awarded  to
the appellant-husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC in  the
High Court which is still pending.  When the criminal appeal  filed  by  the
appellant-husband challenging his conviction for the offence  under  Section
498-A of the IPC was allowed  and  he  was  acquitted,  the  respondent-wife
filed criminal appeal in the High  Court  challenging  the  said  acquittal.
During this period respondent-wife and  members  of  her  family  have  also
filed complaints in the High Court complaining about  the  appellant-husband
so that he would be removed from the job.  The conduct  of  the  respondent-
wife in  filing  a  complaint  making  unfounded,  indecent  and  defamatory
allegation  against  her   mother-in-law,   in   filing   revision   seeking
enhancement of the sentence awarded  to  the  appellant-husband,  in  filing
appeal questioning the acquittal of the appellant-husband and  acquittal  of
his parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that he  and  his
parents are put in jail and he is removed from his job.  We have  no  manner
of doubt that this conduct has  caused  mental  cruelty  to  the  appellant-
husband.

24.   In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  wrongly  held  that  because  the
appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did not stay together there is  no
question of the parties causing cruelty to  each  other.   Staying  together
under the same roof is not a pre-condition for mental cruelty.   Spouse  can
cause mental cruelty by his or her conduct even  while  he  or  she  is  not
staying under the same roof.  In a given case, while staying away, a  spouse
can cause  mental  cruelty  to  the  other  spouse  by  sending  vulgar  and
defamatory letters or  notices  or  filing  complaints  containing  indecent
allegations or by initiating  number  of  judicial  proceedings  making  the
other spouse’s life miserable.  This is what has happened in this case.

25.   It is also to be noted that the appellant-husband and the  respondent-
wife are staying apart from 27/4/1999.  Thus,  they  are  living  separately
for more than ten  years.   This  separation  has  created  an  unbridgeable
distance between the two.  As held in Samar Ghosh, if  we  refuse  to  sever
the tie, it may lead to mental cruelty.

26.   We are also satisfied that  this  marriage  has  irretrievably  broken
down.       Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for  divorce
under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  But, where marriage  is  beyond  repair
on account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or the  wife  or
of both, the courts have always taken irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage
as a very weighty circumstance amongst  others  necessitating  severance  of
marital tie.  A marriage which is dead for all purposes  cannot  be  revived
by the court’s verdict, if the parties are  not  willing.  This  is  because
marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and  if  they  are  dried-up
there is hardly any chance of their springing back to  life  on  account  of
artificial reunion created by the court’s decree.

27.   In V. Bhagat this Court noted that divorce petition  was  pending  for
eight years and a good part of the  lives  of  both  the  parties  had  been
consumed in litigation, yet the end was not in sight.  The facts  were  such
that there was no question of reunion,  the  marriage  having  irretrievably
broken down.  While dissolving the marriage on the ground of mental  cruelty
this Court observed that  irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  is  not  a
ground by  itself,  but,  while  scrutinizing  the  evidence  on  record  to
determine whether the grounds alleged are made out and  in  determining  the
relief to be granted the said circumstance can certainly be borne  in  mind.
In Naveen Kohli, where husband and wife had been living separately for  more
than 10 years and a large number of criminal proceedings had been  initiated
by the wife against the husband, this Court observed that the  marriage  had
been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and public interest and interest  of
all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct  de
jure what is already defunct de facto.  It is  important  to  note  that  in
this case this Court made a recommendation to the Union of  India  that  the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be amended to incorporate  irretrievable  breakdown
of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce.

28.   In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-wife has  caused
by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellant-husband and the marriage  has
irretrievably broken down.  Dissolution of marriage will relieve both  sides
of pain and anguish.  In this Court the respondent-wife expressed  that  she
wants to go back to the appellant-husband, but, that is  not  possible  now.
The appellant-husband is not willing to take her back.  Even  if  we  refuse
decree of divorce to the appellant-husband, there are hardly any chances  of
the respondent-wife leading a happy life with the appellant-husband  because
a lot of bitterness is created by the conduct of the respondent-wife.


29.   In Vijay Kumar, it was submitted that if the decree of divorce is  set
aside, there may be fresh  avenues  and  scope  for  reconciliation  between
parties.   This  court  observed  that  judged  in  the  background  of  all
surrounding circumstances, the claim appeared to  be  too  desolate,  merely
born out of despair rather than based upon any  real,  concrete  or  genuine
purpose or aim.  In the facts of this case we feel the same.

30.   While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce  must  be  granted,
we are alive to the plight of the  respondent-wife.   The  appellant-husband
is working as an Assistant Registrar in the Andhra Pradesh High  Court.   He
is getting a good salary.  The respondent-wife  fought  the  litigation  for
more than 10 years.  She appears to be entirely  dependent  on  her  parents
and on her brother, therefore, her future must be secured by  directing  the
appellant-husband  to  give  her  permanent  alimony.   In  the  facts   and
circumstance of this case, we are of the opinion that the  appellant-husband
should be directed to pay a sum  of  Rs.15,00,000/-  (Rupees  Fifteen  Lakhs
only) to the respondent-wife as and by way of  permanent  alimony.   In  the
result, the impugned judgment  is  quashed  and  set  aside.   The  marriage
between the appellant-husband - K. Srinivas Rao and  the  respondent-wife  -
D.A. Deepa is dissolved by  a  decree  of  divorce.   The  appellant-husband
shall  pay  to  the  respondent-wife  permanent  alimony  in  the   sum   of
Rs.15,00,000/-, in three instalments.  The first instalment of Rs.5,00,000/-
 (Rupees Five Lakhs only) should be paid on  15/03/2013  and  the  remaining
amount  of  Rs.10,00,000/-  (Rupees  Ten  Lakhs  only)  should  be  paid  in
instalments of Rs.5,00,000/-  each  after  a  gap  of  two  months  i.e.  on
15/05/2013 and 15/07/2013 respectively.  Each  instalment  of  Rs.5,00,000/-
be paid by a demand draft drawn  in  favour  of  the  respondent-wife  “D.A.
Deepa”.

31.   Before parting, we wish to touch upon  an  issue  which  needs  to  be
discussed in the interest of victims of  matrimonial  disputes.   Though  in
this case, we have recorded a finding that by her conduct,  the  respondent-
wife has caused mental cruelty to  the  appellant-husband,  we  may  not  be
understood, however, to  have  said  that  the  fault  lies  only  with  the
respondent-wife.   In matrimonial disputes there is hardly  any  case  where
one spouse is entirely at fault.  But,  then,  before  the  dispute  assumes
alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see  reason.
 In this case, if at the earliest stage, before  the  respondent-wife  filed
the complaint making indecent  allegation  against  her  mother-in-law,  she
were to be counselled by  an  independent  and  sensible  elder  or  if  the
parties were sent to a mediation centre or if they  had  access  to  a  pre-
litigation clinic, perhaps the bitterness would not have escalated.   Things
would not have come to such  a  pass  if,  at  the  earliest,  somebody  had
mediated between the two.  It  is  possible  that  the  respondent-wife  was
desperate to save the marriage.  Perhaps, in desperation, she  lost  balance
and went on filing complaints.  It  is  possible  that  she  was  misguided.
Perhaps, the appellant-husband should  have  forgiven  her  indiscretion  in
filing complaints in the larger interest of matrimony.   But,  the  way  the
respondent-wife approached the problem was wrong.  It portrays a  vindictive
mind.  She caused extreme mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.  Now  the
marriage is beyond repair.

32.   Quite often, the  cause  of  the  misunderstanding  in  a  matrimonial
dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as a method  of  alternative
dispute resolution has got legal recognition now.  We have referred  several
matrimonial disputes to mediation centres.  Our experience shows that  about
10 to 15% of matrimonial disputes get settled in this Court through  various
mediation centres.  We, therefore, feel that  at  the  earliest  stage  i.e.
when the dispute is taken up by the Family Court or by the  court  of  first
instance  for  hearing,  it  must  be   referred   to   mediation   centres.
Matrimonial disputes  particularly  those  relating  to  custody  of  child,
maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit  for  mediation.  Section  9  of  the
Family Courts Act enjoins upon the Family Court to make  efforts  to  settle
the matrimonial disputes and in these efforts, Family  Courts  are  assisted
by Counsellors.  Even if the Counsellors fail in their efforts,  the  Family
Courts should  direct  the  parties  to  mediation  centres,  where  trained
mediators are appointed to mediate between the parties.   Being  trained  in
the skill of mediation, they produce good results.

33.   The idea of  pre-litigation  mediation  is  also  catching  up.   Some
mediation centres have, after giving wide publicity, set up “Help Desks”  at
prominent places  including  facilitation  centres  at  court  complexes  to
conduct pre-litigation mediation.  We are informed that in Delhi  Government
Mediation and Conciliation  Centres,  and  in  Delhi  High  Court  Mediation
Centre, several matrimonial disputes are  settled.   These  centres  have  a
good success rate in pre-litigation mediation.   If  all  mediation  centres
set up pre-litigation  desks/clinics  by  giving  sufficient  publicity  and
matrimonial disputes  are  taken  up  for  pre-litigation  settlement,  many
families will be saved of hardship if, at least, some of them  are  settled.


34.   While purely a civil matrimonial dispute can be amicably settled by  a
Family Court either by itself or by directing the  parties  to  explore  the
possibility of settlement through mediation, a complaint under Section  498-
A  of  the  IPC  presents  difficulty  because  the  said  offence  is   not
compoundable except in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  where  by  a  State
amendment, it has been made compoundable.  Though in  Ramgopal  &  Anr.   v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.[8], this Court requested the  Law  Commission
and the Government of India to  examine  whether  offence  punishable  under
Section 498-A of the IPC could be made compoundable, it has  not  been  made
compoundable as yet.   The  courts  direct  parties  to  approach  mediation
centres where offences are compoundable.  Offence punishable  under  Section
498-A being a non-compoundable offence, such a course  is  not  followed  in
respect thereof.  This Court has always  adopted  a  positive  approach  and
encouraged  settlement  of  matrimonial  disputes  and   discouraged   their
escalation.  In this connection, we must refer  to  the  relevant  paragraph
from G.V. Rao  v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors.[9], where the complaint  appeared  to
be the result of matrimonial dispute, while refusing to interfere  with  the
High Court’s order quashing the complaint, this court  made  very  pertinent
observations, which read thus:

      “12. There has been an outburst  of  matrimonial  disputes  in  recent
      times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is  to
      enable the young couple to settle down in life  and  live  peacefully.
      But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt  which  often  assume
      serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which
      elders of the family are also involved with the result that those  who
      could have counselled and brought  about  rapprochement  are  rendered
      helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There
      are many other reasons which  need  not  be  mentioned  here  for  not
      encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over
      their  defaults  and  terminate  their  disputes  amicably  by  mutual
      agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it  takes
      years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their
      “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.”



      In B.S. Joshi & Ors.  v.  State of Haryana & Anr.[10], after referring
to the above observations, this Court stated that the said observations  are
required to be kept  in  view  by  courts  while  dealing  with  matrimonial
disputes and held that complaint involving offence under  Section  498-A  of
the IPC can be quashed by the High Court in exercise  of  its  powers  under
Section 482 of the Code if the parties settle their dispute.   Even in  Gian
Singh  v.  State of Punjab & Anr.[11], this  Court  expressed  that  certain
offences which overwhelmingly and  predominantly  bear  civil  flavour  like
those arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or  the
family dispute and where  the  offender  and  the  victim  had  settled  all
disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such  offences
have not been made compoundable, the  High  Court  may  quash  the  criminal
proceedings if it feels that by not quashing the same, the ends  of  justice
shall be defeated.

35.   We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under Section  498-
A of the IPC is not compoundable, in appropriate cases if  the  parties  are
willing and if it appears to the criminal court that  there  exist  elements
of settlement, it should direct the parties to explore  the  possibility  of
settlement through  mediation.   This  is,  obviously,  not  to  dilute  the
rigour, efficacy and purport of Section 498-A of  the  IPC,  but  to  locate
cases where the matrimonial dispute can be nipped in  bud  in  an  equitable
manner.  The judges, with their expertise, must ensure  that  this  exercise
does not lead to the erring spouse using mediation process  to  get  out  of
clutches of the law. During mediation, the  parties  can  either  decide  to
part company on mutually agreed terms or they may decide  to  patch  up  and
stay together.  In either case for  the  settlement  to  come  through,  the
complaint will have to be quashed.  In that event,  they  can  approach  the
High Court and get the complaint quashed.  If  however  they  chose  not  to
settle, they can proceed with the complaint.  In this exercise, there is  no
loss to anyone. If there is settlement, the parties will be saved  from  the
trials and tribulations of a criminal case and that will reduce  the  burden
on the courts which will be in the larger public interest.   Obviously,  the
High  Court  will  quash  the  complaint  only  if  after  considering   all
circumstances it finds the settlement to be equitable and genuine.   Such  a
course, in our opinion, will be beneficial to those who  genuinely  want  to
accord a quietus to their matrimonial disputes.  We would, however, like  to
clarify that reduction of burden of cases on the courts  will,  however,  be
merely an incidental benefit and not the reason for sending the parties  for
mediation.  We recognize ‘mediation’ as an effective method  of  alternative
dispute resolution in matrimonial matters and that  is  the  reason  why  we
want the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through  mediation
in matrimonial disputes.

36.   We, therefore, issue directions, which the  courts  dealing  with  the
matrimonial matters shall follow:

     a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the  Family  Courts
        shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial  disputes  through
        mediation.  Even if the Counsellors submit a  failure  report,  the
        Family Courts shall, with the consent of  the  parties,  refer  the
        matter to the mediation centre.   In  such  a  case,  however,  the
        Family Courts shall set  a  reasonable  time  limit  for  mediation
        centres to complete the process of mediation because otherwise  the
        resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed.  In
        a given case, if there is good chance  of  settlement,  the  Family
        Court in its discretion, can always extend the time limit.


     b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section  498-A
        of the IPC should, at any stage and particularly, before they  take
        up the complaint for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre
        if they feel that there exist elements of settlement and  both  the
        parties are willing.  However, they should take care to see that in
        this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the
        IPC is not diluted.  Needless to say that the discretion  to  grant
        or not to grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this direction.
        It will be for the concerned  court  to  work  out  the  modalities
        taking into consideration the facts of each case.

     c) All mediation centres shall set  up  pre-litigation  desks/clinics;
        give them wide publicity and make  efforts  to  settle  matrimonial
        disputes at pre-litigation stage.

37.   The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.


                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                                       (AFTAB ALAM)


                                                       ……………………………………………..J.
                                              (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 22, 2013.
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[1]    (2002) 2 SCC 296
[2]    (2002) 5 SCC 706
[3]    (2003) 6 SCC 334
[4]    (2005) 7 SCC 353
[5]    (2006) 4 SCC 558
[6]    (2007) 4 SCC 511
[7]    (1994) 1 SCC 337
[8]    (2010) 13 SCC 540
[9]    (2000) 3 SCC 693
[10]   AIR 2003 SC 1386
[11]   (2012) 10 SCC 303

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